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CRITIQUE OF THE JULY 1987 INDO – SRI LANKA ACCORD
THE ACCORD
Broadly the accord required Sri Lanka to undertake specific constitutional measures to end discrimination against its Tamil minority and cease military operations in Northern and Eastern provinces, Tamil rebels to forego violence and surrender their weapons to the Government, and India to act as a guarantor for actions of both the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil groups in terms of the accord and to employ force, if needed.
Key Political Provisions that the Accord Proposed to Execute
An
interim merger of the Tamil predominant Northern and Eastern Provinces into a
single administrative unit within three months of signing of the accord and
holding of elections, in the presence of Indian observers, to the Provincial
Council by 31 December 1987.
The
final outcome of the merger will be subject to a referendum in Eastern Province
to be held by 31 December 1988 and to be decided by simple majority.
Sri
Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in
custody under The Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency laws, and to
combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under
these laws.
India
and Sri Lanka will expedite repatriation of resident Indian citizens from Sri
Lanka to India, and of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka.
Tamil
and English will also be given status of official language in Sri Lanka.
Key Military Provisions that the Accord Proposed to Execute
Cessation
of hostilities will take place within 48 hours of signing of this agreement,
and all arms held by militant groups will be surrendered to designated Sri
Lanka authorities in the presence of the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the Indian Red
Cross representatives within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities.
This
will be followed by immediate confining of Sri Lanka security forces to the
barracks, except law enforcement and security mechanisms which shall continue
to function as per norms in the rest of the country.
The
Government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions and provide
military assistance to implement these proposals as and when requested by the
Government of Sri Lanka. An Indian peace keeping contingent may be invited by
the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of
hostilities.
A
joint Indo-Sri Lankan observer group will monitor the cessation of hostilities
from 31 July 1987.
The
full text of the accord is at Appendix attached.
CRITIQUE ON THE ACCORD
Basic Tenets of the Accord
A
dispassionate reading of the Accord highlights three distinct strands around
which its fabric is woven.
First,
it records the acceptance by all parties that the unity,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka shall remain inviolate.
Second,
it legitimises the Tamil minority grievances of discrimination by the Sri Lanka
state and commitment by the latter to resolve these grievances by ‘giving equal
status and opportunity to its ethnic and linguistic identities and promote their
distinctive cultures’. More important, the Sri Lanka government accepted to
‘give due consideration to the special claim of ethnic Tamils on Northern and
Eastern Provinces’.
Third,
devolving upon India the role of the guarantor for actions of both the
Government of Sri Lanka and Tamil rebel organisations, ipso facto recognises
India’s special security interests in the region.
Unity, Sovereignty, and Territorial Integrity of Sri Lanka
This
factor is essential to understand the rationale that led to infirmities in the
Accord to safeguard India’s geopolitical interests.
The
Accord acknowledges convergence of interests between India and Sri Lanka on maintaining
the territorial integrity of the latter. It highlights beyond reasonable doubt
the position of the Indian state that it does not favour an independent Tamil state
being carved out from Sri Lanka. India was always wary of undertaking any
geopolitical course that may lead to possible consequences of fueling
centrifugal forces in peninsular India.
This
is the overriding factor which hamstrung India in employing the option of
resolving the dispute by force, despite recalcitration by Sri Lanka, and to
that extent weakened its bargaining position.
Understanding
of this weakness is also the probable reason that Sri Lanka engaged in
protracted negotiations with India in the run up to the Accord. In support of
this finding, it is pertinent to peruse
Para 2.15 of the Accord, “The proposals negotiated between India and Sri Lanka from
4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986 are deemed to be part of the Accord. Residual matters
not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and
Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this agreement. These proposals
are also conditional to the Government of India co-operating directly with the
Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.”
This
is one of the most interesting provision of the Accord, generally not seen in
geopolitical agreements. It acknowledges written exchanges of previous
diplomatic attempts between the two countries to resolve the issues at hand. It
also hints at failure to come to a common understanding on some of the more
contentious issues. It also underlines the probability of a break in further
negotiations between the two countries, which may have led India to harden its
stand and consider a more forceful unilateral intervention.
Mobilisation
of specific military formations by India for a probable military intervention
in Sri Lanka on more than one occasion during the mid-80s can be better
understood as an attempt to lend credence to its threat to use of force to
resolve the issue.
Securing the Interests of Sri Lanka
The
Accord preserved the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
All
arms held by militant groups were to be surrendered in accordance with an
agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri
Lanka.
The
confinement of army and other security personnel to barracks was contingent to
surrender of arms by militant groups.
Responsibility
for law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces was to rest with the Sri Lanka government.
Decision
to hold or postpone the referendum on merger/demerger of the Northern and
Eastern Provinces rested with President of Sri Lanka.
The
monitoring committee to oversee conduct of the referendum was to be headed by
the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka, and the two nominated members were to be formally
appointed by the President of Sri Lanka.
India
was enjoined to cooperate and provide military assistance on request to Sri
Lanka for action against militant groups refusing to accept the terms of the
Accord.
Indian
cooperation was obtained to ensure that its territory is not used by militants
opposing the Accord.
India
also guaranteed security and safety of all communities in Northern and Eastern
Provinces.
Thus
we see that Sri Lanka was able to secure its interests in that all actions
pursuant to the Accord were placed in its sovereign jurisprudence, while India
was enjoined to cooperate in its implementation.
Even
Indian military intervention was made subject to request of Sri Lanka.
Meeting Aspirations of Sri Lanka Tamils
The
Accord laid down very significant timelines: -
·
It would come into effect immediately on signing.
·
Hostilities would cease within 48 hours of signing.
·
Surrender of arms by militants and confining of the security
personnel to barracks would be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of
hostilities.
·
Emergency provisions would be lifted in the Eastern and
Northern Provinces by 15 August 1987.
·
There would be upfront provisional merger of the Tamil
predominant Northern and Eastern Provinces into one unitary administrative unit.
·
Elections to merged Provincial Council would be held within
three months (i.e., end October 1987) from signing of the Accord and in any
event before 31st December 1987.
·
Referendum on merger/demerger of North-Eastern Provincial
Council would be held before 31 December 1988.
Such
swift and definite timelines point to the measure of distrust between the
warring parties. It also left little leeway for Sri Lanka to delay the merger
of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and devolving of administrative powers,
thereby assuaging the concerns of the Tamil minority about the sincerity of
approach of Sri Lankan government, and early securing of their key political
interests.
India’s Role as Guarantor of the Accord
The
Accord acknowledged and legitimised India’s role as the guarantor of the Accord.
Sri
Lanka was obligated to invite the presence of Indian
observers for elections to the Provincial Council of the North and East.
India’s
cooperation was requested in the political sphere of rehabilitation process of militant
youth by Government of Sri Lanka, repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees in India
and Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, assuring safety and security of all communities
in Northern and Eastern Provinces, ensuring conditions amenable to conduct of
free and fair elections by Sri Lanka to the North-Eastern Provincial Council
and providing Indian observers for these elections, and in overall
implementation of the Accord.
Militarily
India was requested to provide military assistance on request to Sri Lanka for
action against militant groups refusing to accept the terms of the Accord, and
ensure non-use of its territory by Tamil rebel groups.
Overall
the Accord acknowledged India’s position as the dominant power and adjudicator
of the Accord and ensuring adherence to it by all diverse parties.
India
was able to secure the rights to ensure oversight of the electoral process in
Northern and Eastern Provinces, for conduct of Provincial Council elections and
referendum.
However,
these provisions inter alia also acknowledged use of Indian territory by
militant groups operating against the Sri Lanka state, as also ensured Indian
guarantee to prevent reprisals against non-Tamil communities in Northern and
Eastern Provinces post transfer of governance to Provincial administration.
Curiously
India accepted two provisions that went against its interests: -
Para 2.16.c of the Accord. “In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka
requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement
these proposals the Government of India will cooperate by giving to the
Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.”
Para 6 of Appendix of the Accord. “The President of Sri Lanka and the
Prime Minister of India also agree that in the terms of paragraph 2.14 and
paragraph 2.16(c) of the agreement, an Indian peace keeping contingent may be
invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of
hostilities, if so required.”
From
the standpoint of safeguarding of interests of India, these provisions turned
out to be a fatal flaw, and were used, in the changed political environment in
Colombo, to insist on withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force from Sri
Lanka. What influenced India, the guiding force behind the Accord, to accept
these provisions is a matter of debate.
EVALUATION
Both
Sri Lanka and LTTE, the Tamil rebel group which mattered, were reluctant to
sign the Accord. India’s pushing through
the Accord against resistance from the two interested parties, resulted in the edifice of the Accord
being erected on weak foundations.
The
Indian military was all along prepared for a conventional military intervention
in support of the suffering ethnic Tamil minority community in Sri Lanka. The undue
haste in signing and executing the Accord, did not give adequate time to the Indian
military to plan its response to the changed circumstances of its proposed
deployment.
Even
at home, India was unable to develop a political consensus on military intervention
in Sri Lanka. The political division became even more pronounced once military operations began to disarm the LTTE.
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) troops could sense the sullen hostility
amongst the local population at the mounting base of Chennai, and it had an
adverse psychological impact.
Within the constraints of its own interests, India did negotiate the best possible deal for Sri Lanka Tamils within the framework of Constitution of Sri Lanka. However it failed to secure its own interests by letting the Indian military intervention be incumbent on request of Government of Sri Lanka. It ended up dealing the key ace to the latter.
Faced
with mounting political opposition at home, and increasingly loud pronouncements
from Sri Lanka for withdrawal of IPKF, the Indian state buckled under pressure
and conceded to a premature de-induction of the IPKF from Sri Lanka.
Once
the IPKF was withdrawn from Sri Lanka, India was bereft
of any decisive influence to oversee the implementation of the Accord by the Government
of Sri Lanka.
The
ghost of the political failure to see through to the end its first geopolitical
intervention in Sri Lanka continues to impact Indian policy establishment even in
the present times. India remains hamstrung to adopt a coherent strategy to deal
with the intransigence by Sri Lanka to implement the political solution agreed
upon in the Accord against the backdrop of a more dangerous Chinese
presence in Sri Lanka.
The
lacunae of an institutional set up to formulate Out of Area military intervention
was never clearer.
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APPENDIX
THE INDO –
SRI LANKA ACCORD, COLOMBO 29 JULY 1987
The
President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Mr
JR Jayewardene, and the Prime Minister of The Republic of India, His Excellency
Mr Rajiv Gandhi, having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987.
Attaching
utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional
friendship of Sri Lanka and India, and acknowledging the imperative need of
resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for
the safety, wellbeing and prosperity of people belonging to all communities of
Sri Lanka.
Have
this day entered into the following agreement to fulfill this objective
1.
In this context,
1.1
Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka:
1.2
Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a 'multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural
society'' consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and
Burghers:
1.3
Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic
identity which has to be carefully nurtured:
1.4
Also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of
historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all
times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups:
1.5
Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its
character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi- religious plural society,
in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and
fulfill their aspirations:
2.
Resolve that:
2.1
Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining provinces to
join to form one administrative unit and also by a Referendum to separate as
may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:
2.2
During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e. from the
date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.8 to
the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3), the Northern and Eastern
Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one
elected provincial council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief
Minister and one Board of Ministers.
2.3
There will be a Referendum on or before 31st December 1988 to enable the people
of the Eastern Province to decide whether:
a)
The Eastern Province should remain linked with the Northern Province as one
administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the Northern
Province as specified in para 2.2 or:
b)
The Eastern province should constitute a separate administrative unit having
its own distinct provincial council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister
and Board of Ministers. The president may, at his discretion, decide to postpone
such a referendum.
2.4
All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence or other reasons
will have the right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to
enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created.
2.5
The Referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief
Justice, a member appointed by the President, nominated by the Government of
Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by the president, nominated by the
representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the Eastern Province.
2.6
A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the Referendum.
2.7
Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the
country, will be allowed before the Referendum.
2.8
Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in
any event before 31st December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for
elections to the Provincial Council of the north and east.
2.9
The emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by Aug. 15,
1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the island
within 48 hours of signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by
militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to
authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the
cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the army
and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25 May
1987. The process of surrendering arms and the confining of security personnel
moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of
hostilities coming into effect.
2.10 The Government of Sri Lanka will utilise
for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern
and Eastern Provinces the same organisations and mechanisms of Government as
are used in the rest of the country.
2.11
The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other
prisoners now held in custody under The Prevention of Terrorism Act and other
emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged
and/or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make
special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them
back into the mainstream of national life. India will co-operate in the
process.
2.12
The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and
expect all others to do likewise.
2.13
If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the Government of Sri Lanka
will implement the relevant proposals forthwith.
2.14
The Government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and
co-operate in the implementation of these proposals.
2.16
These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the
following actions if any militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept
this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely,
a)
India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used
for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka
b)
The Indian navy/coast guard will cooperate with the Sri Lankan navy in
preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
d)
The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian
citizens to India who are resident here, concurrently with the repatriation of
Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
e)
The Governments of Sri Lanka and India will co-operate in ensuring the physical
security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern
Provinces.
2.17
The government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of
voters from all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in electoral
processes envisaged in this agreement. The Government of India will extend full
co-operation to the Government of Sri Lanka in this regard.
2.18
The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will
also be official languages.
3.
This agreement and the annexure thereto shall come into force upon signature.
In
witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto.
Done
in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twenty-ninth day of July of the year one
thousand nine hundred and eighty seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally
authentic.
Junius
Richard Jayewardene President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Rajiv
Gandhi Prime Minister of the Republic of India
Annexure 1.
1.
His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree
that the Referendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its subparagraphs of the
agreement will be observed by a representative of the Election Commission of
India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.
2.
Similarly, both heads of Government agree that the elections to the provincial
council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the agreement will be observed and all
para-military personnel will be withdrawn from the eastern and northern
provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the
council.
3.
The President, in his discretion shall absorb such para-military forces, which
came into being due to ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri
Lanka.
4.
The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the Tamil
militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be
designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the
presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the
Indian Red Cross.
5.
The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that a joint
Indo-Sri Lankan observer group consisting of qualified representatives of the
Government of Sri Lanka and the Government of India would monitor the cessation
of hostilities from 31 July 1987.
6.
The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India also agree that in
the terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(c) of the agreement, an Indian
peace keeping contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to
guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.
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