RECTIFYING ANOMALIES IN THE POST OF CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

KEY TO SUCCESSFUL ROLLING OUT OF

INDARMY THEATRE COMMAND REFORMS

 

“In today’s technologically advanced AI empowered world, ponderous decision making apparatus are a wily adversaries dream and a security force nightmare, that can only lead to further jeopardising national security!” – Col RS Sidhu

 

Context

Reforms to the apex military hierarchy of India were boldly announced by the Prime Minister of India from the ramparts of Red Fort on 15th of August 2019, and the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) assumed office on 1st of January 2020. The CDS is charged to bring about jointness of the three Services, among other tasks, within three years of the first CDS assuming office. However, reforming the Indarmy apex military hierarchy is still a work in progress, well past the laid down deadline. One of the major contributory factor to this inordinate delay has been the emasculating anomalies inbuilt into the Government Order (GO) instituting the appointment of the CDS.

Recent media reports now indicate to feverish, behind the scenes, activity to commence roll out of the Integrated Theatre Commands and Functional Commands before the year end.

But instituting these reforms without first resolving the command & control anomalies of the position of CDS would be akin to putting the ‘cart before the horse’.

Views on the more critical aspects of the upcoming apex military reforms are shared below.

Rectifying Anomalies of CDS Post

The existing GO bars both the CDS and the Services chiefs from the chain of command of the upcoming Theatre and Functional Commands. With the Ministry of Defense (MoD) lacking the requisite military competence to supervise the Theatre and Functional Commands, this is the biggest lacunae in successful implementation of reforms to the apex military hierarchy.

This should be the dominant reason for the CDS to be brought into direct reporting channel for the Theatre and Functional Commands proposed to be set up.

The CDS Secretariat too needs to be synchronised with this thought process by competent staff that empowers operational decision making and exercising follow through oversight.

Making the CDS as first amongst equals is an adhoc and disjointed solution, best evidenced by the delayed military reforms. In a status conscious bureaucracy, rank matters in resolving differing viewpoints and cut through red tape. Enhanced weightage to the appointment of CDS is, therefore, advisable by upgrading from the present 4 Star to a 5 Star rank.  

The CDS needs to be directly accountable to the Raksha Mantri (RM), hold status equivalent to the National Security Advisor (NSA), and be made statutory advisory member of the Cabinet Committee for Security (CCS).

The post of the Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) should be bifurcated, but with indirect reporting to the CDS.

An Act of Parliament should be brought in to rectify the anomalies, and institutionalise the post of CDS. It will showcase the determination and will of the Government to go through with the reforms to the bitter end, and subtly discourage opposition from vested interests. A GO, on the other hand, shall only signal uncertainty that may embolden those opposing the reforms.

The Maritime Theatre Command (MTC)

Based on the publicly available information a single MTC, headquartered in Vishakhapatnam, has been proposed. This needs a rethink because of certain nuances.

As compared to the 3.28 million square kilometres territorial size of the mainland India, its maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is 2.37 million square kilometers. Protection of such a vast maritime swathe is very cumbersome, especially as through merchant shipping movement is permissible in accordance with the international laws of the sea, unlike on the land, where inimical access can be controlled along the land border itself.

The maritime trade routes in the Arabian Sea and the adjoining Indian Ocean maritime zone, on the western seaboard side of peninsular India, are vital for India’s maritime trade, especially the energy supplies. This necessitates building up naval resources for implementing a strategy of sea control in the open waters of the Indian Ocean.

The best strategy to counter the enhanced presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the maritime waters adjoining the 2.37 million square kilometres EEZ of India, is for the Indian Navy to adopt a dissuasive deployment posture close to the eastern seaboard of China.  This necessitates developing counterstrike capability through acquiring naval assets that can successfully operate in the close and shallow waters of the East China Sea.

Keeping in view the size of India’s maritime area of interest, from the African coast in the west to the eastern seaboard of China in the east, and the necessity to adopt differing naval strategy in the west vis-à-vis the east, there is no escaping the requirement of establishing two MTCs.

An Eastern Maritime Command (EMC), to equip and deploy specialised naval resources to pose credible threat along the eastern coastline of mainland China. An Indian Ocean Maritime Command (IMC) to deny access to the Indian mainland and its vast EEZ from the western seaboard, and for sea denial to China and Pakistan maritime trade while keeping maritime trade routes open for own shipping. The inter-theatre maritime boundary may be considered along 78 degrees East Longitude.    

The Northern Theatre Command (NTC)

The length of various sections of border with China are 500 kms between POJK and Xinjiang region of China, 1600 kms along Laddakh – Tibet, 600 kms of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand with Tibet, 200 kms along Sikkim – Tibet, and 1100 kms along Arunachal Pradesh – Tibet.

Geographically the land borders between India and China extend from the region of Karakoram Pass in the West to Talu Pass in Arunachal Pradesh to the East. Generally, a single Theatre Command guarding the full extent of borders with China has obvious advantages.

However, the information available in public domain suggests that the thought process of the Indian strategic establishment on the geographical extent of the NTC is still ambiguous. The issue posing major quandary is the ongoing insurgency status of the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, and the high probability of a joint threat from China and Pakistan along the Baltistan-Shaksgam-Aksai Chin region.

China has de facto, already insinuated itself into the Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (POJK) dispute, through its occupation of the illegally ceded Shaksgam Valley region of POJK by Pakistan, construction and operation of energy assets of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the disputed territory of POJK, and deploying PLA troops and technical manpower in POJK in close proximity to the Line of Control. Being the more powerful of the two adversary countries, POJK should be prudently evaluated in conjunction with the Chinese threat.

At times seemingly complex issues are best resolved by adopting simple solutions. Extending NTC boundary from Talu Pass in Arunachal Pradesh in the east, to Pir Panjal range in the west is recommended. It would enable NTC to give a cohesive response through flexibility in developing complementary operations against China on either flanks, and enable optimum exploitation of combat resources due to similarity in terrain along the NTC frontage. It shall also preclude Pakistan from developing a credible threat from the south, along the proposed inter theatre boundary, by virtue of the Pir Panjals being a major restricting factor for movement of large military forces.

Anomalies in Hinterland Security

The security of the Indian hinterland is primarily the domain of Ministry of Home Affairs (MoH). However, the newer technologies now available are forcefully blurring the areas of responsibility between the MoD and the MoH.

For example, the setting up of the Integrated Air Defence Command with responsibility to counter the full spectrum of aerial threats, violations of sovereign airspace, and exercise command & control over all air defence resources, shall spill over into civil air space control as well as control over UAVs employed in commercial enterprise. With drones and autonomous warheads emerging as the weapon of choice for terrorist activities, coordination between MoD and MoH shall need to be more intricate and intimate. Same holds true for setting up of Integrated Cyberspace Command/Agency.

Various options may be considered. One option would be to set up an Integrated Hinterland Defence Command, incorporating MoH resources as well. Another would be to broad base the National Security Council from an advisory to an executive role as well. A third option would be a Hinterland Theatre Command, which could also be tasked to hold reserve strategic resources.

But one thing is for sure, that demolishing inter-ministry silos is the need of the hour. The failure to ground the hijacked Indian Airlines IC-814 aircraft at Amritsar in 1999, cohesively counter the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, counter the increased successful violations of Indian airspace by drones from across the western borders, countering the covert activity by sub-surface autonomous vehicles in the Indian EEZ, are all examples of the catastrophic adverse impact on national security where the OODA (Observe Orient Decision Action) loop gets entangled in organisational silos. In today’s technologically advanced AI empowered world, ponderous decision making apparatus are a wily adversaries dream and a security force nightmare, that can only lead to further jeopardising national security!

 

Interested readers may also revisit the author’s writeup, ‘Exploring One Head Three Hats of CDS DMA COSC’, appearing in Financial Express online edition of 4th of January 2022, which even two years down the timeline continues to be relevant. Link is shared below: -

https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/exploring-one-head-three-hats-of-cds-dma-cosc/2398227/  

 


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