REVIEW OF PROPOSED

LEAD ROLE TO INDO TIBETAN BORDER POLICE ALONG THE LAC

 

“Capacity building for implementing a disruptive strategy is the surest way to deter China from adopting a coercive geopolitical path.” – Col RS Sidhu

Brief on ITBP

The Indo Tibetan Border Police, conceived as an integrated unconventional guerrilla cum-intelligence-cum-fighting Force to operate primarily in the inhospitable, wild and vertical world of the Himalayas, was raised on October 24, 1962, for reorganizing the frontier intelligence and security set up along the Indo-Tibetan border. ITBP was initially raised under the CRPF Act, with a sanctioned strength of four Battalions. In 1992, the Parliament enacted the ITBPF Act and the rules there under were framed in 1994.

The ITBP has been assigned the following roles: -  

-          Vigil on the northern borders, detection and prevention of border violations, and promotion of the sense of security among the local populace.

-          Check illegal immigration, trans-border smuggling and crimes.

-          Security to sensitive installations, banks and protected persons.

-          Restore and preserve order in any area in the event of disturbance.

 

In the year 2004, in pursuance of GoM recommendations on “One Border One Force”, the entire stretch of India-China Border comprising 3488 Kms has been assigned to the ITBP for Border Guarding duty. Presently the ITBP is guarding India-China border in Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh states from the Karakoram pass in Jammu & Kashmir to Diphu La in Arunachal Pradesh. The ITBP deployment extends over a frontage of 3,488 kilometers, at altitudes ranging from 9,000 ft to 18,750 ft. However, the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) continues to guard the open Indian fronts with Nepal (1,751 kms) and Bhutan (699 kms). There is therefore a need to merge the SSB into the ITBP.

 

Roughly one fourth of the force is committed in providing security to various installations of national importance throughout the country, guarding of sensitive diplomatic missions abroad, and combating naxal insurgency in selected districts of Chhattisgarh.

With these additional tasks entrusted to ITBP, its strength has gradually increased to 56 service Battalions, 4 Specialist Battalions, 17 Training Centres and 07 logistics establishments comprising a total strength of around 90,000 personnel, deployed under 15 Sector, 05 Frontier, and 02 Command Headquarters.

Proposed Lead Role to ITBP along LAC

In a replay of the ‘Agniveer’ controversy, a social media storm has been generated by the mid-August 2022 mainstream Indian media reports of India’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) considering a proposal to assign lead role to ITBP along the Northern borders of the country. As per brief details shared in the media, the proposal under consideration envisages for ITBP to assume full responsibility along the Northern borders in a progressive manner. Initially the ITBP shall be responsible for the less threatened Central and Eastern sectors along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, followed by the Northern sector. The proposal shall be subject to disengagement of the armies of the two countries from the current standoff along the LAC, and reaching of an agreement whereby India’s ITBP and Border Defence Regiment of China shall only be deployed along the LAC and establish formal channel of communication.

To understand the impact of the proposal, the issue needs to be approached from two different perspectives. Firstly, whether the strategic situation merit restructuring of peacetime border management along the LAC.  Secondly, if the answer is in the affirmative, then does the ITBP has the requisite wherewithal to take on the proposed lead role along LAC during peacetime.

Enmeshing of External and Internal Security Environment

Fast paced advancements in Cyberspace, Artificial Intelligence, biological vectors and unmanned air-land-sea mobile platforms have phenomenally enhanced the internal security vulnerabilities to threats emanating not only from within but also from beyond the national borders.

The continuing faceoff with China is impacting the internal security dimension within India in cyberspace, commerce, economic, political and civil society domains. The outbreak of COVID 19 pandemic in conjunction with armed ingress on the borders, enhanced cyberspace attacks, targeting of critical assets of sensitive national installations and major Indian corporations, orchestrated fly by night public space vandalism, grey origin psychological warfare media op-eds propagating Chinese interests, are all ‘Battle Indicators’ of the ongoing hidden spectrum warfare between the two countries.

The resultant overlap in external and internal security purview has enlarged the scope of internal security domain that needs to be secured. Major reforms are needed in organisation of National Security Council to align it to proactively steer the nation to meet future full spectrum technological and physical threats of internal security.  A super arching Ministry of Interior Security or broad basing the National Security Council from an advisory to an executive role needs to be considered.

Intricacies of Peace Time Guarding Of India’s Borders

Guarding India’s borders during peacetime is a complex task along its land frontier of 15,200 kms, coastline of 7,516 kms and Exclusive Economic Zone area of 2 million square kilometers. India’s border with Afghanistan de facto doesn’t exist, owing to occupation of large swathes of Jammu & Kashmir province of India, by Pakistan and China. Nearly one third of the border with Pakistan is disputed, necessitating deployment of the regular army along the Line of Control (LC) and Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). With China almost the entire length of borders is disputed leading to deployment of regular troops along the LAC. Nepal, hitherto a quiet border, is increasingly falling under the sway of Chinese influence. India’s most vulnerable 24 kms wide Siliguri corridor, flanked by Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, is merely 130 kms from Chumbi Valley in China and is a major strategic vulnerability. Bhutan, whose defence rests with India, is uncomfortable to confront China.

The issue is further compounded by the adhoc division of responsibility between the Indian army (IA) under Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the multifarious border guarding force under MHA, leading to dichotomy in chain of command and control. Except for Assam Rifles (AR), which is under command of IA, all other Para Military Forces (PMF) are deployed under direct control of MHA during peacetime. Requirement of combating cross-border fuelled insurgencies in J&K, Ladakh and NE border states further complicates the issue.

Existing Border Management Superstructure

In January 2004 the MHA established a Department of Border Management, tasked with comprehensive management of border areas, including guarding and development of infrastructure. However, this has not been able to negate the prevailing ad hocism in peacetime border guard responsibilities. While the IA is deployed on the disputed border sections with China and Pakistan, various paramilitary forces are deployed along the International Borders (IB) with different countries. In principle, the Border Security Force (BSF) guards the IB with Pakistan and Bangla Desh, ITBP is deployed on the border with China, SSB secures the IB with Nepal and Bhutan, AR covers the IB with Myanmar, and Coast Guard (CG) polices the maritime boundary.

The existing dichotomies in command and control and allied anomalies has been largely responsible for the series of gaffes Kargil 1999, Doklam 2017, Galwan 2020. 

Review of the Proposal

A unitary command and control structure will be preferable to the current anomalous division of responsibilities between MOD and MHA at the apex, and IA and PMFs. The principle of deploying ‘one border one force’ during peacetime is therefore sound logic. Accordingly, assigning the lead role to ITBP along LAC goes with this principle.

Freeing the IA from active deployment along the borders during peacetime comes with concomitant advantages. The Army has always wanted to be relieved of peacetime operational commitments to enable it to train for future battlefields. So it should not be looking the gift horse in the mouth. In any case the reactive stance of the government along the Northern borders does not give any leeway for the Army to adopt innovative approaches to tackling the China threat. 

However, due cognisance needs to be given to the following factors. These PMF are neither equipped nor have adequate strength to replace the existing IA deployment along the borders during peacetime. The threat from across the LAC, with eyeball to eyeball deployment, is now of paramount concern to India vis a vis the threat from across the LC/AGPL. Taking the logic of ITBP being deployed in the forward tier all along the LAC, it stands to logic that BSF assumes similar responsibility along the LC/AGPL. Currently neither the ITBP nor the BSF is having adequate force and major weapons and equipment to shoulder the new responsibility.

Even when the proposal is subject to implementation post disengagement from the current standoff, ITBP capabilities to match the operational strength of China’s Border Guards Regiment, needs to be assessed.

We shall therefore follow through with a comprehensive review of whether the ITBP is equipped to effectively shoulder its proposed responsibility of effectively guarding the Northern borders during peacetime, or is there a requirement to restructure it de novo.  

Lacunae In Existing Deployment Pattern of ITBP

Out of 56 Service Battalions only 30 odd units are available for deployment along the LAC frontage of roughly 3000 kilometers, resulting in an extended linear deployment of an ITBP battalion ranging from 30 to 100 kilometers. This entails large gaps which are difficult to be patrolled on foot during inclement environment conditions. The units, deployed over extended frontages, lack adequate firepower for self defense against surprise local offensive actions by the adversary.

Currently the ITBP Border Out Posts (BOPs) along the LAC are administratively oriented with extensive gaps, which are vulnerable to Chinese policy of incremental encroachment of Indian territory. The current deployment pattern of these BOPs lack the additional troops required for extensive and regular patrolling to cover these gaps and do not have inherent staying power to ward off surprise Chinese offensive actions.

Administrative infrastructure at BOPs is rudimentary. Prolonged deployment extending over three to five years in harsh topography and environment, with inadequate administrative infrastructure, enhances fatigue factor on troops.

ITBP lacks Integrated Surveillance and Reaction capability necessary to counter Chinese incremental encroachment. Electronic surveillance and effective communication infrastructure, essential to operate in inclement environment is lacking. 

While the command & control for peacetime deployment varies between MOD and MOH, based on threat perception, during hot war the ITBP deployment shall come under control of Army, necessitating coordination with the latter.  Inferior firepower of ITBP Battalion inhibits Army to deploy ITBP unit cohesively during hot war. Quite often it leads to piecemeal deployment of ITBP Battalion under different Infantry Battalions. This has an adverse psychological effect on troops.

Chinese Border Guard Regiments have superior combat power comparative to ITBP Battalions, that gets further enhanced due to the former’s proactive encroachment policy enabling it local superiority in area of intrusion. China’s deployment of special police commando units and construction of 624 Border Defence Villages in Tibet, has further strengthened the combat power of their Border Guards.

Proposed Deployment Doctrine for ITBP

There is a requirement to adopt an effective strategy to deter China from pursuing its strategy of incremental encroachment.

ITBP disposition should be premised on a dissuasive posture by deploying its companies in secure strong points during peacetime, backed by effective surveillance of gaps by electronic surveillance and mobile patrols, to detect and provide early warning of enemy ingress, followed by timely deployment of mobile reserves in area of interest.

Tactical ingredients for successful implementation of such a strategy are as under: -

-        Quick reaction capability at every level of command & control.

-        Electronic and aerial surveillance capability should extend upto 12 hours foot movement time beyond LAC.

-        ITBP battalions should be deployed in two tiers, enabling immediate availability of reserves from depth deployment for short range Patrols (SRPs) and operational contingency tasks.

-        An integral Commando Quick Reaction force should be authorised to the battalion, for special contingency tasks.

-        The Sector Headquarters should have a battalion minus uncommitted troops for Long Range Patrols (LRPs), and timely reinforcements to meet operational contingencies.

-        A reserve battalion should be available with Frontier Headquarters.

-        The Command Headquarters of ITBP should have a dedicated Special Force unit for surveillance of nomadic pastures and tribes, and covert trans-LAC surveillance missions. The existing VIKAS battalions under MOH may be assigned for this task.

-        The area of responsibility of ITBP battalions should be restricted to within six to eight hours road movement time, of Sector within 12 to 18 hours road movement time, and of Frontier Headquarters within 24 hours road movement time.

Force & Manpower Restructuring Recommendations

ITBP manpower is drawn on all India basis and is not indigenous to the extreme terrain and climate obtainable in its primary area of responsibility. Continuous deployment in extreme high altitude impacts health and motivation of troops. There is therefore a need for   providing deployment stations below high altitude to enable peace-field profile. A case also exists to recruit 25 % of troops from hill tribes and border areas, to provide inherent regional expertise.

A review of de novo deployment pattern of ITBP along LAC needs to be undertaken and additional strength should be authorised to be recruited and trained in a swift time frame.

Current tenures of Commanders and key appointments at Frontier Headquarters and above should be of three years to ensure continuity in operational effectiveness.

Future requirement to operate high technology weapons and equipment will necessitate enhancing educational Qualitative Requirements for recruitment for all cadres. Technical entry stream needs to be introduced.

Young age profile is essential for operating in extreme high altitude areas. Fixing service age limit of 40 years for NCOs and below, 45 years for JCOs, and 50 years for Commandants and below officers, needs to be adopted. Lateral transfer of affected ITBP personnel to other PMF and CPOs is recommended.

Introduce a Commando Platoon with superior weapons and equipment in ITBP service Battalions for domination of gaps and quick reaction.

Introduce a light UAV section with ITBP service Battalions.

Introduce a sniper section with each Company to dominate large gaps.

Sector reserves should be nominated from a portion of troops deployed in second tier.

Cross-country mobility vehicles such as Snow-scooters, All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs), and armoured tracked and wheeled high mobility vehicles should be provided for swift movement of reserves.

Special sniper rifles, advanced squad automatic weapons, solar powered sensors, light surveillance UAVs, special personal clothing need to be introduced.

An integrated surveillance and communication grid and access to satellite imagery at Sector Headquarters should be considered.

Closing Thought

Hopefully, the above issues will be resolved prior to implementing the proposed change over of responsibilities between MOD and MHA.  

 

“When push comes to a shove, adopting an unpredicted response is likely to beget highest dividend to faceoff China.” - ‘Disruptive Strategy To Countervail China’ by Col RS Sidhu