OPERATION PAWAN
AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE INDO SRI LANKA ACCORD JULY 1987
Backdrop
Well nigh 44
years have elapsed since the signing of the Indo Sri Lanka Accord of 29 July
1987 plunging the armed forces of India headlong into launching Operation PAWAN
in Sri Lanka, the first overseas peacekeeping operation under Indian flag post-independence.
The Accord was signed between India and Sri Lanka, two sovereign powers, and an
implied but reluctant assent of a non-state organisation the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the self-appointed sole custodians of ethnic Tamils of
Sri Lanka.
Four decades
down the line, provides adequate historical perspective to study and assess the
losses and gains of the three main proponents of the Accord. In this brief we
shall look at the Accord per se and the play off from the Accord from the
perspective of the three proponents.
THREE INTERESTING
SIDELIGHTS ON THE ACCORD
Urgency Explicit in the Making of the
Indo Sri Lanka Accord
The Accord was the result of a long drawn out process of
diplomatic negotiations between India and Sri Lanka. To substantiate this observation one
has to just read the first sentence of para 2.15 of the Accord, “These
proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from
4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986…”
Yet it
displayed a sense of urgency, implicit in the second sentence of the same
paragraph of the Accord, “…Residual matters not finalised during
the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a
period of six weeks of signing this agreement…”
Reading of para 3 of the Accord, “This agreement and
the annexure thereto shall come into force upon signature”, is also
indicative of the urgency, as are the
short timelines for accomplishing the political and military resolves within
the Accord.
Thus we see a very interesting
facet of the making of this accord. It was under due negotiation for a
protracted period of over seven months, if not longer, followed by a
non-recorded interregnum of another over seven months, followed by a literally
overnight signing of the Accord, while still being a work in progress!
Contradiction of Tamil Militants Being a Non-signatory Party
to the Indo Sri Lanka Accord
Para 2.9 of the Accord records “… A cessation of hostilities will come
into effect all over the island within 48 hours of signing of this agreement.
All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered…The process of
surrendering arms and the confining of security personnel moving back to
barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities
coming into effect.”
Yet LTTE, the dominant Tamil militant group and the other
Tamil militant groups were not a signatory to the Accord. So the Accord remained
a document entered between two sovereign states, India and Sri Lanka. Yet it
placed obligations on third, not well defined non-sovereign parties, to
undertake actions decided by the two sovereign powers executing the agreement.
Even more
curious is para 2.14 which
records “The Government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions,
and co-operate in the implementation of these proposals.” India accepted an obligation to
ensure compliance by parties not subject to its sovereign jurisdiction and
without recording their written consent.
Camouflaging Indian Intervention By Overt Consent of Sri
Lanka
The
deployment of an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka flows from para
2.16 (c) “In the event
that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford
military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India will
cooperate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as
and when requested”, and Annexure 1 para 6, “ The President of Sri Lanka and the
Prime Minister of India also agree that in the terms of paragraph 2.14 and
paragraph 2.16(c) of the agreement, an Indian peace keeping contingent may be
invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of
hostilities, if so required.”
Given the
backdrop of the negotiation process which clearly indicated the reluctance of
Sri Lanka and also the LTTE towards the Accord, the naivete of Indian negotiators is difficult to be
believed, even with hindsight, of gifting the key ace of Indian military
intervention being made subject to invitation of Sri Lanka.
Seeing that
India had resolved to employ its armed might to intervene in Sri Lanka even in
the absence of the Accord, and past intervention in 1971 in erstwhile East
Pakistan in somewhat akin circumstances, it reflected a weak geopolitical will
of the Government of the day. Sri Lanka’s subsequent official request to recall
the IPKF, and India’s acquiescing to it, is also reflective of this
observation.
VICTOR, VANQUISHED AND THE ALSO RAN
Sri Lanka
From a
historical perspective Sri Lanka emerges as the clear victor. It was able to
secure a guarantee of its unity and territorial integrity as well as effecting
resolution of the ethnic dispute within the framework of its constitution. Most
important, Indian armed presence in Sri Lanka was subject to its consent.
Sri Lanka
judiciously employed the tactical respite provided to it by the presence of
IPKF in its North and East provinces to marshal its resources to decimate the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) led insurgency in its South. Thereafter it
entered into a tacit agreement with LTTE to call for the withdrawal of IPKF and
engage in joint operations to annihilate the competing Tamil militant groups
who were in support of the Accord. With the move out of IPKF, Sri Lanka was
free to rearm its armed forces and in next decade and a half succeeded in
annihilating the LTTE.
The
unification of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, one of the main plank of the
Accord, was also undone through its Supreme Court declaration of the merger
being ultra vires of the constitution.
LTTE
The LTTE looked
at itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Sri Lanka Tamils and
followed an absolutist and totalitarian ideology. Sharing political space in a
democratic system of governance had no place in its planned strategic outcome
of their struggle against the Sri Lanka state. This was the principle reason
for its opposition to the Accord which merely promised greater autonomy and
merger of Tamil majority North and East Provinces, within a broad democratic
framework under the Sri Lanka constitution. It fell far short of their
political aspirations of an independent Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka.
Its initial
tactical successes against rival Tamil militant groups, albeit with active
support of Sri Lanka armed forces, induced a displaced sense of superiority in
its strategic strength resulting in strategic overreach when it successfully
assassinated the former Prime Minister of India. This act, in one stroke,
denied it the logistics support base in Southern India which formed the
critical backbone in its struggle against Sri Lanka. Devoid of external
support, it was an easy prey for the rearmed and rejuvenated Sri Lanka armed
forces, who succeeded in comprehensively decimating the LTTE in 2007 after a
prolonged and ruthlessly conducted campaign which resulted in its entire
leadership meeting a fate similar to that of JVP.
India
India’s
political leadership of the day and its strategic establishment came out
looking indecisive and weak willed. It was out smarted and out maneuvered by
the strategic guiles employed by both Sri Lanka and LTTE.
It entered
into the Accord without resolving the contradictions inherent between the
political interests of the Government of the day and geopolitical interests of
India as a state.
Reiterating
its support to the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and committing to resolve the ethnic
dispute within the framework of constitution of Sri Lanka, provides the
clearest evidence of India not being interested in carving out an independent
Tamil state within Sri Lanka. Refer para 1.1 of the Accord “Desiring to
preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka:”, and para
1.5, “Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to
the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving
its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi- religious plural
society, in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and
prosper and fulfill their aspirations:”.
Evidently it
perceived an independent Tamil state within Sri Lanka against its interests
owing to a distinct possibility of it fueling centrifugal forces in its South.
So it leaves
the ostensive reason of political pressure from the South as the driving factor
for the Government of India to engage in pursuing an Accord which was desired
neither by Sri Lanka nor by LTTE, and a military intervention not in interest
of the Indian state.
Withdrawal
of the IPKF has now left India without decisive influence on Sri Lanka to
fulfil its unmet obligations under the Accord.
Author’s
Note
India looks at Sri Lanka as a friendly and sovereign country, which
should be sensitive towards the special security interests of India in the
region.
In this context, Sri Lanka’s action in accommodating major Chinese
presence in Sri Lanka by way of leasing its sovereign territory to Chinese
ports and infrastructure development corporations and amending own constitution
to provide extra-territorial jurisdiction to China on the leased territory,
adds new dynamics to the geopolitical relations between India and Sri
Lanka.
On the other hand, Sri Lanka is being recalcitrant in meeting its full
obligations under the Accord. This is in direct contrast to the alacrity shown
by it in meeting the sensitivities of China even to the extent of amending its
constitution.
There is thus a case for India to secure its interests by more
forceful interjection with the Government of Sri Lanka. The Accord is yet alive
and provides an ideal instrument for India to undertake actions in its best
national interest.
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