OPERATION 'SINDOOR'/OPERATION 'BUNYAN UL MARSOOS'

A DIALECTIC INQUIRY (Abridged)

PART 3 – STRATEGIC EVALUATION

 

The Second Law of Unintended Consequences

“Applying force via fulcrum to leverage an object, without true understanding of all the related parameters, will move the object in the direction opposite to that intended, and if persisted, result in unintended break of the fulcrum itself.” – Col RS Sidhu

 

Preamble

The 22^nd April 2025 massacre at Baisaran meadow of Pahalgam, India in a cross-border Pakistan sponsored terrorist act, occurred in the immediate aftermath of a religiously inflammatory address by Gen Asim Munir, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army and the de facto ruler of Pakistan, on 16^th of April 2025. He termed J&K as the jugular vein and emphasised the irreconcilable differences in the identity of Pakistan and a ‘Hindu’ India. This set the ideological overtone for the communal massacre of Indian citizens by Pakistan sponsored terrorists. 

India named its military response to the massacre as ‘Operation Sindoor’. In ‘Sanatam Dharm’, widely but incorrectly known as ‘Hindu’ religion, ‘Sindoor’ is a religious mark applied on the head by a married woman, and holds religious and spiritual significance. The terrorists had brutally shot dead the male hostages, after ascertaining their religion, in front of their wives and children. ‘Operation Sindoor’ obliquely signifies seeking reprisal for the widows of the Indian citizens massacred in cold blood.

Pakistan followed through by naming its riposte to Indian military strikes as ‘Operation Bunyan ul Marsoos’, after a verse from the holy book of Islam, “Indeed, Allah loves those who fight in His cause in rows as though they are a solid structure (Bunyan ul Marsoos).” – Quran, Surah As-Saaf (Chapter 61, Verse 4).

This set the stage for the first spiritual-military confrontation between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan, with a highly factitious domestic polity, and dwindling support from the Islamic comity of nations, hoped to rally domestic and the ‘Islamic Ummah’ (world muslim community) support, to face off the Indian military challenge. More insidiously, it was also an attempt to subvert the loyalty of the substantial Indian muslim population by appealing to place religion over country.

For India, it highlights the determination of its current unabashedly nationalist and right wing Government to take Pakistan head-on by calling its religious bluff. At the same time, it also looked to consolidate its domestic base.

Factors at Play

This inquiry shall not be complete without first factoring the influence of China in the entire episode. Despite facing unremitting hostility from China, the Indian state and its military has a lot to thank it for. The covert hand of China in leveraging Pakistan to orchestrate the course of events leading to Operation ‘Sindoor’/Operation ‘Bunyan ul Marsoos’, is the third instance after 1962, and 2020, when Chinese hostility has forced India to undertake strategic course corrections in the right direction.

The second aspect which needs detailed consideration is the plausible trigger for the Pahalgam massacre and the subsequent chain reaction.

Thereafter, several tangible and intangible factors have been considered to holistically assess the outcome of the first spiritual-military confrontation between India and Pakistan in April-May of 2025. More often than not it’s the ‘intangibles’ that assume greater criticality and are also more difficult to analyse. The evaluation shall cover the following: -

Preliminary Inquiry

China Factor

Plausible Trigger

Review of Tangibles

Factor 1 – National Aim

Factor 2 – Role of Predictability 

Factor 3 – Nuclear Deterrence

Factor 4 – Effect on National Economy

Discussing Intangibles

Factor 5 – India’s ‘Operation Sindoor New Normal’ Doctrine 

Factor 6 – Domestic Impact

Factor 7 – Geopolitical Repercussions

Factor 8 – Perception Management

The China Factor

China looks at the territory of all countries adjoining its land borders, and the maritime waters adjoining its eastern board, as its first line of defence. Since the coming to power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China, it looks at India and Japan as major stumbling blocks to its dominance in Asia, and its aspiration to orchestrate a China centric global order.

To secure its Northwestern, and Southwestern flanks it has cultivated nuclear armed North Korea and Pakistan. China is also the biggest supplier of major weapons and military infrastructure for the Pakistan military, and the largest investor in its energy, ports, and surface communication infrastructure. The choke hold of China over Pakistan is further revealed from two statistics.  80% of weapons and equipment of Pakistan military are from China, and the latter is also its biggest creditor with loans totalling US Dollars 29 billion, which is 22% of total debt of Pakistan.

China has invested deeply in the energy, surface communication, and maritime infrastructure in Pakistan, under the special purpose vehicle the China Pakistan Energy Corridor (CPEC). This is critical to its own energy security as an alternative to the vulnerable maritime trade route.

The key factor that cements the alliance between China and Pakistan is their enduring hostility towards India. Both are totalitarian states with a common long term vision to neutralise India and stymie its rise on the global stage. Pakistan is the perfect and ever willing catspaw of China for use against India.

Plausible Trigger

The fail safe remedy of every totalitarian state, when faced with critical internal contradictions is to raise the bogey of external threat. The leadership of China is faced with economic turmoil resulting from the most unpredictable and frequently changing stance of the Trump administration of the US, being enforced through tariff war, trade restrictions on high technology related merchandise, and manipulating shifts of critical foreign manufacturing away from China. Even more concerning to China is the likely shift of this manufacturing to its Asian rival India.

Pakistan itself is in the throes of great political turmoil. Its economy is stagnating, and mere survival is dependent on foreign loans. While uniting the country against the traditional enemy India is a time tested option for the Pakistan military, the poor state of the economy makes any prolonged military confrontation against a powerful India, on its own, unsustainable.

For China, embroiling India in a prolonged regional conflict with Pakistan is a low cost alternative to dissuade this shift. An open military confrontation with India, prolonged and subsidised by covert support from China, suits the self-interests of the leadership of both the states.

The methodology of the massacre of innocent civilians, and provoking message left with the survivors indicate inviting an assured response from a predictable India.

The tracing of Chinese Huawei satellite phones and highly encrypted ‘Ultra’ sets that communicate via Chinese BeiDou satellite system communication link with the terrorists, are plausible indicators of indirect Chinese facilitation.

The ‘battlefield indicators’, selection of inaccessible to vehicular traffic, void of security cover, and remote locale for executing terrorist action, are hallmarks of military precision and extensive training.

Even the selection of the date and time for the planned massacre, synchronised with the absence of the Indian PM on a foreign visit to Saudi Arabia is highly revealing.

It all points to a joint, well planned strategy to enmesh India in an economically debilitating military confrontation.

Factor 1 – Defining & Achievement of Aim

There is no official Indian document in the public domain which declares the aim for ‘Operation Sindoor’. The same, perforce, needs to be deduced from the statements of their apex leadership. Here two statements stand out.

The first is the categoric remark of the Indian PM, made on 24^th of April 2025, his first public address in the immediate aftermath of the Pahalgam massacre, “…Today, from the soil of Bihar, I say to the whole world: India will identify, track, and punish every terrorist, and their backers. We will pursue them to the ends of the earth…I want to say in the clearest terms: those who carried out this attack, the terrorists, and those who plotted it, will face punishment beyond their imagination...The time has come to wipe out even the last remnants of terrorist strongholds.”

The second is the statement of the PM at a joint meeting with the RM, NSA, CDS, and Chiefs of Staff of the three services, held on 29^th of April 2025, as reported in the media, “…it is our national resolve to deal a crushing blow to terrorism”.

In concise words, the stated aim of Operation ‘Sindoor’ may well be inferred as

-          identifying and neutralising the five perpetrators of the massacre, their supporting OGWs from the LeT/TRF, Pakistan based masterminds of the LeT/TRF, and their ISI handlers from the Pakistan military.

-          neutralising major terror sites housing the command chain, training infrastructure, and logistics network of Pakistan based terror organisations operating against India.

-          dissuade Pakistan from undertaking/supporting such misadventures in future. 

In the above meeting of 24^th of April, the PM was also quoted, “… (of delegating) complete operational freedom to decide on the mode, targets, and timing of the nation’s response to the Pahalgam terror attack…”, to the Chiefs of Staff of the three services.

However, in a functioning democracy, such ‘free hands’ are invariably accompanied with unstated caveats. In this instance, it may be inferred from the diplomatic signalling between New Delhi and Islamabad, and the decision to select only terrorist infrastructure targets for initial neutralisation, that giving minimum cause to the adversary to escalate the military confrontation was a key consideration.

The initial strikes caused severe destruction to the command chain of JeM at Markaz Subhanallah Bahawalpur, and the LeT Markaz Taiba at Muridke, and their advanced camps at Shakargarh and Sharjal at Sialkot in Punjab province of Pakistan. In POJK the terror infrastructure of JeM, LeT, and HuM was hit at Mehmoona Joya, Gulpur and Abbas near Kotli, Barnala near Bhimber, and Syedna Bilal and Sawai Nala near Muzaffarabad in POJK.  A total of nine terror sites, four in Punjab province of Pakistan, and five in POJK were targeted.

These sites account for nine of the 21 terror sites reflected in the map displayed during the official press briefing at New Delhi. It is logical to assume that the balance twelve terrorist camps had minimal logistics infrastructure being more of transit facility prior to infiltration into India, and were likely vacated owing to the long anticipated Indian retaliatory strike. Hence, were not deemed as a viable target for punitive action.

However, the heads of the LeT, JeM, and HuM are still in command of their terrorist organisations. There is no official input on the action against the ISI handlers. The five terrorists involved in executing the massacre are also untraceable. It may therefore be judicious to infer that achieving the inferred aim by India is only partial.

But the heavy retaliation by Pakistan escalated the conflict into a direct, though limited, confrontation between the two militaries. Here India, by breaching the Pakistan ADGE to inflict heavy damage on all their major strategic airbases, gained a decisive edge. This advantage was further broadened by restricting Pakistan offensive assets to the vicinity of the IB.  

Pakistan on the other hand, failed to attain most of its national objectives. The UNSC meet held at its request was inconclusive. Except for a symbolic statement in favour of Pakistan by the OIC, and statements of support from China, Turkiye, and Azerbaijan, its stand did not receive any international support. 

Militarily it was not able to provoke India into a prolonged military standoff/conflict, and was forced to approach India for a face saving request for ceasefire.

It was not able to make good its threat on deeming India’s action on IWT as an ‘act of war.’

The only indeterminate factor is the degree of success in deterring Pakistan from continuing with its strategy of actively supporting crossborder terrorist acts within India.   

Having decimated the Pakistan ADGE, neutralising the Pakistan nuclear umbrella, terming IWT as non-negotiable, and holding ‘Operation Sindoor’ as a threat in being, India holds Pakistan in a straitjacket.

Factor 2 – Role of Predictability 

The underlying premise of the joint China-Pakistan strategy was to provoke India into a predictable response. In retaliating with trans-LC ‘surgical strikes’ in 2016, Indian had targeted terrorist infrastructure eleven days later. In 2019, India delivered its trans-LC retaliatory airstrikes targeting terrorist infrastructure twelve days later. India had set three predictable patterns. A time span of around a fortnight, targeting only terror infrastructure, and not violating the IB.

The Indian retaliation to the Pahalgam massacre was launched fifteen days later, and targeted only terror infrastructure. However, it broke the third pattern by not only launching strikes across LC, but for the first time also across the IB.

This had a singular impact on the planning and conduct of the ensuing military operations. Due to the unstated political caveat, India spread its offensive air effort into fighter bomber, fighter air support, and electronic support roles, in mission packages assigned to different targets.

Pakistan on the other hand anticipating predicted response by India, assigned approximately 2/3^rd available effort poised towards the LC, and 1/3^rd to cover the IB sector. It was also able to design its mission packages with predominantly fighter aircrafts for interdiction roles. This, coupled with its effective placement of available Saab 2000 Erieye Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircrafts to vector its air effort onto intended targets, enabled it to achieve a localised favourable air situation. This is the primary reason for it to claim more kills over IAF aircrafts across the LC. The PAF, anticipating no violation of airspace, based on predictability pattern, had also strategise to employ long range AAMs to target IAF assets across the IB/LC in Indian airspace. Another plausible reason for it to secure ‘kills’ in the initial phase. 

India achieved its subsequent success by breaking its own predictability patterns. Its retaliation was not one off, and broke its self-imposed taboo on targeting Pakistan strategic military installations, including nuclear sensitive infrastructure. This was a contingency which the Pakistan military had not anticipated. This is evident from its subsequent weak military response, and being forced to request India for a ceasefire.

Both adversaries, India and Pakistan, would have derived their own learnings for implementation in the next conflict scenario. As regards China, it too shall introspect on confronting India differently.   

Factor 3 – Nuclear Deterrence

Despite unstinted support of China in equipping Pakistan military with modern weapons platforms and war fighting equipment, the latter simply lacks requisite combat potential to take on India militarily. Acquiring a nuclear umbrella enabled the Pakistan military to claim overall parity with India. Thus, nuclear sabre rattling formed the basic premise behind Pakistan’s strategy of engaging India in asymmetric warfare.

India’s innovative multiple strikes on selective strategic bases of Pakistan has shattered this premise. An even more fundamental difference has emerged. Indian political leadership has shed its inhibition to engage in dissuasive strikes against Pakistan. This is the biggest self-inflicted injury to Pakistan.

On a broader canvas, it also signals China of Indian determination to safeguard its sovereignty. Militarily too it has showcased India’s military interdiction reach over China’s strategically vital CPEC and CMEC projects, to the east and west of India.

Factor 4 – Effect on National Economy

India, by limiting the military confrontation in time and space, has ensured no adverse economic fallout on its economy. There has been minimal damage to military infrastructure and major weapons platforms. Even then, the release of additional INR 50,000 crore funds to its military in emergency powers to recoup its high end munitions expenditure, and purchase of key new technology enabled war fighting resources, in just four days of limited military engagement, educates us on one critical aspect. The debilitating adverse fallout on the national economy, had India been forced into a protracted open military conflict.

Learnings emerging from the course of military operations, shall most probably direct the future military acquisitions towards a mix of limited advanced foreign military equipment, complemented with a mass of indigenous developed technology platforms. For India, this shall add heft to ‘Atamnirbharta’ (Self-reliance) in defence manufacturing. As a bonus, it would also reduce its dependence on unreliable, foreign original equipment manufacturers.

For Pakistan, even this limited confrontation will turn out to be very prohibitive. Its economy, already surviving on IMF bailouts and foreign doles, will be severely hit by the inevitable rise in military expenditure. A concomitant factor to this eventuality will be the reduced availability of funds for development of public infrastructure, a recipe for increased regional instability.

Factor 5 – India’s ‘Operation Sindoor New Normal’ Doctrine 

Pakistan had entered the fray, anticipating absorbing a light Indian retaliation before launching its own riposte, that would orchestrate a limited but prolonged military confrontation, followed by strategic international intervention to prevent a ‘nuclear conflict’ at an appropriate stage. The overall aim was to vitiate the foreign investment climate in India. However, India did not follow the predicted script.

Pakistan was caught off guard by India holding in abeyance the IWT. In one stroke India seized the initiative from Pakistan. By successfully calling the nuclear bluff, India has also opened the door to widen the conflict scenario at will.

India’s political leadership, filled with new confidence, is less likely to leave unchallenged any future provocations by Pakistan. Assured retaliation shall be a new reality for Pakistan.

This has left Pakistan with restricted manoeuvre space to pursue its self-interests. 

Factor 6 – Domestic Impact

The Indian state is already stage managing the spectacular display of professional performance by the military to script a favourable public opinion of the political leadership currently in government.

This will have a great impact on the political environment, by weakening the opposition to the controversial reforms being undertaken by the present government, and firm its grip over organs of the state.

It may also generate greater political interest by giving a fillip to the stalled reforms in the military, and introduce changes in the existing ponderous Chain of Command.

In Pakistan, the first impact is already visible with the imminent promotion of Gen Asim Munir, their COAS, to the rank of a Field Marshal. His securing an extension of service by another 2-3 years is also now a distinct possibility. If so, there’s less probability of the government introducing any extraordinary change in body politic of the country.

But there are provincial factors also at play in Pakistan. This is the first time since 1971, that the common citizen has experienced the sound and fury of India’s military might in the midst of their population centres. No amount of censorship and perception management can negate this reality. This will have a major impact about the competency of their own military, on the minds of their citizens. This has a strong probability of converting into a political storm, and further embolden separatism tendencies in outlying provinces.

Factor 7 – Geopolitical Repercussions

There are three major ongoing conflicts, Rus in Central Europe, Levant in West Asia, and India China-Pakistan in South Asia. Each of these conflicts have their unique dynamics, with distinct learnings.

The events of the short and sharp military exchange between two nuclear weapon armed states, with the shadow of a third major nuclear armed weapon state looming over the conflict zone, are most unique.  

For Pakistan the geopolitical outcome is on predicted lines. Its reliance on external military and economic support will increase, making it more vulnerable to pulls and pressures of its backers. This will make its actions more volatile, more unpredictive, and decrease the reliability of any understandings arrived at with it.

However, the US and China are equally at home in inducing instability, in regions of interest, and fish in troubled waters. So it will further enhance the suitability of Pakistan to act as their proverbial catspaw. India needs to understand that there is going to be no let up in the ‘Great Game.’  

In humour it may be said that it should be comparatively easy for Indian leadership to readjust to this ground reality. More so, as it is at ease functioning in chaos. India is no stranger to this game, as evident from the popular usage of the Punjabi vernacular, ‘Siapa’, and even a paraphrase in Hindi vernacular ‘raita failana.’   

India’s success brings to it a bag of mixed fruits. It shall enhance its status as a reckonable entity in the Indian Ocean Region. However, this very success shall also beget greater attention as a serious emerging competitor on the global stage. India, while being alert to external machinations to tie it down in South Asia through regional instability, shall have to adapt its strategic thought process for action on a broader canvas.

Factor 8 – Perception Management

While terming ‘Operation Sindoor’ as the ‘new normal’ by India may be vicariously questioned, both internally and externally, the one factor on which there is commonality of opinion is, perception management being the ‘new normal’. This is a factor, where totalitarian regimes have a running start over their adversaries with democratic form of governance.

Pakistan scored over India in managing the fallout of the terror incident, and orchestrating international concern on the imminence of a nuclear exchange. The provenance of this statement may be fairly established, by its securing a second tranche of the IMF loan despite the terror incident, and serious attempts at diplomatic intervention by the US for a ceasefire.

India’s learnings from the predictability factor gave it an edge in blunting Pakistan denials on effectiveness of the strikes on targets within Pakistan. This time India launched precision strikes on targets in full public glare, and displayed photographic, and technology based evidence to substantiate provenance of destruction caused by its strikes.

India’s second success in perception management lay in blanketing own casualties reasonably well. Despite repeated claims by Pakistan of downing Indian aircrafts, the latter has been partially successful in obfuscating the issue. This has denied situational military advantage to Pakistan.

India was also successful in eroding global audience trust in official Pakistan briefings. The ‘photo op’ visit of the Indian PM to Adampur airfield, which Pakistan had claimed was destroyed along with the advanced S400 AD platform, immediately after the stop firing agreement, is indicative of active perception management steps by India.

But India’s biggest success lay in brilliantly managing the nuclear escalation front. Its effective strikes on the strategic Nur Khan and Sargodha nuclear hinges of Pakistan, and yet denying hitting any nuclear infrastructure stumped Pakistan. The persistent social media campaign on the subject while inducing a denial from the IAEA, forced the Pakistan PM to admit the destruction of these targets by India.

Overall India maintained an edge over Pakistan in perception management of the conflict. However, its information management mechanism, though reasonably effective in long term, is too ponderous to secure situational advantage for itself, that continues to be the forte of Pakistan.

To sum up this factor with humour, while sharing the basic truth, Pakistan military may have to struggle harder to fight the sarcasm of their own citizens evident from some of the more popular meme awash on their social media, ‘Larai kadi jeetey nahi, election kadi haarey nahi!’ (never won a war, never lost an election!)

Overall Outcome

For India, ‘Operation Sindoor’ has delivered invaluable experience in the nuances of applying military force. No amount of wargaming would have brought the actual decision makers face to face with the existing vulnerabilities in the national command chain, the right direction for the restructuring of the national defence architecture, and for re-equipping the armed forces.

The most valuable lesson gained by India is the exposure of its political leadership in real time decision matrix; in military parlance, ‘battle inoculation under live fire’. They entered the battle with cautious treads, but when ‘the push came to a shove’ they showed nerves of steel, as earlier during the 2020 Galwan faceoff against China. 

The biggest gain for India has been the shedding of inhibition, by its political leadership, to cross the IB. This predictability earlier put its military at a severe operational disadvantage, and was at the root of the Pakistan strategy to ‘bleed India by a thousand cuts.’

Another major gain is, once and for all, to bring down the curtain on the adversary’s nuclear umbrella. The destruction of Nur Khan and Sargodha air bases of Pakistan, was the clearest message, that their National Command Authority was within reach of India’s might. 

As the adversaries reflect on what went wrong for them, India has gained critical time to rearm and restructure its armed forces, ramp up its defensive and economic infrastructure, and build trusted geopolitical alliances.

The Pakistan military, the de facto decision makers, are stunned by this serious military reverse. But this is not the first time that the Pakistan military has been bested by India, as attested to by the outcomes of 1948, 1965, 1971, 1984, and 1999 battles between the two. Supported and armed, earlier by the USA, and now by China, the Pakistan military has stuck to the façade of being the victors within their domestic civil society.

What is new this time is that their nuclear umbrella, a panacea for all their ills, has been blown away. But an even more significant occurrence is that this is the first time that the Pakistan military leadership found their ‘own skin in the game’. No military ruler ever rings up his prime minister in the middle of the night to inform them that their most secure military complex, at a hand shaking distance from their location, has just been destroyed by the enemy.

But it should be realistic to assume that the contest is not yet over. With China at its back, Pakistan military will look at new ways to claw back into yet another, and more imaginative, confrontation with India.   

Future Probabilities for India

India’s ‘Operation Sindoor New Normal’ doctrine – First articulated by the Kargil Review Committee Report in 1999, it has taken India’s political hierarchy a quarter of a century to be confident enough to publicly embrace and enforce zero tolerance to cross-border terrorism as a state policy. But the efficacy of this ‘new normal’ shall be dependent on two factors. First shall be, a strong Indian political will to stay the course. The second shall flow from the innovations employed by the Pakistan military to circumvent the dynamics of the ‘new normal’. Any other alternative for the Pakistan military hierarchy shall lead to the unthinkable eventuality of giving up on the levers of power, an unlikely occurrence.  

Escalatory deterrence – By linking denial of trade, and water to compliance on ceasing crossborder support to terrorism, and introducing the ever present danger of retaliatory crossborder military strikes, India has been successful in crafting a new sub-nuclear escalatory deterrence matrix. But a wily Pakistan shall always look at creative ways to circumvent and wear down India, an aspect that needs to be factored in future contingency management. Creativity and innovations should be the ‘mantra’ for India’s dealings with Pakistan, to keep the latter off-balance.

Enhancing military preparedness – To better prepare itself for the coming global uncertainties, India shall need to imbibe the right lessons from the limited military confrontation, and fast pace reforms and re-equipping its military to rectify observed: -

Anomalies in the military chain of command.

Fast track stalled Theatre Command structuring.

Roll out Maritime Theatre Command, the only low hanging fruit.

But the most critical is to relook at integrating the proposed Joint Air Defence Command into an Integrated Homeland Air Defence Command to ward off the ever present and ever increasing dimension of the drone threat.

Finally, India needs to overcome its diffidence in confronting China. CPEC and the Pakistan military business empire should be fair game in the next inevitable punitive military strike in Pakistan.