THRUST & LOGIC OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

(Published in Trishul, a Triservice journal of Defence Services Staff College Wellington (India), Volume VI No 2 – January 1994, and reproduced with their kind permission.)

Author’s Note 

(Even during my school days I found reading books on military campaigns very interesting. Subsequently as a student of history during my graduate and postgraduate years I found the history of China, Japan and Tibet very fascinating. 1990s was the time when the Indian strategic establishment started shifting its focus from Pakistan to look at China as the long term threat. It came naturally to me to write this article, in 1993, based on almost two decades of my insight on the subject.)

Introduction

For centuries, China regarded herself as the Central Flowery Kingdom, the only ‘Civilisation’ on Earth, and it’s ruler as T’ien-Tzu, the Son of Heaven. There has been a two thousand years old tradition to view China as the centre of the Universe. All the Chinese leaders from Sun Yat-Sen to Chiang Kai-Shek to Mao Tse-Dong, down to Deng share the belief in the greatness of China. Infact, it was Sun Yat-Sen, rather than the communists, as popularly believed, who first advocated that China assume a greater responsibility towards the world by articulating “......we must aid the weaker and smaller peoples to oppose the Greater Powers”. The traditional China believed itself to be the repository of unique values that ought to be accepted by all mankind. This traditional belief amongst her people continues even today, and has a bearing upon her political thinking and foreign policy. The difficulty of modern China in adjusting to the fast changing international comity of nations is partly explained by this factor.

Search for a Modern Ideology by China

The history of China’s confrontation with the West clearly shows that the Chinese search for a new ideology was the result of deep national frustration at the inadequacy of the traditional Confucian ideology and socio-political system to cope with the powerful challenge of the West at the turn of this century.

Rejection of Democracy

To meet the challenge posed by the West and to solve their own national problems, the Chinese could only turn to Western ideologies. Democracy was perfunctorily tried but it did not fit into the traditional Chinese framework and failed.

Meeting Points of Communism and Confucianism

Communism had in it many important elements of the traditional Chinese socio-political order:-

• A centralised regime.
• A conformist ideology.
• A ruling elite well versed in scriptures.
• Lastly, and most important, it had a universal vision.

Thus, the Communist ideology and political system, besides being modern and having the advantage of multi-point contact with traditional China, also carried with it the promise of restoring China it’s traditional universal role.

Adoption of Communism for Advancement of China’s National Aims

The communist movement grew under the shadow of growing national indignation against the Western Powers and Japan. The war against Japan enabled the communists to mobilise the masses and work for up their patriotic fervour. The communist success against the KMT was in no small measure due to their skilful propaganda denigrating the Nationalist party as a stooge of imperialism. The Chinese Communists had thus largely conceived their struggle in nationalist terms. Infact, Mao’s ascendancy in the Communist movement represented the triumph of the nationalist aspect of communism. Therefore, the movement in China, though inspired by the Communist ideology and Russian example, was essentially a nationalist growth aimed at China’s regeneration. The subsequent break by the Chinese communist from the international movement under Russian leadership, further emphasises this point. It is immaterial today whether the Communist ruling elite of China see their struggle as an ideological or historical one, because by now ideology in their minds has become indistinguishable from nationalism. Indeed, communism and nationalism have attained a near – perfect fusion in China.

Foreign Policy Objectives of Modern China

• Global Objectives. The greatest desire of China has been to build for herself a position of prestige through the development of economic and military strength and to exercise effective political influence and power on the world stage. Thus, the ultimate aim of communist China is to bring about proletarian revolution through people’s war. In realpolitik terms, to achieve a Great Power status.
• Nuclear Weapons and Blue Water Navy. China has ample historical experience to realise that no nation can attain a Super Power status without a strong nuclear armoury and blue water navy. It is for this reason that China has been single-mindedly building up its nuclear forces and an ocean going navy in spite of all its economic problems.
• Economic Power. The Communist Chinese hierarchy are aware of the twin principles that ‘power flows from the barrel of the gun’ and ‘money purchases the gun’. Towards this end China has been studiously building up her economy. After initially dropping the ‘Bamboo Curtain’, vital to ensure the very survival of Communism in China and also to protect her nascent industries from foreign competition, the Communists have been steadily entering the world economic system. The ‘Great Leap Forward’ under Mao and the recent ‘ Four Modernisations’ programme under Deng are cases in point. China is determined to back up her thrust towards achieving a Super Power status with economic strength. The fact of the Chinese economy presently being the most dynamic and fastest growing, coupled with her having developed a huge trade surplus with USA, are indicators of the success achieved by her in this sphere.
• Regional Objectives. As a pre-requisite towards attainment of Super Power status, it is imperative that China establishes her predominance in the Asian region. Towards this end the Chinese policy in this region is aimed at:-
• Establishing Hegemony. In realpolitik terms read as suzerainty, in the region adjoining her borders. This includes any region ever ruled by any ruler of China. Witness the annexation of Tibet, part of Spratley Islands, the Ussuri river dispute with USSR, the Mac-Mohan Line border dispute with India and laying claims of suzerainty on large tracts of areas in various South East Asian countries adjacent to her borders. In these ventures China has met with only partial success due to lack of a modern army and a comparatively weak economy. Hence, her temporary abandonment of expansionist plans and instituting a modernisation plan for her armed forces and economy before continuing afresh.
• Prevent the establishment of any rival centre of power in the region. Witness the Chinese opposition to the establishment of US influence in the region by fighting a proxy war against it in Korea in the early fifties and aiding North Vietnam against USA in the sixties and seventies; destroying India’s influence in the region by one stroke in the 1962 war; attempt to cow down Vietnam by a so-called punitive action in the eighties.
• Attain influence in the region through economic ties and export of weapons and technology, especially with nations inimical to the interest of USA.

Tactical Shifts in Policy. In pursuit of their international strategy, the Chinese Communists have quite often changed their tactics. These tactical shifts are designed to promote the basic Chinese strategy of establishing a world order whose centre is Beijing, by ensuring that the country at no time is forced to fight a two-front war. Consequently, China has gone in for temporary friendships/alliances with individual countries as dictated by political compulsions of given situations. China has never hesitated to cast off such temporary shifts as soon as they outlive their utility as evidenced by following:-

• Sino-USSR Brotherhood. To attain power in Beijing the Communists had to fight against the USA backed Chiang Kai-Shek. Thus, initially friendship with USSR was necessary not only to secure its rear but also to receive Russian aid in strengthening her economy and armed forces. But China was averse to playing second fiddle to USSR. Hence, when the Western threat receded, the Chinese broke off with USSR over ideological and territorial differences.
• Sino-Indian Bhai Bhaism. The need to keep her Southern flank secure while fighting the Western backed Chiang Kai-Shek was reason enough to initially establish friendship with India. However, giving refuge to the Dalai Lama of Tibet by India after annexation of Tibet by China, coupled with border differences and growing influence of India in international fora were sufficient reasons for China to break off this short lived friendship by invading India in 1962.
• Sino-Vietnamese Break. The Chinese initially supported North Vietnam to oppose the establishment of US influence in the region. However, the increased stature of Vietnam in the region, after the military withdrawal of US, was perceived by China as inimical to its interest in the region. Vietnam’s alliance with USSR was also viewed as being aimed at reducing her influence in the region. The above two factors, coupled with China’s view of Vietnam being it’s vassal state in the historical past, resulted in China launching its abortive punitive action against Vietnam in the eighties.
• Sino-Japanese Relations. China’s historical enmity with Japan is by now legendary. The latter is still viewed by China as one of the major threats to itself. But this has not prevented the Chinese hierarchy from seeking friendly relations with Japan, initially to secure its Eastern flank from the Russian threat, and subsequently to gain access to Japanese funds and technology in an attempt to bolster its economy.
• Sino-US Rapprochement. The US attempts at establishing its influence in the region coupled with its support to Chiang Kai-Shek in China caused the latter to enter into a proxy war with USA in Korea in the fifties and Vietnam in the sixties and seventies. However, the break with USSR forced China to reconsider its relations with USA. Thus, China entered into a rapprochement with its erstwhile numero uno enemy not only to use it as a countervailing force against USSR but also to obtain modern technology, funds and influence to enter the world trading system so as to modernise and strengthen its own economy and military strength.

Likely Effects of Breakup of USSR on Chinese Policy

The breakup of the USSR is bound to have a profound effect on Chinese policy as it has not only reduced the threat on its Western borders, but has also resulted in a power vacuum readymade for being stepped into by China.

• The break-up of USSR due to economic reasons will further reinforce Chinese determination to strengthen her economy at all costs. Thus, economic recovery will be the main propulsion of Chinese policy vis-a-vis territorial ambitions in the near future.
• A USA dominated unipolar world can retard the Chinese drive towards economic strength. Hence, China is likely to adopt a low profile internationally till she feels herself to have become strong enough to challenge US power on equal terms.
• China’s thrust in future will be power politics at low key with special emphasis on economic dependence by:-
• Allowing regional countries a slice of the Chinese market on the one hand and investing in critical sectors of economies of other countries, on the other.
• Aid to underdeveloped countries to wean them from Western dependence.

Likely Chinese Policy towards India In The Near Future. The world situation is once again leading China towards it’s by now customary, tactical shifts in foreign policy. The following factors are likely to influence China in adopting a softer line towards India in the near future:-

• The disintegration of USSR has removed a major threat to China from across the Western border. But the resultant instability in this Muslim dominated region coupled with a volatile Muslim population in its province of Sinkiang, which borders this region, is giving Chinese leaders unease.
• China requires a period of relative peace on its borders so as to enable its economic restructuring and modernisation of industry and the armed forces to be put into effect without any external interference.
• China perceives a reduced threat from India at this juncture owing to the latter’s preoccupation with her economic restructuring, safeguarding own integrity from separatist militant movements within her own borders and an aggressive Pakistan waiting on the sidelines to take advantage of the situation, aided and gently goaded by China.
• Deterioration of the geo-political situation in the Asian sub-continent may induce US intervention in the region, which would go against long term Chinese interests in the region.

Likely Long Term Chinese Policy towards India. Thus, any softening in the Chinese stance towards India should be viewed by the latter in the correct perspective and should not be taken to signal any change in the long term policy objective of China towards India. It would be more in the form of short term tactical deviation to tide over the compulsions of the existing economic and geo-political situation. China would feel free to revert to its original policy course once the geo-political situation is again in her favour. An economically vibrant and militarily far more powerful China will be a greater threat to India in the long term, especially in view of its nuclear super power status.

Conclusion

As in the historical past, the Chinese Communist today visualise China as the originator of a superior doctrine and political system which other countries would do well to accept in their own interest. Thus, seen from historical perspective, the basic thrust of the Chinese foreign policy has always been a compulsive urge to reassert China’s imperial grandeur.


(Maj RS Sidhu, SM was commissioned into the 7 PUNJAB in 1978 and is presently posted to 15 MECH INF since raising. He is a post graduate in History from Delhi University.)