1971 WAR IN THE EASTERN SECTOR

 

‘A Leader is best when people barely know he exists. Not so good when people obey and acclaim him. Worse when they despise him.

But of a good Leader, who talks little, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say, “We did this ourselves”.’

- 'The Way of Life', Lao Tzu

 

If any maxim were to apply to India’s victory in the Eastern sector during the 1971 War with Pakistan, then above should be the one!

Mrs Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, had a plethora of advisors from all fields, diplomatic, political, economic, intelligence, military et al. It also needs no gainsaying that the Prime Minister was presented with multitude of policy options, and none of them were easy ones. With US, a superpower, and China, an inimical and powerful neighbour, supporting Pakistan, exercising the option of forcing a military decision was an extraordinary one. Setting the geopolitical stage by seeking out the USSR umbrella, before exercising the chosen military option, was what enabled India to withstand the coercive power of US and China. The ultimate decision to go with a particular advice was of the Prime Minister, and her alone. The entire Team functioned as a cohesive whole, leading to India’s finest hour in the geopolitical arena. It is also on record that post the phenomenal victory when the Advisors lined up to claim having her ear for the course of action she adopted, she kept her counsel and neither supported the claims nor contradicted any of them.

Similar was the case in the military domain. Creation of logistics infrastructure in a militarily unfavourable terrain and denial of air and sea lanes of communication to the enemy were critical to swift culmination of military operations, a critical factor owing to the prevailing geopolitical environment.

The adoption of the ‘flowing torrent’ military doctrine for offensive operations in riverine terrain, by predominantly infantry forces, was in itself the most audacious military decision. The strategy, albeit with a different name, had been adopted earlier by the German and Allied armies in Africa and Europe during Second World War, but they were highly mobile and the terrain was amenable to employment of large scale mechanised forces.

With hindsight, the policy to train, equip and support the Mukti Vahini irregular force much before the traditional battle had been joined, was farsighted. It’s a moot question whether the Indian Army could have gone beyond the initially assigned military objective to threaten and capture Dhaka, in an acceptable time frame, but for the presence of the Mukti Vahini, which more than delivered on the ‘bang for the buck’ spent on it.

In a fluid battle success is dependent on the seizing and retaining of initiative. It involves brilliance in marshalling of the forces at the strategic level, continuously identifying the centre of gravity at the operational level, and daring and initiative at the tactical level, together opening up ever new avenues for developing new strategic opportunities.

Every military echelon played its role to perfection. The Chiefs of the Armed Forces at New Delhi, the Field Commanders, the logistics support network, and of course the fighting troops who were the tip of the Indian spear, all have due cause to be proud of their bit role in the overall victory.

In a way the chorus of “I did this” by various high personalities appears to smack of a rather shallow attempt at drowning out the unspoken chorus from tip of the Indian spear “We did this ourselves”!