TALIBAN MARCH TO KABUL AND BEYOND – PART II

 

‘The Taliban leadership looks at unpredictability as a major diplomatic tool to achieve geopolitical gains.’ – Veteran Col RS Sidhu 

 

India Gets Its First Diplomatic Gambit Right

The Taliban, despite indirect overtures to India at Doha, failed to make an unequivocal offer of security for Indian diplomatic mission. This issue assumed critical importance for India, as it strongly pointed towards discord within the Taliban hierarchy on geopolitical stance to be adopted by the new Government of Afghanistan. It also highlighted the strong position held within the Taliban coalition by substantial components that are inimical to Indian interests. 

India's immediate interest lay in safe evacuation of it's citizens from Afghanistan, which it effectively organised. India adopted the right strategy to evacuate all its diplomatic staff from Afghanistan, as under the circumstances, retaining the diplomatic staff in situ could have led to high risk of an avoidable hostage crisis. 

Immediate Aftermath of US Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The first impact of the withdrawal from Afghanistan is being felt within the US itself, as it is further fracturing its domestic polity. 

Geopolitically, the most important impact is likely on the maturing of the Quad Alliance, as India will most likely drag its feet on fast forwarding this nascent grouping. US influence with the South China Sea littoral states, especially Vietnam and Philippines, is also likely to be impacted, resulting in their going slow on security tie up with US. 

US standing in West Asia too will be impacted. Its political capital with Israel will be drastically reduced, resulting in its inability to push Israel. It will also find it difficult to resume nuclear deal with Iran, one of the stated goals of the Joe Biden presidency. 

N-proliferation by N Korea, Pakistan, Iran will be that much more difficult to be checkmated by US. 

India’s Stance

Based on past performance, its safe to state that India’s MEA has invariably adopted a policy of ‘wait and watch’, whenever the chips were down. So too this time. The MEA is upbeat confabulating with Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, Taliban head of political office in Doha. Much is being made out of his military training at IMA, Dehra Dun. In corporate parlance he may be comparable to a marketing head, willing to promise the moon to get the business. However, delivery on the promises made is always an operational issue. 

There is no clarity on operational satraps of the Taliban, as they are a motley mix, owing loyalty to varied interests several of whom are known to be inimical to India, and will likely be more than happy to scuttle any agreement arrived at between India and Afghanistan. Under the circumstances, promises made and accepted will not be worth the paper they’ll be written on. 

Taliban's immediate concern is to gain international legitimacy, to be able to access international financial aid. While engaging in talks, even with the enemy, is good diplomatic strategy, I sincerely do hope that MEA is able to visualise their gambit. On this score the diplomatic outcomes of 1948, 1965, 1971, 1987, 1999, 2019 do not offer much confidence. 

With no direct geographic access between India-Afghanistan, the only way the situation there can impact the internal security situation within India is through Pakistan. Signaling an unequivocal and powerful retaliatory response, and overt preparation for same, is the key to handling the situation. India will need to be prepared for undertaking hard action against Pakistan at the very first sign of its involvement in trans LC infiltration and sponsoring of terrorist activities.

As regards economic access to CAR is concerned, Afghanistan does not figure in it. The access can only be through Iran, unless Pakistan capitulates!!! Hence, there’s no urgency for India to declare its diplomatic stance towards the Taliban Afghanistan.

“Thus, ‘prepare and wait’ rather than ‘wait and watch’ would be the more appropriate option for India.” – Veteran Col RS Sidhu