DECODING PAKISTAN’S PASNI PORT OFFER TO THE US

“Leveraging foreign presence on its soil to enhance own security, is an old ploy of Pakistan, as discernible from ceding the Trans-Karakoram Tract comprising the Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963, followed by formalising Chinese control over Gwadar port operations in 2013, and now proposing operational control and development of Pasni port by the US.” – Col RS Sidhu

Backdrop

The May 2025 Indarmy launched Operation ‘Sindoor’ against Operation ‘Bunyan ul Marsoos’ of Pakistan military has turned out to be a watershed event in the series of military confrontations between the two warring adversaries. Its impact goes beyond that of the 1971 war, that led to carving out Bangla Desh by severing the spatially separated eastern half from Pakistan.

Operation ‘Sindoor’/’Bunyan ul Marsoos’ lasted for 90 hrs, but its geopolitical reverberations are transforming the strategic landscape in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The deep precision strikes launched by the Indian military, with impunity, on the most heavily defended strategic military assets across the length and breadth of Pakistan, left the latter floundering. Pakistan’s nuclear bluff was called out, and its faith in the reliability of its closest ally ‘iron brother’ China was shaken.

Coupled with the geopolitical realignments being pursued by the US in the region, it has set the stage for recalibration of Pakistan’s geopolitical ties with the former, as may be deduced from the series of one on one meetings within a time span of three months, on 18 June, 09 August, and 25 September 2025, between POTUS Donald Trump, and Pakistan duo of Field Marshal Asim Munir, COAS/Shahbaz Shareef, PM.

Pakistan, under Field Marshal Asim Munir, has pandered to POTUS Donald Trump personally, by signing a hazy multi-billion US Dollar cryptocurrency deal between Trump family backed World Liberty Financial (WLF) and the newly formed Pakistan Crypto Council (PCC); and recommending him for the Nobel peace prize.

Pakistan has also offered geopolitical options to the US in West Asia and South Asia region by offering itself as a reliable intermediary of the US for pursuing leasing of Bagram airbase from the Taliban led Afghanistan government; geopolitical messaging to China; exploitation rights to rare earth minerals in its insurgency prone province of Baluchistan; deployment of Pakistan military in support of US geopolitical initiatives in West Asia, namely Gaza; development and operational control over Pasni port, 117 kms to the east of Gwadar port operated by China.

Port Geopolitics in the Indian Ocean Region

Operating naval/maritime support bases and port infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) by extra regional powers is quite wide spread.

The paramount extra regional power in the IOR, the US, has major naval bases on the island of Diego Garcia, Djibouti, and Bahrain; and agreements for naval access to port facilities in India, UAE, Oman, and Qatar.

China, a rising extra regional power in the IOR, is maintaining a naval support base at Djibouti, on the west coast of the Bab-el-Mandab Strait chokepoint that joins the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. In addition it is involved in construction/enhancement of port infrastructure at 21 locations all along the eastern coastline of Africa, the Makran coast on the Arabian Sea, west coast of Sri Lanka, and in the Bay of Bengal. Of these, the major ports being operated by China, that interest India strategically, are Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangla Desh, Hambantota and Colombo Port Terminal in Sri Lanka, and Gwadar in Pakistan. China is also operating an electronics listening posts on the Cocos Island in the Bay of Bengal, 48 kms from the Indian Andamans Island territories.   

India, the most significant home naval power of the IOR, is engaged in enhancing its port and naval infrastructure on the mainland and the strategically located Andamans and Lakshadweep group of islands. To further its area of influence in the IOR, it has acquired naval access to Assumption Island in Seychelles, Duqm port in Oman, and naval infrastructure on French island territories in the southern IOR. In addition, India has operating rights of the Chabahar port in Iran, 170 kms west of China operated Gwadar port in Pakistan; the Colombo port in Sri Lanka, the Sittwe port in Myanmar, 512 kms from the China operated Kyaukphyu port, and Sabang port in Malaysia, close to the mouth of the strategic Malacca Straits.

What’s most interesting is the close vicinity of the rival naval bases/operational control over ports with dual use infrastructure. Chinese naval base in Djibouti is a mere 8 kms away from the US Camp Lemonnier naval base, Indian operational controlled Chabahar port is 170 kms from China controlled Gwadar port, Indian and Chinese operational controlled port terminals are virtually co-located in Colombo port, while the Indian operational controlled Sittwe port is 500 odd kms from Kyaukphyu port operations controlled by China. Hence, the Pasni port location being 117 kms from China controlled Gwadar port is not of much significance.

What should hold interest for the cognizant, in Pakistan offering Pasni port to the US for development and operations, is its impact on the security dynamics in the IOR, and geopolitical interests of the protagonist countries, Pakistan, China, US, and India.

Impact on Geopolitical Dynamics in IOR

The foremost issue of importance here is, whether this development signals a dynamic switch by Pakistan from its longstanding geopolitical alliance with China in favour of a geopolitical embrace of the US.

The first pointer to study this aspect is the visit by Field Marshal Asim Munir, COAS to China on 24 July 2025, followed by Shahbaz Shareef, PM of Pakistan visiting Beijing from 30 August – 04 September 2025, coinciding with the SCO meeting.  These visits closely followed their first meeting with POTUS Donald Trump on 18 June 2025. This does indicate towards mutual consultations between the apex leaders of China and Pakistan on the issue of the US initiative to draw in Pakistan to further its geopolitical interests in West Asia.

The second key aspect is the likely impact of US presence in Pasni, on Chinese interests in Pakistan. The US is currently linked to destabilisation of the security situation by covertly fuelling insurgency in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan. This adversely impacts the security environment of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), critical to China’s energy security. This finding gains credibility from the US and its close allies blocking a joint proposal of China and Pakistan at the UN Security Council meeting in September 2025, to place the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its suicide unit, the Majeed Brigade, in the UN 1267 sanctions list by designating them as international terrorist organisations. The US, however, did partially ameliorate Pakistan’s concerns by designating these entities as foreign terrorist organisations under its domestic laws. The BLA seeks independence from Pakistan as it opposes ‘economic exploitation of natural resources of Baluchistan by Pakistan and China’. By inviting US commercial investments in the Baluchistan region, Pakistan hopes to wean off the former from indirectly supporting the separatist’s cause. This would also advantage China’s geostrategic CPEC project.

The third major standpoint stems from the marked US reluctance to deploy major troops on the ground in the West Asia region to secure its geopolitical interests. Pakistan’s willingness to deploy its troops in West Asia to support US geopolitical initiatives, as in Gaza, adds biggest value to its worth as a strategic ally in the eyes of the US. China too would not be averse to such an eventuality as Pakistan is its close strategic ally.

We can thus discern a rare convergence of interest between the US and China, in deployment of Pakistan military in West Asia region to support US geopolitical initiatives.

It would, therefore, be right to infer that Pakistan’s geopolitical machinations to ally itself to the US, are not at the cost of its long standing geopolitical alliance with China. Rather, Pakistan may have tacit concurrence of China to ride the two geopolitical boats simultaneously; an act at which its military leadership is most adept!

Impact on Interests of the Protagonist Countries

For Pakistan it’s a win-win situation. It continues to hold onto its strategic alliance with China, its single largest creditor owning 22% of its overall external economic debt, and the original equipment manufacturer of 80% of major weapons and equipment held by the Pakistan military. By allying itself with the US, Pakistan hopes to get easy access to foreign funds for its beleaguered economy, from international financial institutions, and the US Arab allies in West Asia. Pakistan is also likely to gain access to advanced US weapons and military equipment. But the most vital advantage from Pakistan standpoint is the formidable leverage of geopolitical support, from two of the most powerful countries, in its adversarial relationship with India. Pakistan’s success in securing US commercial presence in Pasni, would also grant it a major indirect military advantage. It would provide Pakistan additional secure dispersal space for its naval assets in the eventuality of a hot engagement with India, and also inhibit the latter’s military intervention in Pakistan’s coastal region.    

It would be surprising if China was not uncomfortable with Pakistan’s serving US strategic interests in the IOR, as it would reduce its own leverage over the former. However, Pakistan’s opportunity to be a military catspaw to the US provides major, though indirect, advantages to China. First is the strong probability of Pakistan making China privy to advance information of US aims and intentions in the region; second being the unlikelihood of Pakistan participation in actions that jeopardise core Chinese interests; and lastly the likelihood of security relief for its vital CPEC project. China is also reasonably assured of continuing bonding of Pakistan to its security needs, owing to its stranglehold over Pakistan economy and the military.     

The transactional approach adopted by the US under the Trump administration is most apparent from its roping of Pakistan to meet its geopolitical needs in the IOR. Pakistan supplies boots on the ground, which US is most reluctant to commit. The Arab countries and other allies pay for the Pakistan military commitments in the Levant. Payments to Pakistan for its geopolitical services are recovered from commercial exploitation of Pakistan’s natural resources. US military engagement with Pakistan applies intense strategic pressure on India to penalise it for not aligning with US interests. Lastly, and most important, it brings US on the doorsteps of China.

On the face of it, India does appear to be on the backfoot owing to the emerging realignment of Pakistan with the US. Pakistan is likely to be emboldened to pursue its proxy war against India with renewed vigour. India is also likely to be inhibited in targeting critical military and economic assets of Pakistan in future short military engagements due to physical presence of US commercial assets in that country. The presence of Chinese commercial assets in Karachi port was probably one of the main reasons that inhibited India from targeting it during Operation ‘Sindoor’, despite overwhelming punitive advantage of executing this option.

However, looked at dispassionately, there are a few advantages as well for India. First is that in the uncertain geopolitical milieu of the transactional approach of the US, China would not like to antagonise India by undertaking any offensive geopolitical manoeuvres/military threats against the latter. To that extent it would ease the march of India on its chosen path of maintaining strategic autonomy. Secondly, when ‘push comes to shove’, US too would not like to undertake any action that is likely to permanently drive India into an unbeatable close Russia-India-China alliance; as it would effectively sound the death knell of the long standing US geopolitical supremacy. Any major Out Of Area (OOA) military commitment of Pakistan may inhibit its commitment to pursue its low threshold, low cost unconventional confrontation with India. Finally, it provides the perfect opportunity for India to avoid aligning with the US in its inevitable military confrontation with China in the long run.

Geopolitical Options For India

The joint threat emerging from a geopolitical realignment of Pakistan with the US, and the latter’s geoeconomic and geopolitical hostility towards India is an unanticipated adversity for India. However, given India’s proclaimed intention to accord primacy to its stated policy of maintaining strategic autonomy, there is no backing away from the situation.

There are several factors which weigh heavily in favour of India, that it needs to take advantage.

China is the primary adversary which the US has to confront, to safeguard its own global geoeconomic supremacy. However, the rising comprehensive national power (CNP) of China is the biggest inhibiting factor for the US to challenge China on its own. The existing convergence of interest between China and Russia against the US, further compounds any confrontational attempts by the latter against China. Without India on its side, US lacks the strategic wherewithal to successfully confront China in its own backyard. India needs to just wait out the current US Donald Trump administration.

The employment of Pakistan military in the Levant, comes with its own drawbacks for the US. Israel, the key US ally in the region around which the US regional security architecture is knit, will always be intolerant of any Pakistan military deployment alongside or even in near vicinity of its borders. This is a high potential stress point. It would lead to Israel and India deepening their mutual security alliance to secure their respective national interests from any negative fallouts of any Pakistan military deployment in the West Asia. Similarly, with Iran’s distrust of Pakistan, it provides additional impetus to a deepening of India-Iran alignment in areas of mutual interest.

Already Russia is drawing away from its tentative engaging Pakistan in assisting its defence equipment production. Joining of Russia and India in research and development of advanced space and military technologies and co-production is another way for India to assert its strategic autonomy.

India and China are both sailing in uncertain waters, being at the receiving end of the US transactional approach in securing its own interests at the cost of allies and foes alike. It is in the best interest of the two countries to currently be accommodative towards their respective core national interests.

As far as India’s policy to combat Pakistan’s unconventional confrontational approach towards itself is concerned, it needs to periodically reiterate no change in its stated policy of suitable diplomatic/military riposte at its own choosing.