NATIONAL AMBIVALENCE ON INDIAN MILITARY

 

“The power elite distances from it, the deep state abhors it, and the common man adores it!!! This in a nutshell may best sum up the ambivalence of the Indian nation to its military.”- Veteran Col RS Sidhu                                                   

 

Backdrop

This politico-military commentary is being written under the backdrop of two recent and momentous events, one in the domestic arena, and the other in the geopolitical sphere. These two happenings are as distinct from each other as ‘cheese is from chalk’, but yet bounded by one common factor, their impact on the future security of the Indian state.

The first is celebrating the Indian Naval mutinies of 1946 by the Indian Navy under the benign eye of the Indian state, as part of the ‘Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav’, which has gone broadly unchallenged in the political and mainstream media spectrum.  This has succeeded in scripting a new narrative to replace the role of Mahatma Gandhi and the principles of non-violence espoused by him, as being the raison d’etre for grant of independence in 1947 to India by Britain, with the chronicle of armed struggle being the critical factor that led to the British colonial rulers leaving India. The rehabilitation of the erstwhile ‘mutinous’ Indian National Army (INA), the installation of bust of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose at India Gate in the heart of seat of power of modern India, followed by the official patronage to ‘the mutiny of Indian Navy sailors in 1946’, have created a new narrative which ipso facto legitimises the possession and employment of force to secure national interests. Logically, this should free the strategic thought process of India from the shackles of a defensive mindset and its earlier policy inhibitions in proactively employing force to secure its strategic and trade interests.

The second is the poor performance by the military of yet another major power, that is Russia, in Ukraine in the currently underway Ukraine - Russia conflict, which has all the ingredients of throwing the world into yet another period of successive major world conflicts. For India, with two inimical and powerful neighbours, the immediate future is a critical time to bolster its strategic might to enable maintaining a strong dissuasive posture.

The inherent weaknesses of the Chinese soldiers were fully exposed in its failed attempts at ingress in Ladakh in 2020 and continuing confrontation with Indian military. The hasty and disorderly withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has highlighted the failings and staying power of the US soldier. Now Ukraine, in 2022 has showcased the drawbacks of the Russian soldier. Despite technological and numerical superiority, the great power armies have failed to achieve the national aims on the battlefield, owing to weakness of their ‘soldier behind the weapon’.

In silent contrast the Indian soldiers have stood their ground despite all-round deficiencies in equipment and technology, hierarchical ineptitude, and bureaucratic power games. This is the key lesson to which the Indian state should pay close attention.

The first event has irrevocably broken India’s obsession with the after effects of prolonged subjugation to foreign rulers and firmly set it on the new course of retrieving its strong historical and cultural moorings, so essential in its march to be a global power house. The second event highlights the critical significance of the ‘soldier behind the weapon’ or ‘the boots on the ground’, without which it will be difficult for India to promote and secure its world trade and geopolitical interests. With a comparative weak technological base, safeguarding of India’s national interests in the highly volatile, immediate geopolitical future, will be in the hands of its soldiers. The future actions of the Indian state shall determine how strong or shaky these hands will be.

Indian Military and National Power Elite Love-Hate Relationship

Since independence, the Indian military has suffered from a political bias against it under the active prodding of ‘behind-the-scene’ power elites. The initial proposal to reduce the military to a mere 12,000 force, its successive down gradation in the Government’s ‘Order of Precedence’, reducing military pension entitlements from 70% to 50%, periodic ‘bogeys of military coup’, till recently keeping the military hierarchy outside the formal power structure of the national government, reluctance to implement a comprehensive cadre review entailing lateral induction into other Government services, are all indicators of the deep chasm and suspicion between the national power elite and military leadership in India.

Nothing highlights the aversion of the Indian power elites to military service than the dichotomy of queues for enrolment at soldier level, but shortage of trainees in officer training academies despite falling SSB standards. It’s rare indeed, to see the scions of political and business bigwigs and high bureaucrats in military service in India, unlike other major democratic countries. The desperation to overcome the shortfall in the officers cadre of the military, over 9,000 officers less from approved cadre strength of 70,000, is best reflected by the farcical spectacle of conferring military ranks on cricket icons, to attract young talent into the military, whereas the living legends of the military, the winners of the highest gallantry awards, are generally mothballed in cerebral memory, to be taken out and placed on annual display only during the Republic Day Parade.

Seventy long years post-independence, the new political dispensation in power at New Delhi does appear to have developed a new long term strategic vision for India. However, the path for implementing this vision is strewn with implementation failures, giving the impression of it being treated as a system of trial and error, rather than a planned approach. Concentrating on the actions, rather than vocal resolves, of the new power elite at the helm at New Delhi will better enable us to arrive at the truth of the preceding statements.

Long Term Vision

The major pronouncements and follow through actions, by the current political dispensation in New Delhi, impacting the national security interests are stated below: -

-          Incorporation of a vision statement in the Budget 2019-20 to make India a US Dollar 5 trillion economy by 2024-25, presented on 05 July 2019.

-        Announcement of intent to create Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) by the Prime Minister on 15 August 2019.

-          Creation of the post of CDS and Department of Military Affairs (DMA) under Ministry of Defense effective from 01 January 2020.

-          Atamnirbhar Bharat Abhiyan, for achieving self-sufficiency in defence production, started by the Government of India on 13th May 2020.

-          Strategic realignment with US as a co-equal partner, and also promoting an as yet informal QUAD alliance with US, Japan, and Australia in the Indo-Pacific region.

-          Open realignment with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE in West Asia.

Despite multiple, long outstanding recommendations for reforming the national defence structure, the reforms were held ransom to bureaucratic hubris. Implementation of these reforms signals a strong political will to ready the nation for its new geopolitical course to develop economic strength backed by armed might.

Overt cross-LC surgical strikes against Pakistan by Indian military in September 2016 and February 2019, and occupation of Kailash Heights in Ladakh in August 2020 against China during the Ladakh standoff, may be looked as exploratory steps in adopting a proactive strategic stance.

It would thus be a fair assessment to say that the above actions of the current Indian political establishment have ushered a paradigm shift in the long term strategic vision for India.

The Uncharted Course for Achieving Long Term Vision

But the actions to implement this new strategic vision display an unplanned approach or an ambivalent attitude or even resistance from the entrenched ‘deep state’ or a combination of all these factors. There is a visible chasm between the policy formulators and the implementers. A few relevant issues pertaining to the military and defence of the nation are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

First and foremost is the critical and long outstanding issue of restructuring the armed forces, which hinges on the creation of the appointment of CDS and establishing joint Theatre Commands to replace single service commands. These far reaching and most comprehensive ever reforms in the country’s defence architecture being originated through a Government Order (GO), rather than an Act of Parliament, is in itself indicative of these being an ‘experiment in progress’. For instance, neither the CDS nor the Service Chiefs figure in the operational chain of command of the proposed Theatre Commands. This raises legitimate concerns on the efficacy of the GO, or do we regard it as an attempt to scuttle or emasculate an appointment, which may be viewed as antithetical to the parochial interests of the deep state.

Founded in 2009 by Ajit Doval, the current National Security Advisor, the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) has six verticals focused on National Security and Strategic Studies, International Relations and Diplomacy, Neighbourhood Studies, Governance and Political Studies, Economic Studies, and Historical and Civilisational Studies. Its members, comprising prominent former bureaucrats and defence personnel, occupy key positions in the government and are the primary drivers of the long term policy initiatives of the current political establishment in New Delhi. This raises two distinct possibilities about the deficiencies of the impugned GO. First may be a probable carrying forward of the inherent bureaucratic bias against the military by some of these senior functionaries. The second could be a disagreement within the bureaucratic and military stream of VIF experts, leading to a sort of via media, on the lines of ‘camel being a horse designed by a committee…”

The India – China confrontation in Ladakh in 2020, raises serious concerns of the political and military bureaucratic hierarchies not being in sync with the new strategic vision laid out for the nation. The initial reaction to the incident at Galwan was of denial, even embroiling the Prime Minister, wherein he made a categoric denial of any incursion by China. Yet no heads rolled. The earlier supersession of some in the military chain of command, under the pretext of conventional wars being passe, came to haunt the political leadership during the standoff, but the damage had been done. The Chinese strategy, and now Ukraine, again demonstrate the relevance of the conventional wars despite a nuclear umbrella. All combined, it reflects poorly on the defense and security advisors of the new political dispensation. 

India’s defence expenditure is less than 2.1 % of its GDP against global average of 2.6 %. India’s defence spending for 2022 is budgeted at 70.6 billion US dollars, as against 10 billion US Dollars by Pakistan, and 229 billion US Dollars by China. This is grossly inadequate to face a two front threat posed by its adversaries, especially against the backdrop of the global deterioration in the security environment and in our immediate neighbourhood.

Manhandling of the armed forces veterans peacefully protesting for OROP at Jantar Mantar by Delhi Police in October 2017 is in stark contrast to the kids glove handling of violent farmers protest in 2020-21. It does give reason to believe that political concerns hold primacy over national interests while formulating government response.

The current sanctioned strength of the Indian military is under 1.4 million and periodic reviews are being undertaken to downsize its manpower, without touching the bloated civilian military component in various Headquarters and peace establishments. On the other hand, the seven Central Armed Police Forces under the Ministry of Home, are already having a combined cadre strength of close to one million, with their cadre strength being enhanced periodically. This is anomalous, considering that there is sustained deterioration in the external security environment vis a vis improvement in the internal security environment of the country. While CAPF cadre is being showered with Government largesse in terms of enhanced pay and perks and even NFU, the same is being denied to Armed Forces, with even action on report of Justice L Narsimha Reddy One Man Judicial Commission (OMJC) on the Seventh Pay Commission anomalies for armed forces still pending with the Government for more than five years. It does indicate to the Government promoting the CAPF interests while overlooking the military.

A Future Course

The nationalist bent of the current political elite is well established and not being challenged. In the murky world of our national politics staying in power is critical to implementation of the new vision. The above aspects are highlighted to draw attention to the deficiencies of lack of political supervision over the implementation process of the new strategic vision. It simply cannot be left to the discretion of the bureaucratic machinery and the neo advisors who have emerged from within it.

Designing and implementation of policies require totally different expertise. Bringing the two on a common platform is vital for success. The experiment of formulating of policies by VIF and leaving their implementation to select past bureaucrats seconded to the Government has not worked well and needs to be reviewed. The current bureaucratic and military hierarchy needs to be taken on board during the discussion stage and their concerns and viewpoints need to be addressed. As a case in point, had this been done in the issue of inducting women into combat arms, the Government would not have had to take recourse to the circuitous route of Supreme Court to break through the resistance of the Indian military hierarchy on this aspect.

Molding the bureaucracy to adapt to new nationalist ideology and working ethos is time consuming and effort intensive, but is critical to successful implementation of Government initiatives for comprehensive national development and ensuring security environment conducive to competitive commerce and industry both within and without the country.

For a political hierarchy that is alive to national interest, it doesn’t take much to gain trust of the armed forces. The current political dispensation was able to achieve it in the run up to the 2014 general elections before it lost its way under a new set of advisers. Some ‘ustadi nuskas’ are recommended to start with.

The shenanigan of statements made by ministers of the Government in Parliament not to be taken as policy pronouncements may hold water with the judiciary, but the troops will look at it as just a lie. A given word is sacrosanct in the military unlike in the political arena. So promise a soldier only what you can deliver.

Make a start by the Government ministers giving ‘izzat’ to the military living legends, the receivers of the highest gallantry awards, in day to day life rather than paying lip service on Republic Day. Get them to give motivational talks in the presence of ministers and senior military commanders, at officers training academies, at educational institutes, and even to corporate leaderships. It will set the tone for creating respect for the military and attracting requisite talent.

Revamp the Department of Ex-servicemen Welfare by staffing it with a judicious mix of servicemen and bureaucrats. Its injudicious to let wolves be guardians of livestock.

More than INR 500 crores are spent annually only by Army Headquarters on litigation against its own personnel, despite political pronouncements to minimise this litigation.

Possibility of a quid pro quo influencing these decisions needs to be scrutinised. Take onus for close political supervision of this issue, including taking exemplary action against defaulting appointments. Delays in pensionary awards, once the biggest grievance of ex-servicemen, have been considerably brought down owing to concerted interest shown by the hierarchy.

There is no way the military can be comprehensively restructured to meet new age threats, without lateral transfers/induction into other Government sectors. But it gets stuck in bureaucratic limbo as it impacts departmental ‘empires’. The political leadership needs to take onus of this comprehensive military restructuring, after all it’s a win-win situation. The military gets a younger, meaner and more technologically proficient profile, while the nation begets disciplined manpower which can push its way through bureaucratese.

New dangers require new strategies. The new full spectrum war dictates a joint response by the internal and external security apparatus of the nation. The existing chasm between the MoD and MoH needs to be bridged. This will automatically negate setting up and maintaining military and CAPF as mutually antagonistic countervailing forces, and free scarce resources for more profitable ventures.