A FRACTURED POLITY AND UNMAKING OF PAKISTAN

“The unmaking of Pakistan is the curious tale of two tails that wag the dog! The first allusion is to the Army that owns Pakistan, while the second is this very army being ensnared by the Jihadist culture adopted and promoted by it to serve its political interests.” - Col RS Sidhu

Three Constants of Pakistan

Pakistan, the ‘land of the pure’, was born in 1947 after India was partitioned on religious lines by the British empire, the erstwhile colonial rulers. Unlike India, which adopted a democratic form of governance, Pakistan veered off from the democratic path spelled out by its founders owing to the frequent political interventions by its army.

Pakistan, under the overbearing influence of its army, has espoused three constants in its external outlook: -

-          - Its acquiescence in being the watchdog of geopolitical interests of extra-regional powers in South Asia region, the UK and US earlier on, and now China.

-          - An abiding hostility towards India.

-           - Seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan.

Watchdog of Extra-regional Powers in South Asia

It’s very interesting to note that the British in India had first partitioned Bengal Presidency on religious lines on 16^th of October 1905. It predates by a year, the establishment of the All India Muslim League on 30^th of December 1906. This was closely followed by the establishment of separate Hindu-Muslim electorates in 1909. Subsequently, during the run up to the discussions in the British Parliament on enacting the Government of India Act of 1919, an informal discussion on dividing India to suit British interests did take place. However, it was dropped as the moment was not felt to be opportune, coming soon after the Indian soldier’s valiant performance in the European theatre of war during the First World War. The 1947 Radcliffe Line partitioning India and Pakistan, generally conforms to the proposal discussed in the British Parliament during 1918-19.

Empirical evidence, now available, leaves no doubt that the British had by the turn of the 20^th century already set into motion plans for creating Pakistan, to further British geopolitical interests in the South Asia region. Actual partition of India in 1947 was consequent to decisions already arrived at earlier. While India charted an independent geopolitical path, Pakistan chose to align itself with the dominant US led Western bloc, in the bipolar geopolitical world. In 1954 Pakistan was made a founding member of the US led SEATO geopolitical alliance, and the very next year, in 1955, it was inducted into the US led CENTO geopolitical pact.

Consequent to the invasion of Afghanistan by USSR in 1979, Pakistan became a frontline state and linchpin of US policy of covert support to Afghanistan Mujahedeen in confronting USSR. Withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan in early 1989, and its subsequent collapse as a superpower, led to Pakistan being marginalised in US world view.

A disenchanted Pakistan turned towards China for geopolitical support. China, already in adversarial relationship with India, began actively supporting Pakistan materially and diplomatically to countervail India.

However, in 2001, the launch of US war against religious terrorism being spawned in Afghanistan again brought Pakistan to the forefront of this effort. The US coerced an unwilling Pakistan to support its war against religious terrorism. In a ‘quid quo pro’ Pakistan, in 2004, was granted the status of major non-NATO ally by US.  

 As a recompense, it has been earlier securing tacit diplomatic and active material support from the Western bloc countries, and now from China.

Abiding Hostility Towards India

Pakistan as a state, and the army, is dominated by its Punjab province elite. Resultant dissatisfaction has given rise to centrifugal forces in the other provinces. That religion cannot be a binding factor, has been amply demonstrated by the secession of East Pakistan, the present day Bangladesh. It strikes at the very roots of the raison d’etre of Pakistan, a theocratic state.

In a similar vein, the army’s grip over the levers of power in Pakistan, is dependent on a weak Pakistan polity. An abiding hostility towards India, the quintessential external enemy that needs to be warded off, is just the right recipe to be poured down the throat of the masses, to justify the supremacy of both the Army and the Punjab elite of Pakistan.

It is with this context that we should view Pakistan’s pursuit of its enmity with India, by launching four unprovoked aggressions, in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999, and actively supporting cross-border insurgencies, earlier in the NE states of India, and subsequently in the strategic border provinces of J&K, and Punjab.

To rein in the political parties, the Pakistan Army covertly promoted Islamic fundamentalist forces in the national body politic. While it did weaken the nationalist political parties, making them more amenable to Pakistan army diktat, it had another unplanned adverse fallout. The fundamentalist forces secured a foothold within the Pakistan Army rank and file. The chickens are now coming home to roost.

Seeking ‘Strategic Depth’

Pakistan’s east-west territorial depth averages around 400 kilometres. With Indus river as a major lateral obstacle inhibiting east-west connectivity, this further restricts operational depth. In pursuing their rivalry with India, the Pakistan’s elite have always looked at addressing this geostrategic weakness by seeking strategic depth to the rear within Afghanistan. Towards this end, Pakistan has frequently attempted to arrogate to itself the role of a kingmaker in the broken body politic of Afghanistan.

The USSR invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, followed by the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, devolved the status of a frontline state on Pakistan, who looked at it as an opportunity to further own geopolitical interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan began covertly promoting and supporting Islamic extremist groups within Afghanistan, such as the Haqqani network.

Consequent to US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, in a strategic overreach, Pakistan orchestrated a Taliban offensive to oust the US supported government of Afghanistan and installing a government of its choice in Kabul. However, Pakistan’s policy of ‘running with the hare and hunting with the hounds’, resulted in a conflict of interest with the US.

China’s undeclared challenge to pre-eminence of US geopolitical leadership at the world stage has further served to widen the gap in the national self-interests of Pakistan and US. The latter has retaliated by leveraging its hold over international financial institutions to withhold monetary support to Pakistan.

Pakistan’s floundering economy is unable to support its religious fundamentalist allies in Afghanistan, itself under international financial sanctions, and its search for strategic depth in Afghanistan is sinking in an economic quagmire of its own making.  

The Albatross Around the Neck of Pakistan

The proclivity of Pakistan Army to intervene in political affairs of the nation is best discerned from the sobriquet of it being an ‘army that owns a state.’

The bulk of the Pakistan Army is drawn from Punjab 54%, Pushtoon 15%, Mohajir and Sindhis 5% and Baluch 1%. While the uniformed strength of the Pakistan Army is slightly above six lakhs, it has three million civilians on its payrolls through its entrepreneurial ventures.

Its business empire has a net annual revenue of more than US $ 30 billion, that is 10% of its national GDP. These business ventures are administered by charitable boards, thus avoiding payment of government taxes, and have an annualised rate of growth of nearly 25%. They are the largest business entity in Pakistan in the fields of manufacturing and trading of cement, fertiliser, renewable energy, oil and gas petroleum products, real estate development, transportation, and private security. In addition, some of the largest Public Sector Units are managed and staffed by Pakistan Army veterans.  

Pakistan Army’s meddling in national governance and resultant political instability is costing the national economy dearly. Pakistan’s annual retail inflation is touching 30%. Its debt to GDP ratio has crossed 70%. Its external debt is at US $ 125 billion, necessitating half of its annual revenue generation being used for debt servicing.   

A Floundering Pakistan

A lame duck government that lacks political legitimacy, is helming the nation at a critical juncture when Pakistan’s economy is hostage to continued receipt of foreign aid.

Pakistan’s time and resources employed to orchestrate strategic depth in Afghanistan have come to a naught. Rather, the intransigence of the Afghan Taliban government has resulted in sucking a substantial portion of Pakistan military strategic reserves for deployment along the western borders.

The internal security situation is grim. Insurgency is rampant in all its provinces, except Punjab. The Islamic fundamentalist forces are deeply entrenched into the organs of power within the government, imperiling the very survival of Pakistan. The security of Pakistan nuclear weapons is of biggest concern to India and to the Western Bloc powers. China has already covertly deployed its own armed forces to guard its economic assets in POJK and in the Gwadar port on the Makran coast.

But there are distinct battlefield indicators, to the discerning eye, that Pakistan state is finally alive to the existential threat it is facing from within. The Pakistan Army has been unable to launch decisive internal security operations to tackle the unrest and insurgencies right from Sindh and Baluchistan in the south to FATA in the northwest to the Northern Areas and POJK in the North. But the scale of public killings of Jihadi leadership is a clear sign of the covert involvement of the Pakistan establishment. The stranglehold and coercive power of the Pakistan state is such that these killings cannot continue on this scale and prolonged duration, without their tacit knowledge, if not involvement.

The large scale forced repatriation of Afghan Pashtun refugees from Pakistan is a second indicator of the turn in the thinking of the Pakistan state. This repatriation is being undertaken despite strong resistance from the Afghanistan government, which Pakistan itself had helped in installing.

Another subtle indicator is the holding of the 25 February 2021 ceasefire between India and Pakistan along the LC. Except for minor local infringements, the ceasefire has now held for nearly three years, a major achievement which hints at a change in the thought process of the Pakistan Army GHQ.   

Under the current highly vulnerable internal security scenario, the conduct, and more important the legitimacy, of Pakistan General election scheduled for February 2024, will have a strong bearing on the continued relevance of Pakistan as a state or its unravelling into centrifugal components.