VIGNETTES FROM THE MECHANISED INFANTRY
THE MECHANISED WARFARE FILES – 1
ADOPTING DISRUPTIVE STRATEGY TO COUNTERVAIL CHINA
“Capacity building for implementing a
disruptive strategy is the surest way to deter China from adopting a coercive
geopolitical path.”
GENERAL
China has
set for itself the most audacious vision of establishing a China centric
geopolitical, economic, banking, and commerce world order by the end of the coming decade. The chosen route to achieve this
goal is by gaining lead in advanced technologies, and their disruptive use to
decouple the international banking and commerce system from the US Dollar.
The rise of
a resurgent India is looked at as a major stumbling block by China to realise
its world vision. Its coercive deployment of armed forces in northern Laddakh
in May 2020 to overawe and deter India from emerging
as a regional challenger in Asia has not met with success. This has forced China to revise its national
strategy to employ the full spectrum of its Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to
pose a two front war threat, in conjunction with Pakistan, to neutralise India.
In the strategic community there is consensus
that the only way to dissuade China is willingness to employ force and dialogue
from a position of strength. But India is currently ill-positioned in terms of
availability of resources to successfully combat the enhanced threat from
China-Pakistan combine.
DISRUPTIVE STRATEGY
“When push comes to a shove, adopting
an unpredicted response is likely to beget highest dividend to faceoff China.”
Backdrop
In general, both China and Pakistan
have been employing disruptive strategy to wear down India.
China has successfully employed the
policy of nibbling encroachment across the Line of Actual Control (LAC),
surreptitious support to insurgencies in India’s north east provinces, and
propping up a nuclear armed Pakistan to tie down India.
Pakistan too has taken recourse to
fuel cross-border insurgency in Punjab, and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)
provinces of India. The most daring employment of disruptive strategy by
Pakistan was in 1987, during ‘Exercise Brasstacks’. Faced with the daunting
deployment of two strike corps by India in general area of Thar Desert,
Pakistan moved its Army Reserve South (ARS) northwards opposite Punjab. The
repositioning of the ARS clearly signaled their intent to accept major
territorial losses in the desert against deep gains to be made in the heartland
of Punjab. This disrupted India’s planned strategy as it was forced to redeploy
its strike elements.
India’s propounding of the ‘Cold
Start’ doctrine in the event of an outbreak of hostilities with Pakistan was
the first nebulous step towards adopting a disruptive strategy. But it has
remained a doctrinaire push only as it was never tested in operations. In the
recent past India has attempted clinical trials, so to say, in implementation
of disruptive strategy by launching publicised trans-Line of Control (LC)
strikes against Pakistan, and occupying dominating heights in northern Laddakh
against numerically superior Chinese armed forces in the field.
Geopolitical Options
Geopolitically India has a wide array
of choices for exercising disruptive strategy to engage China.
On the Quad Alliance the options which
can be explored range from greater military cooperation and integration to
formalise the Alliance as a defense pact on the lines of North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO).
Where Taiwan is concerned, the
envisaged options may range from military cooperation to recognising it as an
independent state.
Providing greater freedom of action to
the Tibet Government-in-exile to granting diplomatic recognition are options
with major geopolitical impact.
All or a combination of the listed options
can be exercised at one go as one basket or as graduated response over a period
of time.
The strongest impact is likely to come
where each Chinese act of belligerence is penalised by exercising one of the
geopolitical options in a calibrated manner. This will impose major caution on
Chinese state.
Military Options
On the military front too there are
broad choices of disruptive strategy. However, paucity of resources and
historical penchant to avoid executing any proactive
offensive strategy against China precludes discussing them at this juncture.
China does hold a qualitative and
quantitative edge in strategic weapons. It also has superior battlefield
support infrastructure along the Laddakh-Tibet border, thereby possessing the
ability to mobilise troops in a comparatively faster time frame. It also
possesses greater staying power in the event of long drawn out hostilities,
owing to availability of additional reserve formations and advantage of
indigenous manufacturing of war fighting resources.
Nevertheless following factors possess
considerable weightage at operational and tactical level when discussing
battlefield disruptive strategy against China:-
-
India has
achieved near parity in frontline deployability of troops.
-
China’s military hierarchy
is hampered in reacting to unforeseen situations and rapidly changing
battlefield scenarios due to limitations imposed by traditional subservience to
political paramountcy, from highest echelons down to unit level.
-
Chinese troops
tend to buckle under pressure when confronted by battle hardened opponents.
Considering the discussed factors, the best way out for
employing disruptive strategy against China, on the military front, is by
shifting the battlefield center of gravity from that planned by China.
AIRBORNE MECHANISED INFANTRY BATTALION (AMIB) BATTLEGROUP
“Shifting the battlefield center of gravity is the best
way forward to unbalance China’s rigid political dominated
conformist military hierarchy, shrink their decision-action matrix and establish
psychological dominance essential to prevail over a larger force.”
Airhead
Establishing an Airhead in operational depth by
employing adequate resources is one of the more audacious execution of
disruptive strategy at operational level, and likely to deliver optimum
results. The shock and awe of such an audacious operation is likely to paralyse
the decision-action matrix of China’s rigid military hierarchy as well as
achieve psychological dominance over their rank and file even before the battle
is joined.
At one stroke it shifts the center of gravity of the
battlefield from the linear front to operational depth.
Broad Concept of the Airhead Operation
The Objective - Should be an existing
airfield or area amenable for use as a landing ground, such as suitable stretch
of a highway. It should be easily defensible and enable swift use for landing
of follow through aircrafts for expanding the operations and be vital to invite
enemy reaction.
Force Composition - Initial force may
comprise a Para Battalion and an AMIB Battlegroup comprising light Armour,
UAVs, Artillery, Air Defense, and Electromagnetic spectrum support. In a choice
between a Para Brigade or Para Brigade minus vis-à-vis an AMIB Battlegroup, the
latter has the obvious military advantage of greater staying power, mobility
and flexibility of deployment in post landing offensive deployment.
Outline Plan of Battle - Establishment of
an Airhead by an AMIB Battlegroup will invite strong reaction from enemy as
mechanised forces invariably gravitate to the point of decision. Simultaneous
operational airdrop of Para and AMIB Battlegroup is to be planned to capture
the objective. Thereafter Para Battalion should be employed for defense of the
objective, while the AMIB Battlegroup will establish pivots to destroy
attacking mechanised forces in pre-selected killing zones. Long range rocket
force artillery, UAVs, and air effort should be employed to support the
operations. The seized airstrip will be utilised to land additional resources.
Strategic Options - The very presence
of an AMIB Battlegroup poses a decision dilemma, for China as well as Pakistan,
in an extensively wide ranging operational arc. It has inherent potential to
capture/threaten Gwadar port in conjunction with maritime beachhead operations
along Makran coastline, carry out interdiction of arterial communication in
POJK, capture Skardu Airfield in conjunction with ground offensive, and in
Tibet interdict strategic road communications, seize and hold advance airfields,
seize and deny critical surface communication bottlenecks.
Miscellaneous Aspects - That the country currently lacks the resources to conceive
and launch such audacious operation is not the point at hand. With current
force comparatives it indeed would be deemed to be foolhardy. However, here it
is the geopolitical signaling which will matter and equally important the
opponent forces which will be tied down to counter this threat at multiple
areas.
In the first
phase, a unit just needs to be redesignated as an ‘AMIB’. No major resources
are required other than for training and maintenance. This will be adequate enough to get the alarm
bells ringing in the geopolitical neighbourhood.
We have
precedence for such redesignations, 54 Air Assault Division of the 1980’s, and
the ‘Mountain Strike Corps’ in the present time which is in limbo for nearly a
decade.
As and when
resources are available additional elements can be integrated to upgrade it to
an AMIB Battlegroup.
A Ready Made Option
The vaunted 12 MECH INF (PARA-MAHAR) is undoubtedly the
most versatile Battalion of the Indian Army. Raised as a Parachute Battalion,
converted to an Infantry Battalion, and now a Mechanised Infantry Battalion, it
carries with it the élan of the paratroopers, the obduracy of the infantry, and
the mental mobility of a mechanised force which is most comfortable with an
ambiguous battlefield environment.
Its capacity to conceive and undertake audacious
operations can be gauged by it successfully pushing for acceptance of an
operational option for employment of mechanised forces to conduct offensive
operations during monsoons in the riverine terrain obtaining in Punjab. The
plan went against conventional military wisdom and operational advice of the
holding formation. Nevertheless, field trials coupled with war gaming of the
option demonstrated it as a highly practical option and adopted for
implementation.
It has pioneered the heavy drop of light armoured
vehicles, and has held the privilege to simultaneously maintain a mechanised
infantry company, with its full complement of equipment, in an airborne/heavy
drop role while also specialising for undertaking offensive operations in
riverine terrain. With a high altitude
operational tenure as a mechanised infantry battalion under its belt, it is tailor
made to be transformed as an AMIB at short notice, and be the nucleus of AMIB Battlegroup
encompassing light Armour, UAV, Electromagnetic Spectrum Support, Integral
Artillery and Air Defence resources.
Incidentally, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has
been practicing drop of light armoured vehicles during combat exercises in
high altitude plains of Tibet.
“Modern armies training to fight the
last war are destined to lose; they have to train to anticipate and simulate
future warfare dimensions to win wars of the future.”
Specialised Units are always a force multiplier. Their explicit employment will of course be based on ground opportunities and boldness of commanders. With growing capabilities within our armed forces it does call for such 'out of the box' ideas. But why restrict the capability to an airborne role only, airborne role combined with sea landing ops role, especially given the versatility of the equipment being an amphibian, air transportable and apt for air landing ops too.
ReplyDeleteThank you Eda for sharing your thoughts. An airborne trained component can undertake amphibian operations at short notice, as floatation training is inherent to mechanised infantry. The current equipment is capable of taking on sea state two conditions.
DeleteAirborne operations requires troops psychologically ready for jumps, which is not universal and needs continuous monitoring and training.
Thank you
Dear Col Rakesh,
DeleteAn extremely well written paper.Heartiest Congratulations.
A disruptive policy is the best defence against the Chinese, Galwan Valley and Kailash Range heights operations by the Indian Army have already proved that.
We currently lack the resources to mount such an operation. But yes as a threat in being, it's an excellent idea.
It would be ideal to have 12 MECH reorganised into an Airborne Mech Inf Bn - AMIB. If done they will be employed in conjunction with Para Bns under the Para Bde. Earlier in early 90s our Bn had a Mech Pl/Coy with the Para Bde.
Getting the AB role for the whole Bn again will be just too great. Personally I would be extremely happy and delighted if such a role comes to our Unit to operate along with the Paras.
I have also gone through your Read more articles along with the main article. All very well written.
Once again thank you for this brilliant article.
Regards.
Yours sincerely,
Lt Col P N Tembe
Dear Col Tembe, thank you for sharing your thoughts on the subject and validating the idea in principle based on your professional experience.
DeleteThank you and best wishes