RECTIFYING ANOMALIES IN THE POST OF CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
KEY TO SUCCESSFUL ROLLING OUT OF
INDARMY THEATRE COMMAND REFORMS
“In today’s technologically
advanced AI empowered world, ponderous decision making apparatus are a wily
adversaries dream and a security force nightmare, that can only lead to further
jeopardising national security!” – Col RS Sidhu
Context
Reforms to the apex military hierarchy of India were boldly announced by
the Prime Minister of India from the ramparts of Red Fort on 15th of
August 2019, and the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) assumed office on 1st
of January 2020. The CDS is charged to bring about
jointness of the three Services, among other tasks, within
three years of the first CDS assuming office. However, reforming the
Indarmy apex military hierarchy is still a work in progress, well past the laid
down deadline. One of the major contributory factor to this inordinate delay
has been the emasculating anomalies inbuilt into the Government Order (GO)
instituting the appointment of the CDS.
Recent media reports now indicate to feverish, behind the scenes,
activity to commence roll out of the Integrated Theatre Commands and Functional
Commands before the year end.
But instituting these reforms without first resolving the command &
control anomalies of the position of CDS would be akin to putting the ‘cart
before the horse’.
Views on the more critical aspects of the upcoming apex military reforms
are shared below.
Rectifying Anomalies of CDS Post
The existing GO bars both the CDS and
the Services chiefs from the chain of command of the upcoming Theatre and
Functional Commands. With the Ministry of Defense (MoD) lacking the requisite
military competence to supervise the Theatre and Functional Commands, this is
the biggest lacunae in successful implementation of reforms to the apex
military hierarchy.
This should be the dominant reason
for the CDS to be brought into direct reporting channel for the Theatre and
Functional Commands proposed to be set up.
The CDS Secretariat too needs to be
synchronised with this thought process by competent staff that empowers
operational decision making and exercising follow through oversight.
Making the CDS as first amongst
equals is an adhoc and disjointed solution, best evidenced by the delayed military
reforms. In a status conscious bureaucracy, rank matters in resolving differing
viewpoints and cut through red tape. Enhanced weightage to the appointment of
CDS is, therefore, advisable by upgrading from the present 4 Star to a 5 Star
rank.
The CDS needs to be directly
accountable to the Raksha Mantri (RM), hold status equivalent to the National
Security Advisor (NSA), and be made statutory advisory member of the Cabinet
Committee for Security (CCS).
The post of the Secretary of the
Department of Military Affairs (DMA) should be bifurcated, but with indirect
reporting to the CDS.
An Act of Parliament should be
brought in to rectify the anomalies, and institutionalise the post of CDS. It
will showcase the determination and will of the Government to go through with the
reforms to the bitter end, and subtly discourage opposition from vested
interests. A GO, on the other hand, shall only signal uncertainty that may embolden
those opposing the reforms.
The Maritime Theatre Command (MTC)
Based on the publicly available
information a single MTC, headquartered in Vishakhapatnam, has been proposed.
This needs a rethink because of certain nuances.
As compared to the 3.28 million
square kilometres territorial size of the mainland India, its maritime
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is 2.37 million square kilometers. Protection of
such a vast maritime swathe is very cumbersome, especially as through merchant
shipping movement is permissible in accordance with the international laws of
the sea, unlike on the land, where inimical access can be controlled along the
land border itself.
The maritime trade routes in the
Arabian Sea and the adjoining Indian Ocean maritime zone, on the western
seaboard side of peninsular India, are vital for India’s maritime trade,
especially the energy supplies. This necessitates building up naval resources
for implementing a strategy of sea control in the open waters of the Indian
Ocean.
The best strategy to counter the enhanced
presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the maritime waters
adjoining the 2.37 million square kilometres EEZ of India, is for the Indian
Navy to adopt a dissuasive deployment posture close to the eastern seaboard of
China. This necessitates developing counterstrike
capability through acquiring naval assets that can successfully operate in the
close and shallow waters of the East China Sea.
Keeping in
view the size of India’s maritime area of interest, from the African coast in
the west to the eastern seaboard of China in the east, and the necessity to
adopt differing naval strategy in the west vis-à-vis the east, there is no
escaping the requirement of establishing two MTCs.
An Eastern
Maritime Command (EMC), to equip and deploy specialised naval resources to pose credible threat along the eastern coastline
of mainland China. An Indian Ocean Maritime Command (IMC) to deny access to
the Indian mainland and its vast EEZ from the western seaboard, and for sea
denial to China and Pakistan maritime trade while keeping maritime trade routes
open for own shipping. The inter-theatre maritime boundary may be considered along 78
degrees East Longitude.
The Northern Theatre Command (NTC)
Geographically
the land borders between India and China extend from the region of Karakoram
Pass in the West to Talu Pass in Arunachal Pradesh to the East. Generally, a
single Theatre Command guarding the full extent of borders with China has
obvious advantages.
However, the information available in
public domain suggests that the thought process of the Indian strategic
establishment on the geographical extent of the NTC is still ambiguous. The
issue posing major quandary is the ongoing insurgency status of the Union
Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, and the high probability of a joint threat
from China and Pakistan along the Baltistan-Shaksgam-Aksai Chin region.
China has de
facto, already insinuated itself into
the Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (POJK) dispute, through its occupation
of the illegally ceded Shaksgam Valley region of POJK by Pakistan, construction
and operation of energy assets of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in
the disputed territory of POJK, and deploying PLA troops and technical manpower
in POJK in close proximity to the Line of Control. Being the more powerful of the two adversary countries, POJK should be prudently evaluated in
conjunction with the Chinese threat.
At times seemingly
complex issues are best resolved by adopting simple solutions. Extending
NTC boundary from Talu Pass in Arunachal Pradesh in the east, to Pir Panjal range
in the west is recommended. It would enable NTC to give a cohesive response through
flexibility in developing complementary operations against China on either
flanks, and enable optimum exploitation of combat resources due to similarity
in terrain along the NTC frontage. It shall also preclude Pakistan from
developing a credible threat from the south, along the proposed inter theatre
boundary, by virtue of the Pir Panjals being a major restricting factor for
movement of large military forces.
Anomalies in Hinterland Security
The security of the Indian hinterland
is primarily the domain of Ministry of Home Affairs (MoH). However, the newer
technologies now available are forcefully blurring the areas of responsibility
between the MoD and the MoH.
For example, the setting up of the Integrated
Air Defence Command with responsibility to counter the full spectrum of aerial
threats, violations of sovereign airspace, and exercise command & control
over all air defence resources, shall spill over into civil air space control
as well as control over UAVs employed in commercial enterprise. With drones and
autonomous warheads emerging as the weapon of choice for terrorist activities,
coordination between MoD and MoH shall need to be more intricate and intimate. Same
holds true for setting up of Integrated Cyberspace Command/Agency.
Various options may be considered. One
option would be to set up an Integrated Hinterland Defence Command,
incorporating MoH resources as well. Another would be to broad base the
National Security Council from an advisory to an executive role as well. A
third option would be a Hinterland Theatre Command, which could also be tasked
to hold reserve strategic resources.
But one thing is
for sure, that demolishing inter-ministry silos is the need of the hour. The failure
to ground the hijacked Indian Airlines IC-814 aircraft at Amritsar in 1999, cohesively
counter the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, counter the increased successful violations
of Indian airspace by drones from across the western borders, countering the
covert activity by sub-surface autonomous vehicles in the Indian EEZ, are all
examples of the catastrophic adverse impact on national security where the OODA
(Observe Orient Decision Action) loop gets entangled in organisational silos. In
today’s technologically advanced AI empowered world, ponderous decision making
apparatus are a wily adversaries dream and a security force nightmare, that can only lead to further jeopardising national
security!
Interested readers may also revisit
the author’s writeup, ‘Exploring One Head Three Hats of CDS DMA COSC’,
appearing in Financial Express online edition of 4th of January
2022, which even two years down the timeline continues to be relevant. Link is
shared below: -
https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/exploring-one-head-three-hats-of-cds-dma-cosc/2398227/
Comments
Post a Comment