THEATRE COMMANDS FOR INDIAN ARMED FORCES

INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMANDS FOR INDIAN ARMED FORCES

 

BACKDROP

 

Two seemingly unconnected developments, in Financial Year 2019-2020, have combined to bring about a paradigm shift in India’s declared geo-strategic intent. These are:-

-        Incorporation of a vision statement in the Budget 2019-20, presented on 05 July 2019, to make India a US Dollar 5 trillion economy by 2024-25.

-        Immediately thereafter, announcement of intent to create Chief of Defense Staff by the Prime Minister on 15 August 2019, followed by creation of the post of CDS and Department of Military Affairs under Ministry of Defense effective from 01 January 2020.

They showcase the unequivocal political resolve of the Indian establishment to -

-        Distance itself from the hitherto fore reactive policy, of a status quo power.

-        Attain super-power status in its economy.

-        Simultaneously, upgrade its combat power to proactively deter potential adversaries from direct interference in its economic endeavours and/or territorial integrity.

The push for a US Dollar 5 trillion economy will necessitate greater reach into markets in volatile regions of East Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, Africa and established markets of Europe and Americas. This will involve securing its market access as well as ensuring safety of its trade and commerce over extended maritime trade routes. India currently lacks economic muscle to develop its strategic reach to safeguard its economic interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood. In the near future, reorganising and restructuring its existing armed might is the only viable alternative to synergise and optimise its combat potential, in conjunction with developing strong alliances with extra regional powers having shared security interests. As the economy develops, greater resources shall be made available to expand the strategic reach.

Despite multiple, long outstanding recommendations for reforming the national defence structure, like Kargil Review Committee 1999 and Shekatkar Committee 2016, the reforms were held ransom to bureaucratic hubris. Implementation of these reforms signals a strong political will to ready the nation for its new geopolitical course.

This also shifts the strategic dialogue on creation of integrated Theatre Commands from “acceptance of necessity” to “implementation”. Restructuring the existing Service Commands into Integrated Theatre Commands and Functional Commands, is the next logical step to optimise India’s combat potential, to further the new national aim to develop economic strength backed by armed might.

 

BROAD SPECTRUM OF THREATS

 

China

China, a practioner of coercive diplomacy, can be dealt with successfully only from position of strength. India therefore needs to equip itself with strategic capability, both conventional and non-conventional, to pose credible strategic threat to the core of China and industries critical to its economy and commerce along its exposed coastline.

China is also a leading practioner of asymmetric warfare by employing Left Wing Extremism (LWE), biological and cyberspace proxies to target rival countries. Hence, India’s geopolitical interface with China needs to cater for a conflict escalation matrix in the spectrums of New Age Technology, Cyberspace, Space, Maritime, Insurgency, and Conventional spheres.

 

Pakistan

To overcome its conventional inferiority vis-à-vis India, Pakistan has allied itself deeply with China which has surreptitiously provided it with technical knowhow to develop nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has the capability to launch nuclear armed missiles on India with just 15 minutes reaction scenario. It is also engaged in fuelling cross border terrorism within India. With new off the shelf technology available in open market, it is well within means of Pakistan proxies to employ drones for major terror attacks.

 

Joint Pakistan – China Threat

China is so deeply involved in POJK that it is now de facto party to the dispute by:-

- Occupying Shaksgam Valley region of POJK, illegally ceded by Pakistan to China.

- Constructing and operating energy assets of CPEC in the disputed POJK territory.

- Deploying troops and technical manpower in POJK in close proximity to Line of Control.

Pakistan and China economic and strategic interests have become so enmeshed in POJK and maritime port region of Gwadar in Arabian Sea that strong possibility exists of Chinese strategic response to Indian operations against Pakistan in POJK and Arabian Sea. With the current field force structure of its military, India lacks adequate resources to meet this joint threat.

This will necessitate India to optimise exploitation of existing military resources by:-

- Reorganising its field forces into integrated Theatre Commands.

- Developing joint nationwide airspace defence system against full spectrum of air threats.

- Optimising deployment of Special Forces to proactively neutralise conventional and unconventional warfare spectrum of threats.

- Creating organisation to optimally employ and safeguard its Space based assets.

- Setting up Unified Cyberspace agency to meet the threat in this spectrum.

 

Nepal

Nepal is a soft state with porous borders. Increasing Chinese influence, rise in fundamentalist activities, LWE along the regions bordering India, and sea access to Nepalese trade and commerce are the major areas of concern.

This border is currently manned by Special Services Bureau, a force low in professionalism. Enhanced surveillance and security is required along Nepal border.

 

Bangladesh

The terrain along border with Bangladesh is riverine, hilly and forested making effective border policing difficult. Illegal immigration and sharing of river waters are the two major irritants between the two countries. Pakistan continues to exercise considerable influence amongst fundamentalist sections of Bangladesh.

India’s 24 kms wide Siliguri Corridor lying roughly 130 kms from Chumbi Valley in China, and flanked by Nepal and Bangladesh is a major strategic vulnerability.

 

 Myanmar

The border with Myanmar is porous owing to thick forests making cross border movement of insurgents difficult to intercept.  It also controls land access to the market economies of ASEAN countries. Growing Chinese influence through CMEC is a matter of concern.

 

Srilanka

India’s interests in Srilanka are twofold, security of ethnic Tamils in Srilanka and denial of deep water ports to countries inimical to India.

 

Extra Regional

Aiming to be US Dollar 5 trillion economy in next 5 years shall necessitate further expansion of Indian interests in Africa, West Asia, Central Asia and in East Asia. This may create conflict of interest with ASEAN countries and aspiring regional powers such as Iran and Turkey.

The Indian Ocean region, Africa, West Asia, Central Asia and East Asia are critical to India’s economic and security interests. Expanding Chinese footprint in these areas necessitates geopolitical countermeasures by India.

 

Asymmetric & Proxy Warfare

India is deeply affected by cross border terrorism, fundamentalist and separatist forces in Valley region of J&K and in the North East. Out of a total of 700 odd administrative districts in India, approximately 70 are impacted by LWE.

 

Multi-National Corporations (MNC)

MNCs in the new age technology fields, have adequate resources at their disposal to pose a threat to national security especially in the data security, cyberspace operations and embedded malware in externally procured weapon software programmes.

Some of these MNCs also have the capability to indirectly influence, through their respective Government policies, the strategic environment in our proximity, possibly to our disadvantage.

 

FACTORS IMPACTING REORGANISATION TO JOINT THEATRE COMMANDS

 

Uniqueness of India’s Defense Environment

India has operationally active land borders with two of its most powerful neighbours posing a joint threat.

Combating cross border terrorism and LWE necessitates diverting precious military resources to managing internal security environment.

Maintaining security of Lines of Communication in border areas is a major issue.

 

Paucity of IAF Resources

The IAF has only 28 squadrons as against an assessed requirement of 45 squadrons for meeting the joint threat from two major adversaries. Similarly there is paucity of strategic force multipliers to meet the projected requirements of all the Theatre Commands.

 

Technological Changes

Fast paced advanced technological changes in today’s world are constantly forcing the modern Armed Forces to keep pace with challenging opportunities to innovate new forms of warfare. Paradigm shifts are already taking place from the hitherto fore three dimensional land, sea and air warfare to five dimensional warfare to include space and cyberspace dimensions as well.

Technology is also shrinking the world necessitating expansion of strategic reach of the armed forces. This is throwing newer challenges in the field of communications and logistics infrastructure management.

Space based surveillance, communications, command & control and weapon systems have enhanced battlefield transparency, reduced response time and increased response reliability. Targeting and safeguarding the space assets have introduced new spectrum of warfare.

Synthesis of the triad of nanotechnology based robotics, information technology and biotechnology is breaching the barriers in future frontier technology research and development in quantum computing and Artificial Intelligence weapon platforms. Lethal swarms of self-propelled, Artificial Intelligence capable nano platforms and robotic soldiers are likely to be fielded in the future battlefields, revolutionising Special Forces operations.

The need of seamless integration, complexity, paucity and command and control of such specialised resources will be feasible only through unified functional commands.

 

Requirement of Unified Functional Commands

 

The need of seamless integration, complexity, paucity and command and control of specialised resources will be feasible only through unified functional commands as under:-

Strategic Forces Command tasked with implementation of directions of National Command Authority for specified strategic weapons and assets is already in existence.

Air Defence Command to cater for:-

- Threats from ballistic missiles and new age Artificial Intelligence enabled aerial platforms.

- Conduct of full spectrum of Air Defence operations of National Airspace and designated areas is a must to reduce decision and response time cycle.

- Command & Control of all airborne, maritime, ground based, medium and long range airspace surveillance & warning assets and weapons platform.

- Defence of static vulnerable areas and vulnerable points.

 

Out of Area Command to conduct:-

- Contingency operations against proximate adversaries

- Out of Area Operations

- Hold Strategic Contingency Reserves

 

Special Operations Command to synthesise optimum utilisation of highly specialised joint assets and targeting multiple threats in near simultaneous time frame with requisite speed and stealth.

- Command & Control of Special Forces and assets

- Planning and execution of Special Operations

- Training of Special Forces

- Procurement of Special Forces equipment

- Conduct Out of Area Special Force Operations

 

Space Command for securing space assets and degrading space assets of potential adversary by conduct of:-

- Operations in Space

- Command & Control of Space surveillance and monitoring assets

- Security of Space assets

 

Cyberspace Command to:-

- Coordinate and launch Cyberspace operations

- Formulate Cyberspace policies and doctrines

- Manage Security of cyberspace spectrums and assets

- Conduct Cyberspace surveillance and monitoring

 

Logistics & Training Command to organise Inter Theatre and Out of Area movement of troops, weapons, equipment and logistics material. Economise stock holding through standardisation, joint procurement and holding logistics installations. Enhance jointness through Joint Training doctrines & training installations.

 

DILEMMA OF GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMANDS

 

General

India has a land frontier of 15,200 kms, coastline of 7,500 kms and Exclusive Economic Zone area of 2 million square kilometres. India has a border of 4000 kms with China, 4100 kms with Bangladesh, 1500 kms with Myanmar, 3300 kms with Pakistan, 1800 kms with Nepal, and 600 kms with Bhutan.

 

Border with China

Geographically the land borders between India and China extend from the region of Karakoram Pass in the West to Talu Pass of Arunachal Pradesh in the East. Generally, a single Theatre Command guarding the full extent of borders with China has obvious advantages.

However, due to existing complicity between China and Pakistan over POJK, action by India to recover POJK from Pakistan will impact Chinese economic and strategic assets and may lead to Chinese military intervention. Being the more powerful of the two, POJK should be prudently evaluated in conjunction with Chinese threat. In any case, China has enmeshed itself as party to POJK dispute.

To pose a credible threat India’s Northern Theatre Command should possess requisite conventional military resources and have physical proximity to threaten China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), the two economic corridors vital to China. This would impact core interests of China.

Therefore, extending Northern Theatre Command boundary from Talu Pass in Arunachal Pradesh in the East to Pir Panjal, included, in the West would have following advantages:-

- Single Theatre Command along the entire contiguous land border would provide a cohesive response to Chinese threats.

- Ability to pose credible threat, from within integral conventional resources, to core interests of China in POJK and Myanmar.

- Similarity of terrain along the Theatre Command frontage provides greater flexibility and optimum exploitation of combat resources.

- Pir Panjal, a major land barrier, precludes credible Pakistan threat from South of Pir Panjal along inter theatre boundary.

- Advantage of internal lines of communication vis-a-vis Pakistan in POJK.

- Flexibility in developing complementary operations against China on either flanks.

Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Kashmir Division (Pir Panjal inclusive) of J&K, lying contiguous to the border with China, are essential to provide supporting base for Northern Theatre Command.

Therefore these states need to be incorporated in the jurisdiction of this command.

To retain a balanced command and control posture it would be preferable to relocate the Headquarters of Northern Theatre Command to a more central location. Lucknow, apart from its central location along the Command boundary, also has the advantage of a well- developed infrastructure of Headquarters Central Command.

 

Border with Pakistan

Terrain South of Pir Panjal down to the coast of Gujarat, except for an initial frontage, is conducive to operations by mechanised forces. A unified Theatre Command would be desirable to conduct cohesive operations along the entire front with Pakistan, South of Pir Panjal ranges.

Indian states of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Jammu Division of J&K (South of Pir Panjal), Haryana, Chandigarh provide support base to the Western Theatre Command, hence should form part of its area of jurisdiction.

The existing Headquarters of the Theatre Command located at Chandimandir, may be retained as it lies close to its centre of gravity.

 

Eastern Borders

The terrain is hilly and forested along Myanmar border whereas along Bangladesh border it is riverine to the East and hilly and forested to the North.

The Line of Communication to the North Eastern border with China and to the Eastern border with Myanmar and North Eastern Bangladesh crosses through the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor.

A single command should be responsible for the borders with both Myanmar and Bangladesh, as also the vital Siliguri Corridor.

The Indian states of Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya, West Bengal, Jharkhand, and Orissa provide desired support base to the Eastern Theatre Command, hence should form part of its area of jurisdiction. Its existing Headquarters located at Calcutta is well poised from command and control point of view.

 

 Southern Peninsula

The country’s exposed 7500 kilometres long coastline houses key R&D, manufacturing and logistics hub. It also has an extensive 2 million square kilometres of EEZ. Internal and external security of peninsular India should be the responsibility of one integrated theatre command.

Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Pudduchery, Telengana, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh need to be placed in the jurisdiction of Southern Peninsula Theatre Command, to provide it adequate support base. Its existing Headquarters located at Pune is centrally poised for command and control and should be retained.

 

Eastern Maritime Region

The easiest access to the Chinese core areas and vital economic assets is through its 14,500 kilometres long coastline. India needs to develop strategic naval power capable of delivering a conventional standoff riposte on vital Chinese strategic assets along its exposed coastline.

The Strait of Malacca, lying on the main maritime passage between Pacific and Indian Oceans, is a strategic chokepoint which ends up in the South China Sea. India needs to develop and deploy naval resources to bottle up Chinese maritime traffic on this critical chokepoint, as also threaten Chinese economic assets in South China Sea and Myanmar’s Kyaukphyu deep sea port, the energy supply terminal for CMEC, opening in the Bay of Bengal.

Denial of access to the Indian mainland and its vast Exclusive Economic Zone from the Eastern Maritime waters is vital to the security of the country.

Establishment of an Eastern Maritime Theatre Command, with AoR East of 78 degrees East Longitude extending upto the Eastern coastline of China and Australia, is therefore crucial to safeguard national interests in the Eastern maritime region.

Andaman & Nicobar Islands are strategically located to provide advanced base facilities and should be placed in its area of jurisdiction.

Vishakhapatnam provides adequate infrastructure for a secure base for operations and is recommended for locating the Headquarters of the Eastern Maritime Theatre Command.

 

Western Maritime Region

Physical proximity of the blue water ports of Karachi and Gwadar has opened up the strong possibility of a joint China – Pakistan maritime threat. Threat from maritime bases of China in the Indian Ocean region and Africa maritime region also needs to be countered.

Strategic capability for sea denial to China and Pakistan maritime trade, simultaneously keeping maritime trade routes open to own shipping, needs to be developed.

India needs to deploy adequate maritime resources to pose credible threat to Pakistan coastal region and maritime facilities.

Denial of access to the Indian mainland and its vast Exclusive Economic Zone in the Western Maritime waters is vital to the security of the country.

Establishment of an integrated Indian Ocean Theatre Command, with AoR West of 78 degrees East Longitude extending upto Africa, is therefore crucial to safeguard national interests in the Western maritime region.

The naval base at Karwar in Goa provides adequate infrastructure for a secure base for operations and is recommended for locating the Headquarters of the Indian Ocean Theatre Command.

Own Lakshadweep & Minicoy Islands should be placed in its area of jurisdiction.

 

Likely Contours for Creation of Theatre Commands Enunciated by CDS

Broad contours enunciated by CDS for creation of Theatre Commands, published by Times of India (TOI) dated 04 February 2020 in its article “India will Create Theatre Commands Despite Inter Service Rivalry & Strong IAF Objections”, are as under:-

- An Integrated Air Defence Command

- An Integrated Logistics & Training Command

- One/Two Northern Theatre Commands to handle China (a Northern one West of Nepal and an Eastern one East of Nepal)

- One/Two Western Theatre Commands to handle Pakistan (one in J&K and the other to include Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat)

- Southern Command for Peninsular India to deal with maritime boundaries, by integrating the existing Western Naval Command, Eastern Naval Command, Southern Naval Command and Southern Army Command.

- Naval Headquarters to deal with the “Big Picture” of the Indian Ocean Region to safeguard India’s interests stretching from East Africa to Australia and Malacca Strait.

- Strategic Forces Command already exists

- Andaman & Nicobar Theatre Command already exists

- Theatre Commands to be set up within likely time frame of three years

 

Assessment of Details Published in TOI Article

- Clarity exists on creation of Integrated Commands for Air Defence, Logistics & Training Command, and Southern Peninsular Theatre Command.

- Clarity also exists on continuation of Strategic Forces Command.

- Continuation of Andaman & Nicobar Theatre Command or its likelihood of coming under Southern Peninsular Theatre Command is as yet unclear.

- Decision to handle borders with China by establishing one or two Theatre Commands is not yet finalised. Same is also the case for handling the border with Pakistan.

- Fate of Eastern Army Command is unclear. If it is retained as a separate Theatre Command then it will impact the responsibility proposed to be assigned to Southern Peninsular Theatre Command.

- Creating a Southern Command for Peninsular India to deal with maritime boundaries, by integrating the existing Western Naval Command, Eastern Naval Command, Southern Naval Command and Southern Army Command, is a very interesting development. It creates a huge synergy of resources tasked for the defence of Peninsular India and its maritime region, to include the vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However, it leaves unclear the command and control and allocation of resources for domination of beyond the near horizon maritime regions and vital sea lanes of communications.

- Similarly, the tasking of Naval Headquarters to deal with the “Big Picture” of the Indian Ocean Region stretching from East Africa to Australia and Malacca Strait, is surprising. Firstly, it lies beyond the stated Government policy of no operational role for individual Service Headquarters. Secondly, it will entail major coordination between Naval Headquarters and the naval resource holding Southern Peninsular Theatre Command, ipso facto broadening the area of operations of the latter. Thirdly, it is likely to interject the factor of duality of command and responsibility, not an ideal solution.

- Probability exists of this being an interim arrangement and may be remedied at a later phase of reorganisation.

- The issue of Integrated Functional Command to handle the highly complex Cyberspace dimension has not been touched upon. This indicates a duality of mind on way forward to homogenise cyberspace operations, technological resources and their command and control. More so as Cyberspace Command, per se, will entail dovetailing operations with other critical non-military organisations and agencies. Setting up an interim organisation to gain additional expertise prior to decision making should be an option under consideration.

- Functional Command for Space dimension has also not been touched upon. Keeping in view the centrality of space based assets in future conflict scenario, this is a surprising omission. Probably additional capability development in managing the resources for securing this fifth dimension of warfare is required. An interim agency, in conjunction with DRDO and ISRO, as a precursor to establishment of a Functional Space Command should be an option under consideration.

 

- Setting up a Joint Special Operations Command is already work in progress.

- Out of Area Theatre Command does not find mention in the views expressed by CDS. The reorganisation to Theatre Commands is currently at a very nascent stage to discuss establishment of a Theatre Command with nebulous tasking.

 

 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMANDS

 

Currently India has a total of 19 commands:-

-        Seven Army Commands (six are operational)

-        Seven Air Force Commands (five are operational)

-        Three Naval Commands (two are operational)

-        Two Joint Commands

 

Integrated Theatre Commands

 

Western Command

Decision to handle borders with Pakistan by establishing one or two Theatre Commands is not yet finalised, as per the views expressed by CDS.

A single Theatre Command, Headquartered at Chandimandir is recommended to handle border with Pakistan, excluding POJK North of Pir Panjal.

Northern Command

As per CDS, the reorganisation of Theatre Commands to cater for border against China is also not yet finalised.

Here again a single Theatre Command, Headquartered at Lucknow is recommended to handle the Northern borders from POJK North of Pir Panjal (included), China, Nepal, and Bhutan. Extension of AoR of this single Theatre to include POJK North of Pir Panjal (included) is strongly recommended to cater for joint China-Pakistan threat.

Eastern Command

Here again there is lack of clarity at this given point of time of retaining Eastern Command as a Theatre Command or merging its area of responsibility fully with Northern Theatre Command or in part with Northern Theatre Command and rest with Southern Peninsular Command.

It is recommended to retain Eastern Command as a Theatre Command with reduced responsibility of catering to border with Myanmar and Bangladesh.

South Central Command

A single Theatre Command, Headquartered at Pune, is recommended to handle Internal and external security of peninsular India.

The CDS has indicated creation of Southern Peninsula Theatre Command by merging the existing single Service Southern Army Command, Southern Naval Command, Eastern Naval Command and Western Naval Command. This Theatre shall be responsible for the defence of Peninsular India, to include the EEZ. The future of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands Theatre Command is also unclear.

However when read in conjunction with the tasking of Naval Headquarters to deal with the Big Picture” of the Indian Ocean Region stretching from East Africa to Australia and Malacca Strait, it does raise grave implications of long term viability of this reorganisation.

Here it would be prudent to accept this reorganisation as an interim measure, to assess its viability. Possible future trifurcation of this Theatre Command into Eastern Maritime Theatre, Western Maritime Theatre and Southern Peninsular Theatre cannot be negated at this juncture.

Eastern Maritime Command

Eastern Maritime Theatre Command, with AoR East of 78 degrees East Longitude extending upto the Eastern coastline of China and Australia, Headquartered at Vishakhapatnam with advanced base facilities at Andaman & Nicobar Islands is recommended.

Indian Ocean Command

Indian Ocean Theatre Command, with AoR West of 78 degrees East Longitude extending upto Africa, Headquartered at Karwar with advanced base facilities at Lakshadweep & Minicoy Islands is recommended.

Indian Ocean Theatre Command and Eastern Maritime Theatre Command

These recommendations stand negated in view of the views already expressed by the CDS. However, the existing Eastern and Western Naval Commands and the Andaman & Nicobar Island Theatre Command are likely to be the nucleus for future reorganisation of Maritime Theatre Commands as and when the need for the same is articulated and accepted in the future.

Integrated Functional Commands

 

Strategic Forces Command

Already functional

Air Defence Command

Creation of this Command is accepted and planning for implementation is in progress.

Logistics & Training Command

Necessity for creation of this Command is accepted, as enunciated by CDS.

Special Operations Command

Setting up of this Command is in progress.

Out of Area Command

Creation of this Command is not a priority and does not find mention in the views expressed by CDS. The reorganisation to Theatre Commands is currently at a very nascent stage to discuss establishment of a Theatre Command with nebulous tasking.

Space Command

Functional Command for Space dimension has not been touched upon by the CDS. Additional capability development in managing the resources for securing this fifth dimension of warfare is also required. An interim agency, in conjunction with DRDO and ISRO, as a precursor to establishment of a Functional Space Command is recommended as an option.

Cyber Command

Cyberspace dimension has also not been touched upon. Cyberspace Command, per se, will entail dovetailing operations with other critical non-military organisations and agencies.

Setting up an interim organisation to gain additional expertise prior to decision making is recommended as an option.

 

MEETING THE MAJOR CHALLENGES OF REORGANISATION OF INTEGRATED COMMANDS

 

Distribution of Limited Strategic Resources & Force Multipliers

The biggest challenge to establishment of Integrated Theatre Commands will be the acute shortage of land, air, and maritime strategic assets. Similarly there is paucity of strategic force multipliers to meet the projected requirements of all the Theatre Commands.

Retaining these scarce resources centrally shall defeat the very purpose of Integrated Theatre Commands and also complicate the command and control of these assets. The Service Headquarters are not in the chain of operational command & control as per the restructuring in place, while the CDS and HQ Integrated Defense Staff is not designed for operational command & control. So retaining vital assets under indeterminate command & control will result in delayed decision matrix.

Therefore, strategic assets and force multipliers should be allocated based on threat perception, identified need and inter se priority of adversary.

 

Primarily the major threats across land borders are most likely to emanate from China and Pakistan. Since China is the major adversary of the two, primacy needs to be accorded to Northern Theatre Command. Conventional strategic assets and force multipliers with adequate reach to pose a credible threat to CPEC and CMEC, need to be allocated to Northern Theatre Command to enable it to impact core interests of China, from within integral resources. China’s major strategic weakness is its extended, tenuous and exposed lines of communication along the borders facing India. Strategic interdiction capability is therefore essential for carrying battle into China’s depth areas.

Also it is the Northern Theatre Command which shall have to bear the brunt of a joint China – Pakistan threat and needs to be bolstered ab initio with requisite strategic assets.

Similarly in the maritime space, the contenders for scarce strategic assets are the Eastern Maritime Command and Indian Ocean Command. Here again the criticality of the trade and commerce routes and joint maritime threat from China and Pakistan lies in the Indian Ocean Command AoR, and hence, needs to be given primacy in allocation of strategic assets.

An option to utilise Integrated Overseas Command, if established, as a reserve command can also be considered. In such an eventuality it may be tasked to hold all strategic and force multiplier assets of all three services, to be allocated on operational directive of the Government through CDS. This aspect should not carry weight in delaying restructuring.

 

Absorption & Management of Existing Ranks of Individual Services

Reduction of individual Service Command Headquarters from existing 19 commands to 13 Theatre and Functional Commands will throw up the second major challenge of management of surplus cadre. In a steeply pyramidal hierarchy this will create deep dissonance.

Upgradation of specified appointments, lateral absorption and enhanced deputation vacancies in Government organisations and PSUs are the likely way forward in the near term.

IMPLEMENTATION

 

The stated intent of making India a US Dollar 5 trillion economy by 2024-25, and the inherent commitment of developing economic strength backed by armed might, leaves no room for delay in optimising the country’s combat potential.

India also has an “unfinished business of Partition” with Pakistan, inherent in the 22 February 1994 resolution of the Parliament, unequivocally stating the entire State of Jammu & Kashmir as integral part of India and calling upon Pakistan to vacate its illegal occupation of POJK.

The efficacy of existing command infrastructure, to successfully implement the assigned aim, has already been exposed during Op Pawan and Op Parakram.

The strong and real danger of joint threat posed by China and Pakistan, owing to their enmeshed economic and strategic interests, dictates urgency in implementing restructuring of field forces.

The strong political will to adopt a proactive geopolitical stance, reflects availability of establishment backing to overcome opposition/delay in implementation of field force reforms.

Phase I (First Year)

Assessing requirement and tentative allocation of Service resources

Unified Strategic Forces Command exists

Phase II (Second Year)

Northern Command to assume responsibility of Western Command along Himachal Pradesh border with China.

Unified Special Forces Command is established

Unified Air Defence Command is established

Phase III (Third Year)

Integrated Northern Theatre Command comes into being and assumes responsibility of Central Command along Uttar Pradesh border with China

Integrated Western Theatre Command is established and assumes responsibility of South Western Command along border with Pakistan

Integrated Eastern Theatre Command is established and assumes responsibility of Andaman Tri Services Command

Integrated South Central Theatre Command is established

Integrated Eastern Maritime Theatre Command is established

Integrated Western Maritime Theatre Command is established

Integrated Logistics & Training Command is established

Phase IV (Fourth Year)

Integrated Northern Theatre Command assumes responsibility of Integrated Eastern Theatre Command along border with China

Integrated Western Theatre Command assumes responsibility of Integrated South Central Theatre Command along border with Pakistan

Integrated Overseas Command is established

Unified Cyber Command is established

Phase V (Fifth Year)

Integrated Northern Theatre Command assumes responsibility of Integrated Western Theatre Command in POJK (North of Pir Panjal inclusive)

Unified Space Command is established

 

END NOTES

There shall be resistance to change.

Longer the period of change greater shall be the resistance and longer the window of vulnerability.

Balance in defensive posture has to be ensured by staggering the restructuring and assumption of full responsibility of designated AOR by Integrated Northern Command and Integrated Western Theatre Command in phases.

Strategic Force multiplier assets and resources, not available in adequate numbers, may be placed under Integrated Overseas Command as strategic reserves. This aspect should not carry weight in delaying restructuring.

To speed up the restructuring of new Unified Commands, ad hoc organisations may be created for specified period, for pre planning and infrastructure development.

Periodic reviews shall have to be undertaken to resolve inadequacies and vulnerabilities.

Personalities with proven dynamic profile shall have to be identified to push through the restructuring in acceptable time frame.

This will be the most comprehensive restructuring of the Armed Forces, and there will be unforeseen glitches, which shall have to be addressed on the go.