OVERCOMING INITIAL MILITARY
CHALLENGES BY INDIAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE (IPKF)
IN SRI LANKA: JULY -
SEPTEMBER 1987
Backdrop to Military Operations by IPKF
IPKF military operations cannot be looked at in isolation from the Indo
Sri Lanka Accord of 29 July 1987, which is inherently flawed from India’s
standpoint. Serious practitioners of geopolitics will always wonder as to how
India, which vigorously pushed its way to get the Accord signed and
implemented, failed to safeguard its own geopolitical interests.
Sri Lanka was
able to secure the acceptance by all parties that its unity,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity shall remain inviolate. Within the
constraints of its own interests, India did negotiate the best possible deal
for Sri Lanka Tamils within the framework of Constitution of Sri Lanka.
However India failed
to secure its own interests. By committing to the Indian military intervention
being incumbent on request of Government of Sri Lanka, it ended up dealing the
key ace to the latter. Once the IPKF was withdrawn prematurely, India was
bereft of any decisive influence to oversee the implementation of the political
provisions of the Accord by Sri Lanka.
There is also no
denying the fact that Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
the main Tamil rebel group, were never keen on the Accord. India’s pushing it through despite resistance
from the two main protagonists, resulted in the edifice of the Accord being
erected on weak foundations. Yet it never crossed the minds of our foreign
policy and security establishments to cater for the contingency of one or both
the protagonists reneging from the commitments of the Accord.
Military Challenges Posed By the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
India’s intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 followed an escalation curve
from attempting a political solution, to forceful attempts at providing
humanitarian assistance, and culminating in a conventional military
intervention. The Accord was
under negotiation between the two countries for a protracted duration, as can
be discerned from para 2.15 which states “…the proposals are conditional to an acceptance of
the proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986.” Unarmed flotilla of
Indian boats carrying humanitarian assistance to suffering Tamil population of
Jaffna was turned back by Sri Lanka Navy, leading to launch of Operation
Poomalai mission undertaken by the Indian Air Force for airdropping
supplies over the besieged town of Jaffna in Sri Lanka on 4 June
1987.
The impending launch of offensive
operation from four mounting bases viz. Agra, Secunderabad, Vishakhapatnam and
Chennai was by itself a major military challenge. The undue haste in signing and executing the Accord, overnight changed the
entire complexion of operations from an offensive to a peace keeping role with
no time for detailed planning, preparations, coordination, liaison and
briefings. The participating units and
troops were suddenly uncertain about the
changed role:-
-
The terms of
the accord and military’s role in its implementation.
-
Attitude of
the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and its armed paramilitary and police organisations.
-
Ambivalence on
situations necessitating use of armed force other than in self-defense.
-
Limited
logistics back up.
Prior to induction for operations in Sri
Lanka, the participating formations and units were orbatted with strike
formation where training is
organized for conventional offensive operations as per formation training
directive. Counter-insurgency or peacekeeping operations were not the assigned
operational task. Yet within three months of deployment the troops were
launched to conduct counter-insurgency operations necessitated by the sudden
change of national aim.
The Interregnum Period of August and
September
The very day of the accord, formations and units of 54
Infantry Division commenced induction into the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Division Headquarters along with 91 Infantry Brigade
were inducted into Jaffna peninsula by air transport to Palaly airfield,
whereas 47 Infantry Brigade carried out amphibious landings at Kankesanthurai
jetty.
15th Mechanised
Infantry Battalion less two companies was air transported to Palaly airfield,
and a second Mechanised Infantry Company conducted amphibious landings at
Kankesanthurai jetty, in conjunction with 91 Infantry Brigade.
76 Infantry
Brigade along with the third Mechanised Infantry Company was moved by Landing
Ship Tanks (LSTs) and merchant shipping to Trincomalee harbour and deployed
along the complete stretch of the Eastern Province from Trincomalee to
Batticaloa and further South to Akkaraipattu, Amparai and Pottuvil.
The deployment was
designated as a peacekeeping operation, in a foreign country having an
established governance organisation, an effective security infrastructure and
yet rife with ethnic, linguistic and communal fervor. There were no set
opponents, precedents and rules to go by. An uneasy equation prevailed between
the IPKF and the Sri Lankan security forces, as the military hierarchy of the
two armies interacted on the modus operandi of implementing the peace keeping
operations in IPKF mandated areas of Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri
Lanka.
During this
interregnum the fighting troops were strictly confined to camps except for
logistics movement. This unfairly denied terrain familiarisation to the combat
troops, critical for conduct of military operations. Coupled with a total void
in military terrain maps of the area it would seriously impede the conduct of
initial stages of subsequent military operations.
The first
serious threat which could have led to a potential unraveling of the accord
occurred with the outbreak of ethno-religious riots in September 1987 in
Trincomalee town. IPKF combat presence in Trincomalee was inadequate to contain
the riots. The Deputy General Officer Commanding of the 54 Infantry Division
and the Battalion Headquarters of 15th Mechanised Infantry Battalion
were moved post haste to Trincomalee to establish an ad-hoc Sector Headquarter
and control the ethnic strife. Using these riots as cover Sri Lanka attempted
to push through additional troops from Colombo to Trincomalee. Having been
forewarned, a Mechanised Infantry Task Force established a swift roadblock to
intercept the SLA reinforcements from entering Eastern Province. The situation
was handled with finesse and an awkward threat to the accord was negated.
The outcome of
the incident had a positive impact of showcasing resolve of IPKF to brook no interference
in areas under its mandate. This to a great extent deterred the SLA from
adopting an adventurous course in Northern and Eastern Provinces.
By end September it was clear that the LTTE and the other Tamil militant
groups were playing truant in surrendering their full cache of weapons and
military equipment.
Peace
Keeping to Peace Enforcement
17 LTTE cadres, including
Pulendran (Lt Col) and Kumarappa
(Lt Col), commanders of Batticaloa and Trincomalee regions respectively,
were apprehended by the Sri Lankan Navy on night 2nd / 3rd
October 1987 in the Palk Strait off Jaffna coastline while clandestinely
transporting by boats a large consignment of weapons and ammunition. They were
brought to Palaly airfield, the main base of SLA in Jaffna Peninsula, pending
transfer to Colombo for further action.
The LTTE insisted that all its
cadres were protected from arrest under the provision of general amnesty
granted under para 2.11 of the Accord and approached 54 Infantry Division to
get their cadres released from SLA custody. The SLA was equally adamant that
carrying of weapons was a breach of the provision of surrender of all weapons
and ammunition by the militant groups under para 2.9 of the Accord, and that
the militants were arrested as common criminals outside the jurisdiction of
IPKF.
54 Infantry Division referred
the matter to higher Indian authorities, who in turn directed them to prevent
the transfer of prisoners to Colombo till a final decision was arrived at.
Firm intervention of the Indian
army ensured periodic access by Indian Army doctors to the LTTE prisoners to
monitor their health. SLA was also persuaded by Indian Army to permit an LTTE
delegation led by their military commander Mahathya to meet with the prisoners.
However, the situation tensed
further on 4th October 1987, in the afternoon, when a Sri Lankan Air
Force plane landed at the Palaly airfield to ferry the prisoners to Colombo the
next day.
The LTTE set the deadline of
afternoon of 5th October 1987 for release of their cadres. Realising
that their transfer was now imminent, the 17 prisoners consumed cyanide in
early evening the same day. Five
prisoners were saved through resuscitation attempts by Indian Army. The other
12, including Pulendran and Kumarappa, died.
Stance
of LTTE
The Accord promised greater autonomy and merger of Tamil majority North
and East Provinces, within a broad democratic framework under the Sri Lanka
constitution. Yet it fell far short of LTTE’s political aspirations of an
independent Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. Sharing of political space in a
democratic system of governance was an anathema to its political ideology. It
looked at itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Sri Lanka Tamils
and brooked no rivals. This dogma propelled them to launch violent fratricidal
wars to the finish, against other Tamil rebel organisations, and is validation
of this reflection.
This incident was merely used by as an excuse to
pullout from the Accord by LTTE leader V Pirbhakaran, as is evident from its
reluctance to surrender its weapons and ammunition well beyond the three days
deadline, and also in continuing to further buildup its combat potential.
The Aftermath
The LTTE repudiated the Accord and also showed its
defiance by launching surprise attacks on isolated IPKF picquets. That the IPKF
was ill-prepared for this eventuality is highlighted by the hasty induction of
additional formations to seize control of the Jaffna peninsula from the grip of
LTTE.
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