Akhand Bharat
REVISITING INDIAN MILITARY THEATRE
COMMAND REFORMS
“The best way forward for India to unbalance China’s coercive
military posture along the northern land border, is to pivot the battlefield centre
of gravity to the Indo-Pacific maritime region.” – Col RS Sidhu
Backdrop
2019 turned out to be a watershed year in India’s
future outlook of itself in the geopolitical space. The Budget 2019-20, presented on 05
July 2019, contained a declaratory statement
to make India a US Dollar 5 trillion economy
by 2024-25. In immediate aftermath, on 15 August 2019, the Prime Minister
announced the government intent to create the appointment of Chief of
Defense Staff (CDS).
Thereafter the wheels of the government moved with
uncharacteristic alacrity. A committee under National Security Advisor was formed on 23
August 2019, to formulate the role and powers of CDS, with report to be
submitted within six weeks.
By
24 December 2019, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), approved the
creation of the post of CDS and Department of Military Affairs (DMA). CDS was also
to be the Secretary DMA, Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC),
and to act as the Principal Military Adviser to Raksha Mantri on all
tri-services matters.
On 30 December 2019, the Cabinet Secretariat implemented the decision
by suitably amending the
Allocation of Business Rules 1961, vide Government of India (Allocation of
Business) Three Hundred Fifty third Amendment Rules, 2019 (5); thus, clearing
the way for the first CDS to assume appointment on 01 January 2020.
One of the key task assigned to the CDS was to bring about jointness in the three Services within three years
of the first CDS assuming office, in operations, logistics, transport,
training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc.
Six
years down the line, the country’s economy
is hovering near US Dollar 4 trillion against the target of US Dollar 5
trillion, while there’s no visible progress in the creation of Theatre
Commands. The latter continues to be a work in progress well past the laid
down deadline.
Review
One
of the key contributory factor to this inordinate delay has been the
emasculating anomalies inbuilt into the Government Order (GO) instituting the
appointment of the CDS.
The existing GO bars both the CDS and the
Services chiefs from the chain of command of the upcoming Theatre and
Functional Commands. As the Ministry of Defense (MoD) lacks the requisite
military competence to supervise the Theatre and Functional Commands, this is
the biggest lacunae in successful implementation of reforms to the apex
military hierarchy.
Making the CDS as first amongst equals is an
adhoc and disjointed solution, as maybe deduced from the delay in instituting
reforms in higher military architecture. In a status conscious bureaucracy,
rank matters in resolving differing viewpoints and cutting through red tape.
Enhanced weightage to the appointment of CDS is, therefore, advisable by upgrading
from the present 4 Star to a 5 Star rank.
The CDS needs to be directly
accountable to the Raksha Mantri (RM), hold status equivalent to the
National Security Advisor (NSA), and be made statutory advisory member of
the CCS.
The post of the Secretary DMA should be
separated, with direct reporting to the CDS.
An Act of Parliament should be brought in to
rectify the anomalies, and ‘constitutionalise’ the post of CDS.
It will showcase the determination and will of the Government to implement the
reforms, and subtly discourage opposition from vested interests. A GO, on the
other hand, signals uncertainty that may embolden those opposing the reforms.
Assessing
Necessity of Higher Military Reforms
The raison d’etre of the argument for
opposing these reforms is that the existing system has delivered in all
operational crisis situations, including the most recent Operation Sindoor; so
“why fix something which isn’t broke?”
The answer to the ibid query is simple. A
vibrant organisation is one that voluntarily adepts to changing environment,
one that evolves with the time rather than being forced to undertake reforms on
encountering failure. The ongoing military conflicts in the Rus region of
Europe, the Levant in West Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia, are live
examples of the heavy cost of military failure to evolve proactively.
Paradigm shifts in
the battlefield have taken place from the hitherto fore three dimensional land,
sea, and air warfare to five dimensional
warfare, with the addition of the new dimensions of space and cyberspace.
New technologies in logistics infrastructure management are shrinking the world, resulting
expansion of strategic reach of the armed forces. Introducing lethal swarms of
self-propelled, AI capable nano platforms, and robotic soldiers, through synthesis
of nanotechnology based robotics, information technology, biotechnology,
quantum computing, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) has morphed the battlefield.
Enhanced battlefield transparency through space
based surveillance, communications, and AI enabled command & control
systems; and reduced response time with increased response reliability of
autonomous weapon systems; are revolutionising decision action matrix.
The seamless
integration, command & control, and optimum capacity utilisation of such
specialised resources will be feasible only through unified functional
commands.
Vision for
Undertaking Military Reforms
Reorganising the higher military
architecture by India to meet the demands of enhanced security of its current
borders, would always remain a disputed domain due to paucity of
resources, lack of political clarity on breaking the current gridlock, and military
vulnerabilities during the time of switch over to the new defense architecture.
It simply does not impart desired dividends commensurate to the resources and
effort needed to execute this transformational project.
The vision for change has to be
propelled by the dynamics of reorganising its military into a powerful force
that assures strategic autonomy essential to safeguard its national interests in
the geopolitical power plays of the realpolitik world. This comes with a
caveat, for it can become a reality only after political clarity is
achieved on the civilisational aspiration of realising an ‘Akhand Bharat’.
Establishing Theatre Commands is
inextricably interlinked to India’s push towards realisation of ‘Akhand
Bharat’ which itself is predicated on the four cardinals of
access to global markets and natural resources to enable highest percentage of economic
growth, expanded out of area military reach to secure its external
trade, gain geographic mass to counter its powerful adversaries, and
capitalise on its demographic dividend.
The Compounding
Factors
Handling the civilisational rivalry
with China shall be the most critical for emergence of India as a powerful
entity in the comity of nations on the world stage. China pursues its deep
rivalry towards India through a seemingly ambivalent strategy of coercive
application of force to gain situational advantage followed by easing off the
pressure so applied. Thereby, China has successfully hemmed India not only across
the 4000 kms long border with COT, but also along India’s 7,500 kms coastline
through its ‘string of pearls’ maritime bases in the Indian Ocean Region
(IOR).
To grasp the
essence of China’s strategy to neutralise India, we have to understand the
basics of the Chinese boardgame Weiqi. To win in this game emphasis is
not on destruction of the rival pieces, but adopting a strategy of positional
encirclement that first immobilises the adversary and then forces it to cede
ground, without engaging in debilitating battle.
The best approach
to neutralise this strategy is not through confrontation at the point of
pressure but through applying counter pressure at a different exposed point
of the adversary. The success of this counter-strategy was distinctly
evident during the Galwan 2020 standoff, where Indian military forced China
reluctantly to the negotiation table by occupying the unheld strategic heights
on the Kailash range.
China’s key vulnerability is not in their
outlying extreme high altitude areas of COT lying in its remote periphery, but
in its maritime trade routes in the Indo-Pacific region. India has to be
prepared to enforce unacceptable economic and military costs on China in the
maritime domain in a future conflict escalation.
India is advantaged
to occupy a central geographical location in Asia, a unique land and
maritime pivot between Southeast Asia and West Asia, that enables it to
dominate the international maritime trade in this vast region with minimum
effort. On the land frontier the positional advantage shall always remain with
China. But on the high seas it is evidently with India where it can orchestrate
a threat in being to China’s vulnerable maritime trade. It is an
unpardonable military folly to contest an adversary at ground and time of their
choice. It is, therefore, imperative for India to shift the centre of
gravity of the rivalry with China to the maritime Indo-Pacific region, as a
counter to offset the positional advantage enjoyed by China along the land
border with COT.
This should
form the single most compounding factor to be considered for operationalising
Theatre Command while reorganising its higher defense architecture.
The expansion of
economy will involve greater reach into markets in volatile regions of East
Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, Africa and established markets of Europe and
Americas. This will necessitate securing its market access as well as ensuring
safety of its trade and commerce over extended maritime trade routes.
The cultural dynamics, military terrain,
economic interests, and geopolitical concerns in the regions to India’s east
and the west are different. Towards its west, the high probability of implosion
of Pakistan is a realistic scenario that should interest and engage India’s
policy makers. To the east, establishing economic and security linkages should
be the principal drivers of India’s realpolitik approach.
Broad Contours
of Spatial Theatre Command Reforms
The discussed factors indicate outward
focus of India’s land security to hinge on three separate Theatre
Commands facing East, West, and the North, with an inward focused Theatre
Command overseeing homeland security of the 3.28
million square kilometres of the mainland India.
In the maritime domain, India has
to focus on securing its vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
of 2.37 million square kilometres, the
critical sea lanes of communication (SLOC), and extending area of naval
influence into the IOR and the coastal seas of East Asia bordering the Pacific
Ocean.
Here again the maritime and naval dynamics
of operating in the narrow and shallow seas to the east, and the open
waters of the Indian Ocean differ greatly. The two distinctive maritime
waters dictate adopting differing naval doctrines, and major naval combatant
platforms with differing specifications. All parameters dictate
reorganising the maritime force into two distinct Maritime Theatre Commands
facing East and West.
This brings us to the most dynamic, and
indeterminate factor of ‘Akhand Bharat’, colonizing the extraterrestrial
space for economic exploitation, that shall necessitate securing its
interests in the two new dimensions of warfare, Cyberspace and Space.
This necessitates for the Indian Air Force (IAF) to transform itself into an
Aerospace Force. Realigning the IAF motto of ‘Touch the Sky with
Glory’, to ‘Touch the Stars with Glory’, best highlights the shift in focus.
The security of the Indian hinterland
is primarily the domain of Ministry of Home Affairs (MoH). However, the newer
technologies are forcefully blurring the areas of responsibility between the
MoD and the MoH.
For example, the setting up of the
Integrated Air Defence Command with the charter to secure the sovereign
airspace, would entail exercising command & control over all air defence
resources, to counter the full spectrum of aerial threats. This shall spill
over into control of civil air space as well as UAVs employed in commercial
enterprise. With drones and autonomous warheads emerging as the weapon of
choice for asymmetrical warfare, coordination between MoD and MoH shall need to
be more intricate and intimate. Same holds true for setting up of an Integrated
Cyberspace Command.
Various options may be considered.
One option would be to set up an Integrated Homeland Defence Command,
incorporating MoH resources as well. Another option may be a Hinterland Theatre
Command, which could also be tasked to hold reserve strategic resources.
Breaking The Current Logjam
There are three broad issues
in the current logjam on undertaking these military reforms.
The first, is perception
issue, that is lack of clarity in vision of Political and Military
Leadership. The political leadership has to address this issue. The choice is
stark; formalise the reforms to support the push for an ‘Akhand Bharat’,
or shelve the reforms.
The second, is the Command
& Control. This issue has become muddled with no clarity, as already
highlighted earlier. To assist the RM, the post of CDS needs to be
institutionalised in the chain of command of the Theatre and Integrated
Commands, should be the way forward. The Theatre/Integrated Commands should
be headed by four star ranks, with the CDS being of five star rank and in the
operational chain of command.
Third, is the underlying concern
of the IAF, of being subsumed by the Army, and of paucity of aerial combat
platforms. There’s need for the IAF to transform from the conventional air
domain to be an Aerospace Force, with Aerospace Theatre Command, and Integrated
Cyberspace Command. Though not an ideal solution, the existing six
operational IAF Commands should be merged into two operational Air Commands as
an interim measure, till the anomaly is addressed.
The aspect of an integrated
national Air Defence set up has to be addressed, in conjunction with the
transformation of the IAF. The futuristic threat scenario dictates it. The
access of non-state organisations to cheap, easy to handle, air/surface/sub-surface
autonomous platforms, should be the cause for biggest alarm. Response time to
successfully defend against such threats shall be in single digit minutes. The
launch can be from anywhere, even from within the borders. The Indian
airspace command & control has to be unitary, for it to be viable. This
should be the first Integrated Command.
Army should go ahead and
reorganise its current six operational Army Commands into four Theatre
Commands, less the Air component; that can be incorporated at a later timeframe,
by subsuming the resources of the proposed interim two IAF operational commands.
The two proposed Maritime
Theatre Commands should be made operational at the earliest, as there’s
least conflict of inter-service interests.
This restructuring will
eventually evolve into joint operational Theatre Commands. This may be the most
viable way to break the current logjam.
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