Akhand Bharat

SENSING AN AD HOC APPROACH TO THEATRE COMMAND REFORMS

“In the absence of a National Security Strategy vision document, the impending Theatre Command reforms suspiciously look like an adhoc consensus achieved in the Chiefs Of Staff Committee (COSC) on equitable distribution of spoils of higher posts between the three protagonists Armed Services.” – Col RS Sidhu

 

Backdrop

Emerging news reports indicate the Indian apex military hierarchy reaching a broad consensus on forwarding a draft on Theatre Command reforms to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) by the end of April/May 2026, coinciding with the end of extended tenure of the current Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

The draft document is reportedly recommending three Theatre Commands by integrating the Tri-service resources. A Lucknow based Northern Theatre Command headed by Army, a Western Theatre Command at Jaipur headed by Air Force, and a Thiruvanthapuram Maritime Theatre Command under the Navy.

At the beginning of the 1960s decade, the Indian Army had three operational commands, while the Navy and the Air Force had one operational command each. At the face of it, the proposed restructuring appears reverting to the early 1960s Command structure of the Indian military, albeit with an additional hierarchical layer.

There is, therefore, an imperative need to broad scan the evolution of the existing higher defence architecture, to logically deduce its futuristic design.   

Impending Theatre Command Reforms

In bureaucratic lore the camel is the product of a committee entrusted to design a horse! It may, therefore, not be farfetched to assume that the adhoc consensus reportedly achieved in COSC on Theatre Command reforms may likely produce another Camel dressed as a horse.

With the exotic directed energy weapon platforms entering service, the transforming battlefields will expose the future national and military leadership to uncharted ‘energies and systemic challenges’, necessitating visionary leadership, adept at ‘reasoning the unknown’.

Under the circumstances, traditional models and concepts can no longer be relied to offer viable way forward for institutionalising higher defence architecture reforms that can seamlessly marshal technological resources to defeat the integrated threats on future battlefields.

Adhoc Restructuring of Command Headquarters

In the initial decade and a half post-independence, the Indian Army had functioned with three operational Army Commands. Western Command headquartered at New Delhi/Shimla, Headquarters Southern Command at Pune, and Eastern Command Headquarters located at Ranchi/Lucknow. It added Headquarters Central Command at Lucknow in 1963, Headquarters Northern Command at Udhampur in 1972, Headquarters Army Training Command at Shimla in 1991, and Headquarters Southwestern Command at Jaipur in 2005.

The Indian Navy had a unitary command structure from 1947 to 1968, when it was bifurcated into two commands, the Western Naval Command Headquarters at Bombay, and the Eastern Naval Command Headquarters at Visakhapatnam.  

The IAF initially functioned with two non-operational Commands, the Training Command (1949) and a Maintenance Command (1955), and one Operational Group upgraded to Eastern Air Command in 1959, at Calcutta. In 1963, post the India-China war of 1962, the IAF underwent major restructuring, with the raising of Western Air Command at New Delhi, Central Air Command at Calcutta, and relocating the Eastern Air Command to Shillong, Assam. The IAF raised two new Air Commands, South Western Air Command at Jodhpur in 1980, and the Southern Air Command at Thiruvanthapuram in 1984.

The creation of two integrated Tri-services Commands, the Andaman and Nicobar Command in 2001, and the Strategic Forces Command in 2005 directly under the Nuclear Command Authority, and the appointment of the CDS and Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in 2020 completed the existing higher defence architecture.

Thus, we have the Indian armed forces restructuring their Command structure twelve times in a time span of six decades. Interestingly, in this sequence of restructuring, the overwhelmingly numerically superior Indian Army continuously playing catch up with the Indian Air Force. This is the clearest indicator to ad hoc restructuring being the norm.

Even the creation of the post of CDS showcases an adhoc approach, with vital command & control anomalies, necessitating issue of clarifying amendments by the Government. Making the CDS as first amongst equals was also a disjointed solution, best evidenced by the delayed Theatre Command reforms.

Viewpoint On Three Theatre Command Restructuring

Four criticalities are perceived in the proposed three Theatre Commands restructuring.

A single Maritime Theatre Command is likely to fall short in overseeing its responsibilities. The security of the vast 2.37 million square kilometers Exclusive Economic Zone, further complicated by heavy maritime traffic, is cumbersome even during peacetime. The maritime trade routes in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and adjoining seas maritime zone, on the western seaboard, are vital for India’s maritime and energy trade, necessitating building up naval resources for implementing a strategy of sea control in the open waters of the Indian Ocean. To counter the threat from the People’s Liberation Army Navy of China in the maritime waters of IOR, the Indian Navy needs to implement strategy of sea denial in the close and shallow waters towards the eastern seaboard of China, necessitating naval assets with lower draft. All parameters combined dictate two Maritime Theatre Commands.

The 4,000 kms length of the various sections of the difficult and active borders with China, the primary adversary, needs the full focus of the proposed Northern Theatre Command. Its attention should not be diverted to threats emerging on its eastern flank towards Myanmar, or to its rear towards Bangladesh. There is thus a need for an Eastern Theatre Command alongside the Northen Theatre Command.

The void in mainland security is a major vulnerability. AI empowered Drones, autonomous weapon systems, and surveillance technologies point towards a conjoined command structure between the MoD and the MoH for defence and security of the mainland during peace and war. A Hinterland Theatre Command, also tasked with holding strategic reserves, is the need of the hour. Coupled with it, an Integrated Air Defence Command is required to counter the full spectrum of aerial threats, command & control of all air defence resources, control over civil air space, as well as control over UAVs employed in commercial enterprise. In addition, an Integrated Cyberspace Command is necessitated for safeguarding the vital banking, commerce, transportation, energy, governance, and defence cyber infrastructure against threats emanating in the cyberspace spectrum.

Another critical void is an Aerospace Theatre Command tasked to safeguard from space based threats, and secure extraterrestrial space assets.

Void of National Security Strategy Vision

Even nearly eight decades post–independence, India lacks a National Security Strategy vision document. It is this visionary void which is the root cause of undertaking the approach of incremental rather than comprehensive reforms in the vital defence architecture, resulting in frequent restructuring of the Indian military command structure.

This void, in conjunction with consensus building approach towards higher defence architecture reforms, will come at the heavy cost of frequent future restructuring. This shall deny the country critical stability in safeguarding of its national interests in these times of geopolitical upheavals.

Imperatives for Long Term Restructuring

Restructuring sans a long term national security strategy vision document is somewhat akin to running on the spot; enormous resources, time, and energy are spent without any forward momentum. As things stand presently, all defence infrastructure reforms flow from the base requirement of ensuring safety and territorial integrity of the land, air, and maritime sovereign space of the country. The current defence architecture has stood the test of multiple wars and has successfully overcome full spectrum of internal and external threats. It has enabled the armed forces to successfully accomplish its deemed role of ensuring territorial integrity of the country. Introducing Theatre Commands to continue to perform its deemed role, only adds merely another hierarchical layer.

But an increasingly aspirational India cannot confine itself to its current boundaries and near abroad. Its fast paced expanding economy, increasing working diaspora abroad, its international trade volume, and need for critical natural resources from across the globe, dictate an ever increasing sphere of military influence and reach beyond its near abroad.

This has to be defined in a long term national security strategy vision document, which will rightfully empower the restructuring of the armed forces to safeguard the expanding national interests. This obviates frequent restructuring, which may result in temporary imbalance at critical junctures. The proposed Theatre Commands fail to meet even the immediate needs of an aspirational India.

Visioning Theatre Commands for an Akhand Bharat

This is where the political executive needs to step in, by visualising the way forward for achieving the goal of an Akhand Bharat. Once the national security strategy for achieving an Akhand Bharat is articulated and documented, it opens the way for creating a future ready viable long term defence architecture…

Spatial Theatre Commands

Northern Theatre Command, to address China centric threats.

Western Theatre Command, to expand reach towards Central and West Asia.

Eastern Theatre Command, with expanded reach into Southeast Asia.

Homeland Theatre Command, safeguarding mainland from full spectrum of internal and external futuristic threats.

Eastern Maritime Theatre Command, with expanded reach for sea denial towards the eastern seaboard of China.

Indian Ocean Theatre Command, with expanded reach for sea control in the IOR and adjoining seas.

Aerospace Theatre Command, to safeguard from space based threats, and secure extraterrestrial space assets.

Integrated Commands

Integrated Cyberspace Command

Integrated Air Defence Command

Integrated Strategic Force Command

Integrated Special Forces Command

Integrated Logistics & Training Command

A Dialogue

Acquisition, equipping, and man-machine integration of major weapon platforms for the armed forces requires lead time of generally two decades. A long term vision is, hence, an imperative.

The COSC, the apex military decision making body before going to the government, is a collegium of equals where consensus rules the roost. In a competition for scarce financial resources, quite often key decisions are held hostage to achieving consensus. Hence, an ad hoc approach to decisions with long term implications, coupled with turf protection, have emerged as the two biggest banes of the Indian armed forces. Evident reluctance of the government to document a National Security Strategy vision further compounds the issue.

All combined, have made the national defence apparatus comfortable with an adhoc approach, resulting in a singular lack of vision. This will be the biggest stumbling block to create a higher defence architecture which can withstand the demands of the 21^st century without undertaking frequent reforms.

Visionary leadership is the need of the hour.   

 

Author’s note: -

For additional insight, interested readers may visit the links below…

Akhand Bharat Revisiting Indian Military Theatre Commands

https://valleysandvalour.blogspot.com/2026/03/bharat-revisiting-indian-military.html

Akhand Bharat The Broad Picture

https://valleysandvalour.blogspot.com/2026/01/akhand-bharat-broad-picture-for-akhand.html