THE VICTOR OF INDIA CHINA STANDOFF 2020

 “In today’s highly factitious domestic polity of democratic countries, geopolitical stance of a country is no longer a matter of purely national interests, but is quite often modulated to suit perceived domestic political payoffs.” 

 

My write up “Afghanistan A Chinese Hot Potato”, generated an interesting discussion amongst a section of viewers leading to a query as to the real victor of the 2020 India-China standoff. I found the query highly pertinent not only from the geopolitical standpoint but also the internal political dynamics of both the countries. However there is no definitive answer, not even in the two aforesaid countries, as the debate is difficult to be approached dispassionately, being viewed more often than not from the prism of political or geopolitical bloc loyalty. Even within the US and NATO countries the stance adopted by them during the standoff is subjective to the political dynamics of respective country.

It’s close to twenty months since May 2020 when the world woke up to the explosive news of the Himalayan faceoff between the two nuclear equipped third and fourth powerful armies of the world. The comity of nations witnessed with bated breath the largest ever high altitude amassing of mechanised forces in the world, before sanity returned in the surcharged atmosphere. Though the opposing forces are no longer engaged in eyeball to eyeball confrontation, but the feverish build-up of infrastructure activity indicates to it being the proverbial lull before the storm.

With the Himalayan passes closed for the winters, it’s as good a time as ever to assess the gains and losses of the Himalayan faceoff.

Backdrop of the Incident

Pursuant to existing border management protocols between India and China, there is an extensive No Man’s Land ranging upto 20 kms from the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and is dominated by frequent patrolling by either side in disputed areas. Though the two countries differ in their perception of the LAC, regular army is not deployed along the LAC. Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and Assam Rifles are deployed to patrol the Indian side of the extensive No Man’s Land. On the Chinese side the patrolling is performed by their Border Guards, under their Military Districts. Use of fire arms is prohibited under the border management protocols, though carriage of personal weapons is optional by the patrols. Protocols also lay down extensive drills to avoid physical contact between the border patrols.

Traditionally both India and China conduct annual operational training by their frontline field formations along the LAC during summer months. However, owing to the impact of the COVID 19 virus, India cancelled the operational training scheduled for the summer of 2020. China, on the other hand, continued to go ahead with its planned operational training.

In early May 2020 China assembled its offensive field formations in operational areas under the garb of training movement and launched simultaneous incursions along the entire length of the LAC. In well planned trans LAC military operations, China tasked its troops to furtively establish defensive positions in the disputed areas of Galwan River Valley, Hot Springs and Patrolling Point 4 at Pangong Tso, in the Ladakh sector.

It followed up with overt deployment of one reserve mechanised infantry division in general area of Depsang Plains to support the operations at Galwan river Valley, and another reserve mechanised infantry division in depth of Pangong Tso to support the operations at PP 4 along its Northern bank. It was an overwhelming show of force to deter India from any retaliatory action.

In the ensuing action India suffered twenty fatal casualties. China remained non-committal about the fatalities on its side. Foreign analysts have estimated 40 to 100 fatal casualties amongst Chinese troops. Subsequently, China has acknowledged only six fatalities after several months. Most surprisingly, during this entire action not a single bullet was fired! India launched a riposte in end August 2020 by occupying sensitive heights on the Kailash range, to compel China to revert to status quo positions prior to May 2020. The resultant chain of events has activated geostrategic forces with still unfolding consequences in global time and space.

Consideration of Factors

“In any battle the imponderable and critical factor is what is going to happen when commanders are exhausted and under extreme pressure and when their men’s adrenalin is flowing.” – Richard Simpkins in ‘Red Armour’        

 

Several tangible and intangible factors have been considered while assessing the outcome of this faceoff. More often than not it’s the ‘intangibles’ that assume greater criticality and are also more difficult to analyse.

Tangibles

1.      What was the operational aim of China and how far was it successful in accomplishing it? 

2.      If territorial gains was the aim, can restricting patrolling rights be considered in purview of such gains? There has been ongoing incremental encroachment of Indian territory by China over the years, from India’s standpoint. Should territory lost in this incident or cumulative losses over period of time be used for quantification? How do we differentiate the two in the absence of authoritative data? 

3.      If casualties suffered is to be a parameter, then which figure is to be accepted for China? 

Intangibles

4.      Were the objectives achieved by China commensurate to the force employed and end result? 

5.      With the breakdown of earlier border management agreements between the two countries and the resultant militarisation of the border areas who holds the advantage on the LAC?

6.      The trade-off of tactical gains by India and China has led to China moving its troops back to PP 8 against withdrawal by India from Pangong Tso Heights and Kailash range. This has resulted in China continuing to hold on to the gains secured by it in other areas while India is now bereft of physical bargaining points. What is the relative impact of this factor on India and China?  

7.      Would India have undertaken a rebalancing of forces against the major adversary to its North, in a realistic time frame, but for the incidence? 

8.      What is the psychological impact of the incident on the psyche of the troops of the two armies, and its likely impact on future combat incidents? 

Factor 1

This factor needs to be addressed in depth owing to the opaqueness surrounding it. Also the success of the analysis of events hinges on capturing it in entirety. Even twenty months down the line India and China are silent on this aspect. Infact, no less than the Chief Of Army Staff (COAS) of the Indian Army, in a frank admission, has stated on record that INDARMY is uncertain about the operational and geopolitical aims of China in launching the operation.

China, as is usual, obfuscates the issue and blames India for the faceoff. Some independent   analysts do infer that the incident may have been the result of over enthusiasm of China’s Western Theatre Command. Geopolitically the situation was inimical to Chinese interests to launch major incursions at a juncture when it was already under extreme international pressure due to blame for COVID 19 pandemic, investigation of role of World Health Organisation in assisting cover up by China, ongoing US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in South China Sea maritime region, formulation of alliance of like-minded powerful international countries against China, and increased scrutiny of its human rights violations in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. Launching of such an operation at a geopolitically inopportune time could not have been undertaken by their Western Theatre Command without go ahead from National leadership.

The subject is best dealt in the book ‘Elephant On The High Himalayas’, relevant extract of which is reproduced below: -

“It was the year 2017 and China was engaged in its road infrastructure development activity in disputed territory adjacent to Doklam, Sikkim close to the sensitive Bharat-Bhutan-Tibet tri junction. Bharat for the first time decided to forcefully challenge the ‘normal’ nibbling territorial encroachment policy of the Chinese by employing troops to stop the road construction…. It was a big setback to the carefully cultivated ‘Wolf Warrior’ image of the Chinese armed forces and resulted in tremendous loss of face domestically and internationally. China’s psychological ascendancy of more than half a century over the Indian state had been lost.

Pursuant to this major policy change, Bharat also began speeding up its own logistics and communication infrastructure along the Northern borders with Tibet. The new found confidence of Bharat rang alarm bells in Beijing, as it sensed a threat to its critical alternate land access to the Indian Ocean and energy centres of West and Central Asia. 

By mid-2019, Bharat had revoked the special status to J&K under Article 370 and Article 35A of its constitution, followed by reiterating its resolve to regain Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (POJK) and Chinese occupied Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley regions of J&K.

Voicing open opposition in diplomatic forums to the BRI initiative designed to further the geostrategic interests of China, cultivating close bilateral ties with Vietnam for commercial exploitation of natural resources in South China Sea disputed by China, actively engaging with the as yet informal ‘Quad Alliance’ partner countries, and developing close military co-operation with USA, were actions of Bharat which China interpreted as threatening its regional supremacy and critical national interests.

Bharat was emerging as a regional challenger to China’s supremacy in Asia and a stumbling block to China’s ambitions of global pre-eminence.

The pivot to the East by USA challenged Chinese dominance in South China Sea maritime region and fueled growing independence leanings in Taiwan and ASEAN countries. Commencement of rearmament by Japan signalled its re-emergence from self-imposed geostrategic restraints and rise of another challenger to established regional supremacy of China.

China perceived growing encirclement by emerging inimical geopolitical alliances. It also felt emboldened by its superior Comprehensive National Power, based on the visible strength of its economy and its modern and strong armed forces. Faced with a growing two front threat which could impede its world vision, China chose to exercise the option of overwhelming show of force, short of an open conflict, to overawe its opponents into submission. With decisive USA presence in the Eastern maritime region, Bharat in its perception was the weaker opponent to intimidate through show of force.”

Factor 2

The official stance of China is that it was India that was engaged in changing the status quo along the LAC by developing infrastructure and its own forces acted to prevent India from doing so.

India Prime Minister has stated on record that no ingress has been made by China into Indian held territory. But this denial does not hold water, and is more aimed at the domestic political constituency. While no defensive positions held by Indian troops has been pushed back, it is equally clear that Chinese troops established positions in territory hitherto patrolled by Indian troops. This curtailment of patrolling rights on territory claimed, but not physically held, by Indian troops and establishing of new Chinese defences well ahead of positions held by it earlier, point to additional territorial gains by China.

While China has agreed to withdraw to erstwhile positions in most of the areas, consequent to military level talks, however, it has refused to move back from Depsang Plains and Gogra region.

Factor 3

While India has all along acknowledged the loss of twenty fatal casualties, China initially did not accept any fatal casualties on its side. World media published figures of forty to more than hundred fatal casualties suffered by China in the fracas. After a hiatus of over six months, under pressure of its heavily censored social media, China has admitted to only six fatal casualties.

The number of fatal casualties is surprisingly high, considering the fact that no bullets were fired by either side, and is reflective of the high passions amongst the troops on the opposing sides.

Factor 4

China deployed two mechanised infantry divisions and an armoured brigade in the depth areas, in addition to the formations deployed in defensive role, to deter and overawe India from undertaking any decisive action.

India, after initial obfuscation of Chinese ingress, got its act together and surprised China by speed and effectiveness of its response. Eventually it also achieved tactical surprise by occupying critical passes on the Kailash mountain range, forcing China to the negotiating table.

India has further responded by speeding up development of infrastructure along the LAC despite objections by China, and has been able to match Chinese forces as far as deployability is concerned. The initial strategic advantage that China held is now obviated. Geopolitically too India remains committed to its informal alliances such as the QUAD, and continues to oppose China’s BRI projects.

China definitely failed to accomplish its strategic aim to overawe India and force it to keep aloof from geopolitical alliances inimical to China. Even diplomatically China was unable to secure major diplomatic support as is evident by the inconclusive closed door meetings of UNSC held at its initiative to discuss the issue.

Factor 5

The first casualty of the incident has been the border management agreements which failed to prevent the incident from snowballing into a major standoff. Owing to the erstwhile pacifist approach of India along the LAC, China was emboldened to effect a policy of creeping encroachment of disputed territory on the Himalayas. The pacifist approach definitely disadvantaged India, which stuck to them despite consistent violations by China. The latter bypassed these agreements at will.

Post militarisation of the LAC, China will now find it difficult to continue unchecked with its policy of incremental encroachment. An intangible gain for India. Of course, the financial burden of militarisation of the LAC will be comparatively heavy for India, owing to the economic might of China, but then gains do come at a cost. No price is too heavy for a nation to defend its sovereignty.

China too shall have to pay a price for this militarisation. Centrifugal forces in Xinjiang and Tibet are in check only due to a strong Chinese military presence. Prolonged deployment of its troops opposite Ladakh could adversely impact its internal security situation, which may lead to domino effect in other sensitive regions.

This military operation by China has forced it into a two front threat, from the maritime region to its East, and from a resurgent India to its South West.

Factor 6

Any gains in Pangong Tso region advantage China by increasing the threat to Leh, whereas the gains in Depsang Plains enable China to threaten Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), a vital forward airfield, and thence to the Indian defences on the Siachen Glacier. Between the two threats, Pangong Tso may be classified as greater. Hence, the priority accorded to disengagement in the Pangong Tso region.

China’s sensitivity to Depsang Plains is premised on it being the shortest approach from India for interdiction of its strategic surface communication network for Xinjiang province. Hence, its recalcitrance at disengagement in this region.

DBO is a forward airfield with great strategic significance owing to its vicinity to Karakoram Pass. Earlier it was lightly defended by India due to Chinese sensitivity and pacifist approach. However, during the faceoff it has been converted into a very strong defensive node. Denuding DBO defences for mere securing of patrolling rights in Depsang Plains is not in the interest of India. 

So, while tactically India is disadvantaged, the strategic gain arising from a fortified DBO complex adjacent to Karakoram provides considerable intangible advantage to India.

Factor 7

The most significant fallout of the faceoff has been the rebalancing of defensive posture by India between its western and northern borders. It was around the turn of the century that strategic thought in India started veering around to the view of the bigger threat to India was from across its northern borders than from the west.

In pursuance of this thought India commenced raising of a reserve operational formation for deployment in the mountainous terrain along the LAC. However, owing to inadequate budgetary support the raising was moribund for more than seven years. The renewed urgency has not only resurrected the raising, albeit in a more flexible form of Integrated Battle Groups (IBG), but has also resulted in operational reorienting of an additional operational formation from the plains for employment in the mountains.

India had earlier maintained three operational formations for employment in the plains, but they remained a mere threat in being. Surprisingly, no such reserves were maintained for deployment in the hills, despite the fact that while gains across the International Border had to be returned, there was no such constraint for retaining gains across the LC. With the reorienting of the operational formation, this lacunae has been overcome to certain aspect. Interestingly, this aspect has not yet sunk in on our western adversary.

While the move to raise the defense threshold on the North had already begun, it was embroiled in red tape in the labyrinthine corridors of North and South Block. China has assisted India in not just fast tracking the process by a decade or so, but also in its urgent re-equipping to ‘fight the wars of the future from mere training to fight the wars of the past’.  

Factor 8

When analysing the combat potential of adversaries, the number of feet on the ground and the guns seldom give the true picture. While the quality of the weapon matters, the hand behind the weapon and the leadership do play a defining role in the outcome of a battle.

Despite having all the advantages of adequate planning, rehearsals, timing and terrain of own choosing, local superiority of numbers, surprise and deception, the best that China could throw at India lost the plan. This dramatically highlights the fatal flaw in the Chinese system of political supremacy over the armed forces.

When looked at from the prism of the outcome of the standoff, the border law introduced recently by China is primarily aimed at their Theatre Commanders and below, and highlights the weakness of their chain of command. Replacement of three handpicked Theatre Commanders within the short time frame of 18 months, post standoff, is evidence of the observation.

The aura of invincibility of their armed forces, so assiduously cultivated over decades by the Chinese propaganda machine has been broken. This will definitely impact the powerful intangible factor of combat potential of the two armies, to the detriment of China, and advantage to India.   

Deduction

In as much as the standoff with India at Doklam 2017 preceded and influenced China’s military operations at Galwan 2020, the latter military operation was implemented without learning the right lessons from the former. With a right wing nationalist Government in power, it was unrealistic to infer that India will not react to a major encroachment of their sovereign territory.

Indian political and military leadership was equally at fault in not learning the right lessons from Doklam 2017. It failed to grasp that China will hit back at place and time of own choosing. India was again caught by surprise, as all the failures of Kargil 1999 came to haunt it again in 2020.

To give China its due, India’s initial reaction did follow the traditional policy of public denial and obfuscation of the incursion. But the violent reactions by India’s troops on the ground, supported by a social media storm, turned the planned outcome on its head. The power centres of both India and China had failed to factor in the power of a free social media in their calculus while planning their actions and reactions. To India’s credit, the political leadership was quick to grasp the mood of the nation and acted with speed by reshaping its response. This is where the entire chain of command in the closed system of China faltered.

China ended up securing possession of a few square kilometers or even hundred odd square kilometers of disputed territory (the extent is not truly quantifiable owing to lack of authentic data about time and space over which it was gained), but at a prohibitive cost. The laissez faire it enjoyed on the LAC is over, weakness of its armed forces have been exposed to its stronger adversaries, it’s now forced to look over its shoulder while facing the stronger adversary to its East, and its long term goal of world domination lies shattered. India has gained critical time to rearm and restructure its armed forces and ramp up its infrastructure, and build strong geopolitical alliances to ward off China.

A stronger India will now be a more difficult India to overcome.