VIGNETTES FROM THE MECHANISED INFANTRY

THE MECHANISED WARFARE FILES – 1

 

ADOPTING DISRUPTIVE STRATEGY TO COUNTERVAIL CHINA

 

 “Capacity building for implementing a disruptive strategy is the surest way to deter China from adopting a coercive geopolitical path.”

 

GENERAL

China has set for itself the most audacious vision of establishing a China centric geopolitical, economic, banking, and commerce world order by the end of the coming decade. The chosen route to achieve this goal is by gaining lead in advanced technologies, and their disruptive use to decouple the international banking and commerce system from the US Dollar.

The rise of a resurgent India is looked at as a major stumbling block by China to realise its world vision. Its coercive deployment of armed forces in northern Laddakh in May 2020 to overawe and deter India from emerging as a regional challenger in Asia has not met with success. This has forced China to revise its national strategy to employ the full spectrum of its Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to pose a two front war threat, in conjunction with Pakistan, to neutralise India.

In the strategic community there is consensus that the only way to dissuade China is willingness to employ force and dialogue from a position of strength. But India is currently ill-positioned in terms of availability of resources to successfully combat the enhanced threat from China-Pakistan combine.


DISRUPTIVE STRATEGY


“When push comes to a shove, adopting an unpredicted response is likely to beget highest dividend to faceoff China.”

 

Backdrop

In general, both China and Pakistan have been employing disruptive strategy to wear down India.

China has successfully employed the policy of nibbling encroachment across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), surreptitious support to insurgencies in India’s north east provinces, and propping up a nuclear armed Pakistan to tie down India.

Pakistan too has taken recourse to fuel cross-border insurgency in Punjab, and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) provinces of India. The most daring employment of disruptive strategy by Pakistan was in 1987, during ‘Exercise Brasstacks’. Faced with the daunting deployment of two strike corps by India in general area of Thar Desert, Pakistan moved its Army Reserve South (ARS) northwards opposite Punjab. The repositioning of the ARS clearly signaled their intent to accept major territorial losses in the desert against deep gains to be made in the heartland of Punjab. This disrupted India’s planned strategy as it was forced to redeploy its strike elements.

India’s propounding of the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine in the event of an outbreak of hostilities with Pakistan was the first nebulous step towards adopting a disruptive strategy. But it has remained a doctrinaire push only as it was never tested in operations. In the recent past India has attempted clinical trials, so to say, in implementation of disruptive strategy by launching publicised trans-Line of Control (LC) strikes against Pakistan, and occupying dominating heights in northern Laddakh against numerically superior Chinese armed forces in the field.


Geopolitical Options

Geopolitically India has a wide array of choices for exercising disruptive strategy to engage China.

On the Quad Alliance the options which can be explored range from greater military cooperation and integration to formalise the Alliance as a defense pact on the lines of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Where Taiwan is concerned, the envisaged options may range from military cooperation to recognising it as an independent state.

Providing greater freedom of action to the Tibet Government-in-exile to granting diplomatic recognition are options with major geopolitical impact.

All or a combination of the listed options can be exercised at one go as one basket or as graduated response over a period of time.

The strongest impact is likely to come where each Chinese act of belligerence is penalised by exercising one of the geopolitical options in a calibrated manner. This will impose major caution on Chinese state.

 

Military Options

On the military front too there are broad choices of disruptive strategy. However, paucity of resources and historical penchant to avoid executing any proactive offensive strategy against China precludes discussing them at this juncture.

China does hold a qualitative and quantitative edge in strategic weapons. It also has superior battlefield support infrastructure along the Laddakh-Tibet border, thereby possessing the ability to mobilise troops in a comparatively faster time frame. It also possesses greater staying power in the event of long drawn out hostilities, owing to availability of additional reserve formations and advantage of indigenous manufacturing of war fighting resources.

Nevertheless following factors possess considerable weightage at operational and tactical level when discussing battlefield disruptive strategy against China:-

-          India has achieved near parity in frontline deployability of troops.

-          China’s military hierarchy is hampered in reacting to unforeseen situations and rapidly changing battlefield scenarios due to limitations imposed by traditional subservience to political paramountcy, from highest echelons down to unit level.

-          Chinese troops tend to buckle under pressure when confronted by battle hardened opponents.

Considering the discussed factors, the best way out for employing disruptive strategy against China, on the military front, is by shifting the battlefield center of gravity from that planned by China.



    

AIRBORNE MECHANISED INFANTRY BATTALION (AMIB) BATTLEGROUP

 

 Shifting the battlefield center of gravity is the best way forward to unbalance China’s rigid political dominated conformist military hierarchy, shrink their decision-action matrix and establish psychological dominance essential to prevail over a larger force.”

 

Airhead

Establishing an Airhead in operational depth by employing adequate resources is one of the more audacious execution of disruptive strategy at operational level, and likely to deliver optimum results. The shock and awe of such an audacious operation is likely to paralyse the decision-action matrix of China’s rigid military hierarchy as well as achieve psychological dominance over their rank and file even before the battle is joined.

At one stroke it shifts the center of gravity of the battlefield from the linear front to operational depth. 


Broad Concept of the Airhead Operation

The Objective - Should be an existing airfield or area amenable for use as a landing ground, such as suitable stretch of a highway. It should be easily defensible and enable swift use for landing of follow through aircrafts for expanding the operations and be vital to invite enemy reaction.

Force Composition - Initial force may comprise a Para Battalion and an AMIB Battlegroup comprising light Armour, UAVs, Artillery, Air Defense, and Electromagnetic spectrum support. In a choice between a Para Brigade or Para Brigade minus vis-à-vis an AMIB Battlegroup, the latter has the obvious military advantage of greater staying power, mobility and flexibility of deployment in post landing offensive deployment.

Outline Plan of Battle - Establishment of an Airhead by an AMIB Battlegroup will invite strong reaction from enemy as mechanised forces invariably gravitate to the point of decision. Simultaneous operational airdrop of Para and AMIB Battlegroup is to be planned to capture the objective. Thereafter Para Battalion should be employed for defense of the objective, while the AMIB Battlegroup will establish pivots to destroy attacking mechanised forces in pre-selected killing zones. Long range rocket force artillery, UAVs, and air effort should be employed to support the operations. The seized airstrip will be utilised to land additional resources.

Strategic Options - The very presence of an AMIB Battlegroup poses a decision dilemma, for China as well as Pakistan, in an extensively wide ranging operational arc. It has inherent potential to capture/threaten Gwadar port in conjunction with maritime beachhead operations along Makran coastline, carry out interdiction of arterial communication in POJK, capture Skardu Airfield in conjunction with ground offensive, and in Tibet interdict strategic road communications, seize and hold advance airfields, seize and deny critical surface communication bottlenecks.

Miscellaneous Aspects - That the country currently lacks the resources to conceive and launch such audacious operation is not the point at hand. With current force comparatives it indeed would be deemed to be foolhardy. However, here it is the geopolitical signaling which will matter and equally important the opponent forces which will be tied down to counter this threat at multiple areas.

In the first phase, a unit just needs to be redesignated as an ‘AMIB’. No major resources are required other than for training and maintenance.  This will be adequate enough to get the alarm bells ringing in the geopolitical neighbourhood.

We have precedence for such redesignations, 54 Air Assault Division of the 1980’s, and the ‘Mountain Strike Corps’ in the present time which is in limbo for nearly a decade.

As and when resources are available additional elements can be integrated to upgrade it to an AMIB Battlegroup.


A Ready Made Option

The vaunted 12 MECH INF (PARA-MAHAR) is undoubtedly the most versatile Battalion of the Indian Army. Raised as a Parachute Battalion, converted to an Infantry Battalion, and now a Mechanised Infantry Battalion, it carries with it the élan of the paratroopers, the obduracy of the infantry, and the mental mobility of a mechanised force which is most comfortable with an ambiguous battlefield environment.

Its capacity to conceive and undertake audacious operations can be gauged by it successfully pushing for acceptance of an operational option for employment of mechanised forces to conduct offensive operations during monsoons in the riverine terrain obtaining in Punjab. The plan went against conventional military wisdom and operational advice of the holding formation. Nevertheless, field trials coupled with war gaming of the option demonstrated it as a highly practical option and adopted for implementation.

It has pioneered the heavy drop of light armoured vehicles, and has held the privilege to simultaneously maintain a mechanised infantry company, with its full complement of equipment, in an airborne/heavy drop role while also specialising for undertaking offensive operations in riverine terrain.  With a high altitude operational tenure as a mechanised infantry battalion under its belt, it is tailor made to be transformed as an AMIB at short notice, and be the nucleus of AMIB Battlegroup encompassing light Armour, UAV, Electromagnetic Spectrum Support, Integral Artillery and Air Defence resources.

Incidentally, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has been practicing drop of light armoured vehicles during combat exercises in high altitude plains of Tibet.  

 

“Modern armies training to fight the last war are destined to lose; they have to train to anticipate and simulate future warfare dimensions to win wars of the future.”

 

Comments

  1. Specialised Units are always a force multiplier. Their explicit employment will of course be based on ground opportunities and boldness of commanders. With growing capabilities within our armed forces it does call for such 'out of the box' ideas. But why restrict the capability to an airborne role only, airborne role combined with sea landing ops role, especially given the versatility of the equipment being an amphibian, air transportable and apt for air landing ops too.

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    Replies
    1. Thank you Eda for sharing your thoughts. An airborne trained component can undertake amphibian operations at short notice, as floatation training is inherent to mechanised infantry. The current equipment is capable of taking on sea state two conditions.

      Airborne operations requires troops psychologically ready for jumps, which is not universal and needs continuous monitoring and training.
      Thank you

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    2. Dear Col Rakesh,
      An extremely well written paper.Heartiest Congratulations.
      A disruptive policy is the best defence against the Chinese, Galwan Valley and Kailash Range heights operations by the Indian Army have already proved that.
      We currently lack the resources to mount such an operation. But yes as a threat in being, it's an excellent idea.
      It would be ideal to have 12 MECH reorganised into an Airborne Mech Inf Bn - AMIB. If done they will be employed in conjunction with Para Bns under the Para Bde. Earlier in early 90s our Bn had a Mech Pl/Coy with the Para Bde.
      Getting the AB role for the whole Bn again will be just too great. Personally I would be extremely happy and delighted if such a role comes to our Unit to operate along with the Paras.
      I have also gone through your Read more articles along with the main article. All very well written.
      Once again thank you for this brilliant article.
      Regards.
      Yours sincerely,
      Lt Col P N Tembe

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    3. Dear Col Tembe, thank you for sharing your thoughts on the subject and validating the idea in principle based on your professional experience.
      Thank you and best wishes

      Delete

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