READING THE TEA LEAVES ON THE INDIA CHINA GEOPOLITICAL TANGO

 

“August 2023 is unfolding as a very interesting time in Asian and even global geopolitical dynamics, presaged by the 30^th of August 2023 Super Blue Moon, a rare celestial phenomenon.” – Col RS Sidhu

 

Backdrop

Four interesting developments, with a significant impact on India China relations, are underway in near simultaneous time frames.

On 8^th of August 2023, the three ex Chiefs of Indian Army, Air Force, and Navy arrived in Taipei, Taiwan to attend the Ketagalan Forum Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue 2023. This was followed through with a talk delivered by Gen MN Naravne, former COAS of Indian army, at the 6^th International Rangzen (Independence) Conference in New Delhi, on 16^th August 2023. Even more significant, is the presence of representatives from Tibet Parliament in Exile, and Umit Hamit, Uyghur freedom fighter, during the talk. 

On 13^th and 14^th of August 2023, the 19^th Military Corps Commander level meeting between India and China was held at Chushul. Of an even greater interest is the follow on meetings between the Divisional Commanders of the two armies at Daulat Beg Oldie and Chushul on 18^th and 19^th of August 2023, portending a probable softening of China’s stance on the ongoing India and China Occupied Tibet (COT) border standoff between the militaries of the two countries. 

On 17^th of August 2023, the top ranked Chinese housing conglomerate, Evergrande, with a US Dollar 300 billion debt including 19 billion in offshore debts, filed for bankruptcy in the US.

The 15^th Heads of States and Governments summit of BRICS is scheduled to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa from 22 to 24 August 2023, with a high probability of one on one meeting between the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Xi Jinping, the Chinese Supreme Leader. Indian governments heavy investment in the Summit can be gauged from the synchronisation of the Chandrayaan 3 lunar module landing on the moon for 23^rd August 2023.

Compulsions of Current Chinese Leadership

Since the coming to power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China, their first and foremost priority is to retain control over all Government apparatus at all costs. Hence, all organs of Government are subordinated to the control of CCP. The affairs of the CCP have traditionally been managed through an informal oligarchic power sharing arrangement between its major political factions.

The second primacy in long term Chinese thought is to replace the existing US led West Bloc global power structure with a Sino-centric world order.

Xi Jinping, by suborning the oligarchic model, has emerged as the most powerful public figure of China. The three most powerful hats of the General Secretary of CCP, President of People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), adorn his head. To him, and his loyalists, ensuring his continuing grip over the levers of power of the CCP is of primary concern, overriding all other interests. But a gloomy economic outlook is impacting his firm grip over the state power apparatus, as it impacts the unquestioned primacy of the CCP.

The Housing sector in China, which accounts for one quarter of its GDP, has witnessed an alarming 33% drop in sales. On 17^th of August 2023, the top ranked Chinese housing conglomerate, Evergrande, with a US Dollar 300 billion debt including 19 billion in offshore debts, filed for bankruptcy safeguards in the US. The second leading Chinese housing conglomerate, Country Garden, with a US Dollar 180 billion debt is also on the verge of collapse. The bursting of the housing finance bubble is the first overt sign of the economic quicksand which is overwhelming the Chinese economy.

On 16^th of August 2023, the monthly economic data released by China reflected a dramatic slowdown in industrial production, and domestic retail market. Since the industrial sector contributes 33% to Chinese GDP, major slowdown of demand is of critical concern. However, it is the non-sharing of unemployment figures, which in June 2023 already stood at a record high of 21%, which should be of more relevance to the discerning analysts, as it highlights the political sensitivities of the CCP.

This political sensitivity is further evidenced by the ‘Qiushi’, an important official publication of the CCP, publishing within hours of the report, selected excerpts from a 7^th February 2023 speech of Xi Jinping to senior CCP officials, highlighting “…economic challenges (that included) food, wealth distribution, healthcare, housing, elderly care, and childcare…” and exhorting “…patience and resilience…in pursuing national rejuvenation…to look at common prosperity as a long term mission…”.

The aspects highlighted in the excerpts are the very key vulnerabilities that are adversely impacting not only the Chinese economy, but also the hold of CCP over the country’s 1.4 billion population. China is not self-sufficient in food grains to feed its huge population. The key to economic revival of China is its private sector, which contributes 60% of its GDP and provides 80% urban employment. But the policy contradiction inherent in wealth distribution and revival of the private sector is the biggest contributor to the gloomy economic outlook. While it is anathema to its private sector, for CCP it is a matter of survival.

The cumulative impact of the three major factors, discussed above, is fuelling social unrest which is further exacerbated by the budgetary constraints to look after its ageing population.

Geopolitically, China is confronting a two front challenge. The growing US led international alliances are challenging China’s supremacy in its eastern maritime region and inhibiting its irrevocable resolve to reunite Taiwan with the Chinese mainland. To the southwest China has confronted itself in a military standoff with India in the COT region.

The two front geopolitical confrontation comes at a time when the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), its strategic bulwark, is in a disarray, as discernible from the sacking of the two topmost military commanders of PLARF, and their being replaced with a commander from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), not a well versed Rocket Force professional. The dramatic penalisation of the PLARF hierarchy was enforced consequent to weak professional performance by this force, under full international media glare, during the show of force across Straits of Taiwan, post Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of US House of Representatives, visit to Taiwan in 2022.

Economic downturn leading to social unrest directly threatens the primacy of the CCP, and is by itself sufficient cause to unleash political events that could unseat Xi Jinping. This leaves two geopolitical options for Xi Jinping. First is to employ military force against India, the weaker of the two adversaries. However, the growing security linkages between India and US makes the success of this option uncertain.

The second option is to take a temporary step back in confronting India, and agree to a face saving de-escalation along the contested region of COT.

China’s proclivity for temporary geopolitical shifts is best covered in “Thrust & Logic of China’s Foreign Policy”, and “Postscript April 2014”. These can be accessed at links given below

https://valleysandvalour.blogspot.com/2020/08/thrust-logic-of-chinese-foreign-policy.html

https://valleysandvalour.blogspot.com/2020/08/postscript-april-2014-thrust-logic-of.html

Considerations of Current Indian Leadership

The Indian military is currently in the throes of a Government driven major reorganisation of its apex military hierarchy and changes in the troop profile of its frontline fighting units. This is bound to adversely impact its combat potential to withstand decisive military operations by China. An effective disengagement along the borders with COT shall give the Indian military a 3 to 5 years window of relative peace to reorganise, re-equip, and assimilate new weapons and equipment for fighting wars of the future.

India’s security and diplomatic establishment has been traditionally wary of antagonising China. An increasing convergence of mutual national interests between India and the US, led by the latter’s geopolitical need to forge an alliance with India against China, has provided India with greater freedom of manoeuvre to explore additional diplomatic avenues to pressurise China to accept a disengagement in the COT region. India now feels emboldened to signal its willingness to widen the diplomatic confrontation into China’s area of core interest, that is Taiwan and COT.

However, India is also wary of falling prey to US pressures not in its national interests. Therefore, a stand down along the northern borders also advantages India in withstanding alliance pressures that are inimical to its interests.

Indian political leadership is focused on the coming General Elections in the country due by March 2024. The increasingly strident rival political discourse in the run up to the elections have vitiated the internal security environment. A disengagement along the northern borders can be portrayed as a major achievement in pursuit of a nationalistic agenda.   

Gazing at the Tea Leaves

The developments at the ongoing India China Military Commanders meetings does indicate a narrowing down of differences on disengagement and de-escalation in the COT region. The prolonged negotiations impart a sense of urgency to its proceedings, in the backdrop of a strong possibility of a Modi – Xi one on one engagement on the sidelines of the upcoming BRICS Head of States and Governments meeting scheduled shortly in South Africa.

China’s internal political contradictions shall play a key role in not giving way on all areas of military discord with India, as China wilting under Indian pressure will impact the very survivability of Xi Jinping, already under internal flak for downturn in China’s economy.

An unfavourable outcome of the Military Commanders meetings shall definitely cast a negative shadow on the all-important Modi – Xi meeting, if it materialises. Chumar, Charding Ninglung Nallah (CNN) Track Junction, and patrolling points in Depsang Plains are some of the more contentious points for de-escalation. China is most sensitive to de-escalation at Depsang plains, where their critical G 315 road runs close to Indian defences of Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) across the Karakoram Pass, and is unlikely to agree to any de-escalation here. So a consensus on one or two major confrontation points opposite eastern Ladakh is a more likely probability.

Xi Jinping also has the option to counterbalance refusal to disengage at Depsang bulge, by consenting to attend the G 20 summit of Heads of States and Governments scheduled at New Delhi on 9-10 September 2023. However, the diplomatic gains for India of such a gambit would be metaphorical.  

India on its part, should be clear that there can be no real rapprochement with China, the gulf in the core national interests is just too wide. What it can look at is a temporary step back by China, before it militarily challenges India at an opportune geopolitical moment.