REPUBLIC OF INDIA INTERNAL SECURITY PORTENDS 2021-25

 

RUMINATIONS ON REINTEGRATION OF MECHANISED FORCES

“The mechanised forces, with their inherent potential to shift the battlefield centre of gravity by their very presence, are the decisive arm in land battle, from the high altitude plateaus down to the plains, deserts, and the littoral regions.” – Col RS Sidhu

 

Backdrop

The Directorate General Mechanised Forces (DGMF) was established in 1986 by amalgamating the Directorate of Armoured Corps and the Mechanised Infantry Regiment, newly raised in 1979, after detaching the latter from the Directorate General of Infantry.

Incidentally, the decision of 1979 to amalgamate the Mechanised Infantry battalions into a new Regiment was vehemently opposed by both the Corps of Infantry and the Armoured Corps. This opposition led to several attempts to disband the Regiment in the first two decades of its existence. Reversion of battalions to erstwhile parent regiments, reassigning ICVs to ASC transport battalions with permanent crews as in the tank transporter company, and infantry battalions providing stick component by rotation, were all throwballed! It is to the credit and professionalism of the senior military leadership that the Regiment not only survived but continued to grow in stature and strength.

By the close of the 20^th century, the Brigade of the Guards was also converted to Mechanised Infantry. In 2020, the Mechanised Infantry was hived out of the DGMF into a separate Additional Directorate General of Mechanised Infantry.

The responsibility for this impercipient separation of the two core components of the Mechanised Force must be assigned to the myopic senior military leadership. The Armoured Corps has to shoulder greater responsibility for this failed jointness, being the dominant partner with a favourable two is to one ratio between the units of the two fighting arms. The Mechanised Infantry was placed on a secondary pedestal in terms of prioritising modernisation of equipment; tenanting key command, staff, instructional appointments; and avenues for promotion. This did not meet the requirement of professionalism.

In a major review of the futuristic battlefield milieu, post – Operation Sindoor, an ‘in principle’ decision was taken around September 2025 to once again reintegrate the Armoured Corps and Mechanised Infantry, at Army Headquarters under Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), turning the wheel full circle. As of 01 June 2026 the Armoured Corps and Corps of Mechanised Infantry have again come together under one roof in the Army Headquarters.

Jointness of Mind

Mechanised warfare is all about combining the flair of a technical mindset, the obduracy of mind of close quarter battle, into that intangible sense of mental mobility, that make it the decisive factor in land battle. But the foremost requirement is the ‘jointness of mind’ of all stakeholders. This takes years to mature in the rank and file, and needs constant reiteration by sagacious leadership, especially at the apex hierarchy of the Mechanised Force.

Learning from their erstwhile dissolved experience of jointness, the senior leadership of the two organisations need to be cognitive of the fact that they have distinctive professional needs. Only then jointness will develop.

The exponential 360 degree proliferation of threat to major weapon platforms, makes survival on the battlefield the key doctrinaire factor. Hence, the primary focus of the Mechanised Infantry and the Armoured Corps should be to optimally synergise their combat power in the battlefields of the future.  The greatest incentive for them to learn to live and fight in cohesion is that their very survival on the future battlefield will be predicated on the degree of coherence they achieve in peacetime. The inherent strengths of the two fighting arms cover the vulnerabilities of the other. Hence, there can be no substitution to ‘jointness of mind’.

The first decade of reintegration of Armoured Corps and Mechanised Infantry shall be critical to ensure that DGMF succeeds in its resurrected avatar. This will entail it being led by visionary leadership, above parochial loyalties, and with adequate tenure in the appointment to deliver on long term plans.

Key deliverables that need priority pursuit are discussed below in brief.

Promotional Avenues

The present officer cadre pro rata promotion policies in the star ranks have a predominant bias that favours Infantry. This has resulted in major imbalance, impacting the espirit de corps within the ‘fighting Arms’, and between the ‘fighting and supporting Arms’, and the Arms and Services. It goes against the very principle of promoting jointness.

Today’s technology predominant battlefield does not support according primacy to a specific fighting arm. ‘Operation Sindoor’ is a prime example of this factor, where gallantry awards were showered on combatants who were deployed well in depth of the tactical battlefield, and were nowhere face to face with the enemy.

Cross fertilisation of command appointments of fighting formations is the need of the future. Gen K Sundarji, the first infantry officer entrusted to command an armoured division, and Lt Gen Arjun Ray, a mechanised force officer entrusted to command a frontline mountain corps, are live examples who synergised their command by infusing innovative operational doctrines that stand the test of time.      

The concept of pro rata promotion policy in senior ranks is contrary to the logic of jointness. The promotion to ‘star’ ranks needs to be competence based rather than on pro rata strength.

Mapping Future Battlefields

The recent wars between Armenia – Azerbaijan, Russia – Ukraine, Israel – Hamas/Hezbollah, US/Israel – Iran, and the Indian military ‘Operation Sindoor’ against Pakistan have asserted the dominant role of advanced technologies on the battlefield, and the need to judiciously align combat force structures, equipment profile, and tactical battlefield doctrines. 

Synthesis of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Quantum Computing, Robotics, and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), have merged the boundary between the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) and depth areas. Command & Control headquarters, major weapons platforms, communication and surveillance networks shall be the primary targets for the adversary.

For the Mechanised Forces, the cyberspace spectrum shall pose the most lethal threats. Cyberattack, DEW, Drone swarms, autonomous anti-tank weapon platforms, shall pose a 360 degree threat envelop, right from their permanent location, through staging areas, to the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).

Survivability on the emerging battlefields, therefore, should logically form the root for the Mechanised Force in incorporating doctrinaire, equipment profile, and organisational changes.

Survivability and Cyberspace Dominance

Battlefield survivability shall be predicated on real time awareness of likely threats in area of interest, domination of area of influence, and security of cyberspace spectrum. The enhanced range of threat spectrum with extremely high hit probability, and increased reach of own weapon platforms, dictate revisiting the desired spread of areas of interest and influence at the level of Combat Team (CT)/Combat Group (CG)/Combat Commands (CC). The area of influence for the three components may range from 50 – 200 sq kms, whereas the area of interest could extend from 100 – 300 sq kms, or as reviewed.    

The greatest threats to the Mechanised Force shall be posed from the cyberspace spectrum. It will require integral offensive and defensive cyberspace resource with the Mechanised Forces to exercise effective domination of cyberspace spectrum in the area of influence. The electronics and communications of the Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) shall have to be hardened to withstand offensive actions from the cyberspace spectrum and DEW. The Mechanised Force of the future needs AFVS armed with DEW.

The presence of plethora of autonomous weapon platforms on the battlefield will require hardy identification Friend Foe (IFF) suite for the Mechanised Forces, linked to the full spectrum of own weapon platforms. 

To further reduce exposure on the mobile battlefield, the AFVs should be equipped with Autonomous Unmanned Fighting Vehicles (AUFV) and armed drones as flank scouts, reconnaissance, surveillance, and screen roles. 

Reorganising of the Mechanised Force units’ Signal Tp/Pl for cyberspace dominance, and Recce Tp/Pl for operating Drones maybe considered.

Review of Operational Doctrines and Tactics

Effective defence against DEW, long range precision guided munition (PGM), Drone swarms, Loitering munitions, miniature land autonomous weapon platforms, shall dictate revision of operational doctrines and tactics of the Mechanised Forces. Operational doctrines and tactics specific to extreme high altitude (EHA), and the littoral regions, will require to be evolved.

The prime endeavour of the Mechanised Forces is to restrict the manoeuvre capability of the adversary, while retaining their own freedom to movement. This is achieved in the open terrain by establishing delay lines fortified by artificial obstacles, and establishing pivots to channel the enemy into a killing zone. It is also predicated on availability of time and space for manoeuvre, and adequate reserves, as massed armour generates its own momentum. However, the narrow valleys in EHA restrict manoeuvrability and impose penalties of a narrow frontage.

Are the principles of mechanised warfare in plains/desert terrain applicable to EHA? Does the EHA terrain favour a battle of attrition on a single defensive line or establishing successive delay lines? How does the High Altitude Mechanised Force (HAMF) orchestrate simultaneity in targeting the head, the centre, and the rear of advancing mechanised forces of the adversary to break the momentum of massed armour in extreme high altitude terrain? Can the naturally steep escarpments and relatively narrow valleys be incorporated into the Mechanised Force design of battle in EHA? How does the defender orchestrate numerical superiority at the point of contact chosen by the attacker? These are queries that demand an innovative approach.

Same holds true for employment of Mechanised Forces for amphibious operations in the Littoral regions. The philosophy and concept of operations for a Maritime Mechanised Force (MMF) needs to be well defined.

Developing a design of battle that employs Mechanised Forces to fight a battle of attrition, is the product of staid mind. An innovative design of battle that synergises the employment of HAMF, Special Forces, and air effort is the need of the hour. Development and procurement of complementary major weapons platforms and supporting equipment for the Mechanised Forces should be based on the outcome of the new doctrine operational doctrines. 

Jointness with Motorised Infantry and Supporting Arms

Another major factor for pursuit by the DGMF is synergising jointness with Arms and Services equipped with AFVs and Armoured Support Vehicles (ASV) operating in conjunction with the Mechanised Force.

Already the process of motorising the Infantry Battalions operating in the plains sector is well underway, by equipping them with armoured High Mobility Vehicles with advanced integral firepower. How and what differentiates the combat potential and principle of employment of the Mechanised Infantry and the Motorised Infantry is a serious factor that needs to be addressed. Does this throw up a need for the Motorised Infantry to also be brought under the umbrella of the DGMF, or the Mechanised Infantry to revert to the Directorate General of Infantry is a subject of serious brainstorming. Providing the Mechanised Infantry with vertical mobility on the future battlefields is also a matter of dialectic study.

The Artillery, Engineers, and Signals supporting arms too are equipped with AFVs and ASVs in large numbers that shall likely exceed the numbers of AFVs with the Mechanised Force.

There is an urgent need to synchronise compatibility of communications, IFF, EW suite, and engineering support for this whole. The reintegrated DGMF shall have its hands full to navigate the prevalent organisational, operational and equipping contradictions, with equilibrium and sagacity.