KEEPING ALIVE THE LEGACY OF 1171 KILLED IN ACTION IN OPERATION ‘PAWAN’

“In today’s highly factitious domestic polity of democratic countries, geopolitical stance of a country is no longer a matter of purely national interests, but is quite often modulated to suit perceived domestic political payoffs.”  - Col RS Sidhu

 

Backdrop

The Emerald Isle, a group of IPKF veterans, is performing yeomen service to keep alive the legacy of Operation ‘Pawan’, which the Government would rather forget. Faced with continued Government apathy to publicly commemorate the supreme sacrifices of the 1171 Indian soldiers Killed In Action (KIA) during Operation ‘Pawan’, the IPKF veterans have reached out directly to the fellow citizens.

Operation ‘Pawan’ is an important interlude in the geopolitical framework which beckons India in the coming decades. Yet it has been swept under the carpet, thereby, precluding study of its acts of omission and commission to derive learnings for the future. More than three decades have passed since the termination of Operation ‘Pawan,’ but its impact on contemporary events continues to hold relevance even today.

Some of the finer aspects of this complex military operation are highlighted below.

Politico-Military Mission

The IPKF was not deployed on a straightforward military mission/operation. It was deployed consequent to invitation from the Government of Sri Lanka for guaranteeing the adherence to the India Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) of 29th of July 1987 by the warring parties, namely, the Sri Lanka security forces and the Tamil militants.

The ISLA consisted of political and military clauses which were to be accomplished by not only Sri Lanka and Tamil militant groups, but also by India. It required the IPKF military leadership to display political acumen to understand and interpret the clauses, military acumen to accomplish the duties and responsibilities, and diplomatic acumen to navigate the shoals of conflicting interests of the warring parties.

The upfront merger of Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka into one constitutional entity, the holding of general elections, to be followed by a referendum in the Eastern Province on the merger with Northern Province, ameliorating the political throttling of Tamil minority rights to bring them at par with those enjoyed by the majority Sinhala, all lay in the political domain.

Pitfalls

To emphasise the politico-military intricacies involved it may be interesting to note that the LTTE, the dominant Tamil militant organisation, against whom the IPKF was conducting military operations, at a point of time, was simultaneously being provided weapons not only by Sri Lanka but also by the Indian intelligence agency R&AW. Apparently, the Indian state was engaged in a policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, with the R&AW and IPKF being employed for the two differing roles!!!

The inherent politico-military pitfalls in the region are best exemplified by the changing national attitudes to the IPKF. Sri Lanka, a vociferous opponent of the IPKF, has erected a War Memorial prominently laid out in their capital city of Colombo, to honour the IPKF. High Indian dignitaries visiting Colombo, including the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the military Chiefs, have paid public homage at this war memorial. 

But the Indian establishment, in its domestic arena, is shy to publicly commemorate the supreme sacrifice by the IPKF personnel.

Government Policy Dithering

The ISLA was signed on 29th of July 1987 and the induction of IPKF commenced on 30th of July 1987. You have to put 2+2 together to understand that it was simply not feasible for any military to launch an overseas military operation within this timeline. The force earmarked for conventional offensive operations was launched on a peacekeeping assignment, without any further thought, revised plans, briefing et al. 

The formations and units tasked for conventional offensive in Sri Lanka were from the Indian formations oriented for offensive operations. They were assigned peacekeeping role with zero warning. Even subsequent undertaking of counter insurgency operations against the LTTE was not their assigned role nor were they trained for it. Probably, the inevitable high casualties were acceptable to the decision makers?!!!  

The troops were psychologically primed to look at Sri Lanka Tamils as friends needing to be saved from the ruthless Sri Lanka security forces. The Indian jawan does not possess a mercenary outlook where you overnight switch the friend and foe. It just doesn’t work that way as it muddies the moral high ground so essential to fight in a foreign land, when own home, family and way of life is not under threat.

For the Army hierarchy down to the field formation, it was a first time exposure to a politico- military mission and most were found out of their depth in the initial phase. But the damage had been done by the time on the job learning was over. 1171 precious lives lost and 3500 maimed for life in this learning process. What a price to be paid!!! 

Successful Deinduction  

Lt Gen AS Kalkat, appointed GOC IPKF after October 1987, overall did make his presence felt as a politico-military strategist. It goes to his credit that the IPKF flawlessly executed its most complicated mission, the deinduction from Sri Lanka.

The deinduction of IPKF from Sri Lanka was a political decision pursuant to diverging interests of the governments of India and Sri Lanka. Militarily speaking, it was the most vulnerable time for the  IPKF.

The probability of Sri Lanka security forces turning hostile towards IPKF at an opportune moment could not be negated. The LTTE, opposed as it was to the IPKF presence in the Northeast province, was being surreptitiously armed by the Sri Lanka government.

As the deinduction progressed, the IPKF in Sri Lanka would become numerically inferior to the antagonist forces arraigned against it. One has to just look at the disastrous withdrawals by the armed forces of the US from Vietnam, and the successive ruinous pullouts by USSR and US from Afghanistan, to comprehend the pitfalls that can arise in this most vulnerable time for any military force.

It goes to the credit of the IPKF military hierarchy that the force maintained its poise and balance till the end to ensure an incident free and successful culmination of this protracted military operation, despite the presence of strong hostile forces.

The Adversary

LTTE was a ruthless organisation that indulged in coerced recruitment, reprisals against recalcitrant families, used civilians as human shields, indulged in fratricidal political killings of Tamils, and actively engaged in drugs and arms trafficking from SE Asia to West Asia.

The LTTE were ultimately brought down in 2007 by their own hubris. Unable to withstand the relentless onslaught from the IPKF, the LTTE fell back to the deep Vanni jungles. They repeated this strategy when facing the subsequent onslaught from a resurgent SLA.

But the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE denied them the logistic base of Tamil Nadu, critical to face the SLA, who were willing to observe and learn, and knew their opponents well. This incident, in one stroke, severed them from their logistical support base in Tamil Nadu, as well as the international support in Western countries orchestrated by the Sri Lanka Tamil diaspora.

The Sri Lanka security forces took a decade and a half to reorganise and rearm before launching their military operation to the finish against LTTE. The Sri Lanka Army proved to be more than a match to the LTTE in ruthlessness. The tried and tested human shield tactics by the LTTE could not succeed against an equally ruthless adversary. The entire LTTE hierarchy was annihilated in one stroke.

The LTTE had burnt all its bridges with India, so this time there was no IPKF to pull their chestnuts from the fire. Rest is history.

Contemporary Relevance

Nearly four decades have lapsed since the signing of the ISLA and the consequent induction into Sri Lanka of the IPKF under ‘Operation Pawan’. Several factors indicate that despite the time lapse, this strategic episode continues to hold significant relevance to India’s security and geopolitical  aspirations in its near abroad.

The first and most important aspect is that the ISLA, despite being put on the backburner, is alive as neither of the two signatories have repudiated it.

The next most important aspect is the enormous resources employed by the nation in this 32 months long venture and the tri-services institutional set up of Headquarters IPKF which was raised to control this mammoth military operation. This organisation in a true sense is the first tri-services organisation in the operational field and is the rightful forerunner to the future Theatre Commands now under consideration. This seamless deployment of inter-service resources towards achieving a common national and military goal in the operational field needs to be evaluated in depth.

The study of this strategic episode holds vital significance to derive politico-military learnings to assist India’s decision makers in undertaking policy decisions and their seamless execution to further national geopolitical interests.

Key Success

Shorn of manipulated political and parochial viewpoints, this tri-service operational venture was a big success. The IPKF succeeded in achieving the politico-military objectives spelt out in the ISLA within a time span of under 18 months.

The Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka had been amalgamated into a single constitutional administrative entity.

General elections to the unified Provincial Council had been successfully held, and a duly elected civilian government sworn in as the Northeast Provincial Council on 10th of December 1988.

Referendum was successfully held in the Eastern province of Sri Lanka, wherein majority of the electorate voted for amalgamation with the Northern Province.

LTTE, the dominant Tamil militant organisation opposing the ISLA, had been marginalised.

Defunct civil infrastructure had been restored, and overall environment conducive to recommencement of private enterprise had been established in Northeast Sri Lanka.  

The Aftermath

The LTTE, dominant Tamil militant organisation opposed to the ISLA and fighting for an independent Tamil nation in Sri Lanka, has been annihilated by the Sri Lanka Army.

The merger of the unified Northeast Province has been constitutionally undone through judicial intervention by supreme Court of Sri Lanka.

The Tamil grievances continue to be unaddressed by the Government of Sri Lanka.

Currently the People’s Republic of China holds a strong influence over the Government of Sri Lanka. India seems to be devoid of any geopolitical options to pursue its interest in its own backyard.

What is even more interesting is that Sri Lanka has erected a War Memorial, prominently laid out in their capital city of Colombo, to honour the IPKF. A commemoration service to honour the supreme sacrifices by the soldiers of IPKF to uphold the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka is held here on 26th of January and 15th of August every year. High Indian dignitaries, including the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Indian military Service Chiefs, visiting Colombo have paid public homage at this war memorial.

But in India, public commemoration of supreme sacrifice by IPKF personnel is not held. The Government of India in 1987 was charged with engaging in Operation ‘Pawan’ in pursuit of its political, rather than national, interests. The wheel has turned full circle as the national interest of public commemoration of the supreme sacrifices by its armed forces continues to be held hostage to perceived parochial interests. Some things never change.

But the most interesting facet for the cognizant should be to recognise the elephant hiding in the room. It is the ISLA that has not been repudiated by either of the two signatories, lying dormant in a state of suspended animation, waiting for a probable resurrection!

Veterans Keep the Flame Burning

It is difficult for the Government to whitewash and sanitise the sins of omission and commission by its apex hierarchy in launch and conduct of Operation ‘Pawan’, with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) veterans still around and kicking!” – Col RS Sidhu

1171 KIAs cannot be consigned to the dustbin of history, unsung, and unseen. Another 3500 injured, with a very high percentage of loss of limbs. The organisation may forget it's Dharm to honour its own, but how can we who led them in battle!!!

As young officers it was our Karm to lead our men in battle. As Veterans it's our Dharm to pay befitting homage to the selfless supreme sacrifice made by our men. 

 

First published in Financial Express online edition

https://wwwfinancialexpress.com/business/defence-keeping-alive-the-legacy-of-1171-killed-in-action-in-operation-pawan-3566463/


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