A CONCEPTUAL LOOK AT UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
“Law
of Unintended Consequences
Politically influenced structural military reforms undertaken by a
committed bureaucracy and submissive military leadership possess inherent
potential to release parallel forces of unintended consequences more powerful from
those intended.”
‘The exclamation ‘Oh my God!’ lends itself to differing
interpretations based on the tone and inflection point of the verbal delivery.
Whether handled deftly or not, the TOD reforms has full potential to be the ‘Oh
my God!’ moment for India and probably the world too.’
Preamble
To call a spade a spade and be objective may be looked at askance
or be treated as a virtue, depending on the reader perception and volatility of
the subject. The TOD reforms have deeply divided the serving and veteran
strategic community opinion on its viability and efficacy with the veterans,
free of statutory restrictions, naturally more vocal in their expressions.
For military interventions to be successful, one of the prime
consideration is to visualise the end state as a reference point for
culmination of the intervention. Indian military offensive to liberate Bangladesh
best exemplifies a successful military intervention. The military operation was
over by mid-December 1971, and the Indian army swiftly moved out of the country
by March 1972, after repatriating the Pakistan army prisoners of war to India. Operation
PAWAN, on the other hand, despite achieving avowed politico-military goals
recorded in the Indo Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987, was dubbed a failure, due
to incorrect perception of the desired end state.
The history of implementation process of some of the recent
big ticket structural reforms undertaken by the Indian state within financial,
agricultural, and military sectors give rise to legitimate concerns on due
application of mind to study their unintended consequences. Hence, it is very critical
to successful execution of deep structural reforms within the armed forces, that
study of unintended consequences is undertaken prior to implementation.
Outsourcing of military interventions to Private Military
Contractors (PMCs) is emerging as the next world-wise big business opportunity.
The last time Indians fought Indians in a global conflict was during the Second
World War, when the Indian National Army fought alongside the German and
Japanese forces against the British Indian Army in Europe and South East Asia. The
unintended consequences of the impending Tour of Duty (TOD) reforms, coupled
with the emerging trend of outsourced warfare, has the potential to recreate
the scenario.
Broad Factors of the TOD Reforms
In the absence of a Government Order (GO) and accompanying
rules for implementation of this reform, there is no clear understanding of the
factors involved. Some inputs provided to select organisations by Government
functionaries provide the basis for deducing the broad parameters, and are
shared herein. A word of caution is advisable here, in that, there may be a
variation in the deductions being shared and the final reforms as they are
rolled out.
Regular armed forces cadre is likely to be progressively
replaced by 50 % by TOD volunteers, engaged on three to five years term of
service.
The reform will be applicable only for Personnel below
officer ranks (PBOR).
Issue of major deficiencies in officers cadre is likely to be
addressed by making the existing Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) more
attractive (whatever it implies).
Current annual recruitment target of 60000 approximately, to
cater for wastage rate, will likely move up to two lakhs annually.
Existing one lakh vacancies in soldier cadre post COVID 19
due to negligible recruitment during pandemic, is a temporary phenomenon and
should not act as the rationale for TOD reforms.
Lateral absorption into government sector and assured private
sector employment shall be catered for the nearly two lakhs personnel exiting
the armed forces annually.
There will be select volunteers from the Central Armed Police
Force (CAPF) who will be provided temporary deputation with the armed forces
under this scheme.
Lateral absorption of this released
manpower is the crux to successful implementation of this concept.
Unintended Consequences
Government continues to maintain ambivalence on the
underlying aims and objectives of these reforms, content to seed the strategic
community and media with indirect inputs. A government which has announced on
record that the statements of its ministers in Parliament cannot be treated as
policy pronouncement, such indirect inputs have no sanctity.
On the basis of these unverified inputs, multitude of defence
and strategic experts have pronounced that the reforms may fail to achieve the
assessed aim of strengthening the Indian armed forces and making them more
agile for battlefields of the future. They have also raised an array of likely
consequences that may arise such as weakening of the fighting ethos, drop in
proficiency of the personnel manning the crew served war equipment, requirement
of more personnel to man the enhanced training infrastructure, no financial
savings accruing to the state consequent to these reforms, militarisation of
Indian society, fillip to criminal and ideological extremist fringes both
political as well as religious.
The Murky World of Mercenaries &
PMCs
Asymmetrical conflicts raging in Syria and now in Ukraine highlight
the trend of contract warfare through PMCs. This trend had begun to gain
legitimacy during the US military interventions against drug cartels in South
America and became a prominent arm of its military interventions in Iraq, West
Asia, and Africa.
Some of the major PMCs operating across the globe are Academi
(erstwhile Blackwater) of US, Wagner of Russia, Aegis Defense Services of UK,
Unity Resources Group of Australia, Define Internacional based in Peru, and a
host of other conglomerates, overt as well as covert. The combined strength of
mercenaries being fielded by these organisations touch an estimate of half a
million, and the world wide net revenue generated by the industry is estimated to
gross 500 billion US Dollars. Mercenary salaries range from 1000 to 10000 US
Dollars for overt Government sponsored interventions, and are many times more
for engaging in covert military actions.
France has since long been in the forefront of legally
employing mercenaries as an adjunct of their regular army, with the French
Foreign Legion comprising foreign national mercenary volunteers drawn from
across the globe. Islamic mercenaries such as Malhama Tactical based in
Uzbekistan provide guns for hire to terrorist organisations. The Azov paramilitary
battalion merged with the Ukraine military, comprises neo Nazi and white
supremacist mercenaries. Islamic Kadyrovtsy Chechen mercenaries are deployed in
Ukraine. Infact Ukraine is aflush with all shades of mercenaries being employed
in combat on both the warring sides. Yemen is the hotbed of conflict being
waged between Iran sponsored Houthis and Saudi Arabia- UAE sponsored PMCs. Then
there are marine privateers, cyber mercenaries, covert intervention specialists. The major mercenary networks operate from the
US, UK, Russia and other erstwhile USSR republics, Latin American special
operations forces, and the Executive Outcomes “alumnae” network in Africa.
The technological advancements in weaponry, such as land, air
and sea, unmanned autonomous combat vehicles, agile fire power platforms,
electronic platforms, access to geospatial inputs, make these PMCs more
powerful than the armies of more than half the nations of the world. Some of
these major PMCs are already fielding heavy fighting equipment such as tanks,
artillery and attack helicopters. It’s a matter of time before space dimension
also comes into the ambit of PMC operations in the not too distant future.
China is a late entry to the field of PMCs, but
with its past experience in training and sponsoring cross border insurgencies, it
possesses the wherewithal to upscale it at short notice, should the pursuit of
national interests so dictate. Even Pakistan has been deputing its armed forces on government to government
contracts for providing special protection and war fighting military services
to select West Asian countries. Pakistan, through its Inter Service
Intelligence (ISI) also employs its special forces from the Special Services
Group (SSG) as mercenaries, in conjunction with fundamentalist terror
organisations in neighbouring countries.
The concept of PMCs is not new to India. Indian kingdoms
tended to maintain a core standing army with ‘darbaris’ obligated to
provide contractual war fighting resources, in terms of men and material,
during critical periods. The ‘Mansabdari system’ of the Mughal rulers,
too had multiple meeting points with the PMCs of today. Infact under a weak
central rule, it was one of the major factor for armies of Indian kingdoms to
succumb on the battlefield to the invading foreign armies. But currently India
has a void in these resources.
Reverting back to the impending TOD reforms, the issues
highlighted by the plethora of strategic experts are all relevant. But the
proverbial elephant in the room, which seems to be getting overlooked, is the
pitfalls and opportunities emerging from the serious geopolitical trend of
outsourced warfare, the mercenaries and their corporate avatar the PMCs, and
how it may impact the TOD reforms per se. Are we addressing the right
questions?
Short Answers to the Right Questions
“Natural tendency of water torrent is to take the path of
least resistance by going around sundry obstacles, and yet it possesses dynamic
energy to burst through blockades barring its path.”
The approximate one
to two lakhs TOD veterans who shall be released annually from military
contractual service, will fall into three broad categories, the naturally
talented, those with middling expertise, and the run of the mill residue. It
shall be the fate of the first group which should be of greatest interest to
the state. This group shall be possessing competencies which command high value
in the world of outsourced warfare. The state shall find it difficult to
determine their lateral absorption that offers appropriate competitive
remuneration. The second group will likely be more amenable to lateral
absorption in appropriate sectors. The third group, is what is likely to be
left to the mercies of organisations such as Central Association of Private
Security Industry (CAPSI), which has very conveniently openly posted an offer
to the Government on the absorption of TOD veterans. Natural starting point of
the flow of right questions should be this one factor that can make or mar the
reforms...
Will the
Indian state be able to accommodate the TOD veterans in appropriate lateral
absorption/placements to preclude creating a pool of disaffected weapon trained
manpower?
Demonstrated performance of political weakness to closely monitor
implementation of structural reforms coupled with inadequate domain experience,
the demonstrated reluctance of the IAS and allied services bureaucracy and IPS
dominated CAPF hierarchy to share their turf, all indicate to very strong
likelihood of government promises of assured lateral absorption falling well
short from the stated scope.
If the answer is indeterminate, will the Indian state be able to institute appropriate legal safeguards that rule out this qualified manpower migrating to organisations inimical to safe society norms or national interests?
TOD veterans on
release from contractual service are free to offer their services to the
employer of choice. Even current short term legal restrictions leak like a
sieve, and will tend to influence the talented to move towards the covert
mercenary segment. As per conservative estimates, and despite government
restrictions, a few thousand Indian citizens are presently operating overseas as
mercenaries with internationally proscribed terror organisations.
If the answer to the second query too is indeterminate, will it be prudent for the Indian state to encourage Indian PMCs that may further national interests in the domain of outsourced warfare?
In India, some of
the major organisations such as Reliance, Mahindra, Adani are already operating
their own security services with rudimentary small scale intervention
capabilities to guard their assets in weak law and order and insurgent prone
areas. Some medium scale overseas companies owned by Indian veterans are also
competitively engaged in providing combat support services to smaller
countries.
The enforced regime changes in Iraq,
Libya, and Afghanistan, consequent to Western military interventions, released
trained manpower that fuelled religious terrorism on the global stage. Indian
TOD reforms, if not handled intelligently, has the potential to generate the
second influx.
Probably the best way out may be to ponder providing tacit
support to establish/expand scope of Indian PMCs. It fills an existing void in
this domain for India, negates the current advantage held by China and
Pakistan, and provides more reliable absorption to the top segment of Indian
military veterans.
An amusing Corollary to “Oh My God!”
While interacting with an Indian veteran on contract with a
foreign PMC deployed for providing protection to high value US assets in terror
affected region, an interesting experience emerged. This specific security
detail composed of Indian, Puerto Rican, Nigerian, and Ugandan veterans. After
evening roll call, the Indian veterans would hold collective prayers ending
with loud call of “Jai Shree Ram”! This perplexed the other
foreign veterans no end, who wondered why do the Indians regularly draw
attention to “C-RAM”, deployed for point protection of that
site!!! (C-RAM is the acronym for Counter-Rocket Artillery Missile system for
point defense against airborne threats.)
Study
For better grasp of issues involved, readers may also read two
connected writeups
National Ambivalence on Indian Military
https://valleysandvalour.blogspot.com/2022/04/national-ambivalence-on-indianmilitary.html
Indarmy Tour of Duty Reforms
https://valleysandvalour.blogspot.com/2020/08/indarmy-tour-of-duty-reforms.html
Very well covered,we got to wait till the blueprint is released the after effect can only be assessed after 7 to 8 years.
ReplyDeleteAnil thank you for your observation
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