VIGNETTES FROM THE MECHANISED INFANTRY

REGIMENTAL FILES – 1

 

MECHANISED INFANTRY IN ‘OPERATION PAWAN’ IN SRI LANKA

Backdrop

The first interesting facet of Sri Lanka demography is that the dominant Sinhala ethnic group comprising just fewer than 75% of the population, and the largest ethnic minority the Tamils comprising 18% of the population, have both migrated from India over the centuries. Around 5% of the current Tamil population was initially brought in by the British colonialists in the 19^th century to work as indentured labour on the plantations, and is deemed to be stateless. The second feature is the Buddhist religion professed by the majority Sinhala and Hinduism practiced by the minority Tamils have also originated from India. Nevertheless, the Sinhala have over time developed their own culture and proud identity, whereas the Tamils have continued to maintain affinity with their ethnic counterparts in South India.

Out of the nine provinces of Sri Lanka, the Tamils are in overwhelming majority in Northern Province, comprising Jaffna peninsula, Mullaitivu forest region, Vavuniya region, and Mannar peninsula. In Eastern Province, comprising Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Amparai regions, the Tamils are the largest ethnic group, closely followed by the Sinhalese. Here the ethnic chasm gets further sub-divided into the religious rift of Hindu and Muslim Tamils, Muslim Moors, Buddhist and Christian Sinhala.

Sinhala chauvinism resulted in widespread government discrimination against the ethnic Tamil population fueling Tamil insurgency by multiple rebel groups, namely Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), People’s Liberation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), and Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). These groups also engaged in fratricidal feuds for supremacy. Subsequently LTTE emerged as the dominant group and was able to establish a mass support base within the Tamil population. The avowed aim of LTTE was to establish an independent Tamil state in Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka security forces retaliated ruthlessly, leading to large scale destruction of property and large scale internment of Tamil population in refugee camps. Continued repressive action led to flow of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees into Tamil Nadu province of India, generating pressure on the Indian government to intervene.  

Diplomatic endeavours by India failed to break the gridlock with the Sri Lanka government. Continued flow of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka, internal dynamics of Tamil Nadu politics, and its own national security interests impelled the Government of India to deploy its armed might in Sri Lanka to end repression of Sri Lanka Tamils.

Indo Sri Lanka Peace Keeping Accord July 1987

Consequent to government directive, the Army Headquarters mobilised 54 Infantry Division, located at Secunderabad, and additional formations for military intervention in Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. 15 MECH INF, ex-31 Armoured Division located at Jhansi, was also mobilised and moved to Secunderabad for impending operations. Parachute Battalion ex-50 (I) Parachute Brigade was also placed on alert for the planned military action.

Confronted with the strong Indian resolve, and already under acute military pressure from a raging Sinhala insurgency movement in its South and the Tamil insurgency in the North of the country, Sri Lanka relented and reluctantly entered into the Indo Sri Lanka Peace Keeping accord of 29 July 1987. The LTTE was reluctant to support the accord and had to be arm-twisted by Indian government to acquiesce to it. As per the terms of the accord Sri Lanka would amend its constitution to create an autonomous integrated North East Province, end discrimination of Tamil minority, return its troops deployed in these provinces to barracks and accept an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Northern and Eastern Provinces till conditions favourable for return of the Tamil refugees have been established and Sri Lanka fulfills the terms of the accord. India on its part was to ensure disarming of the Tamil rebel groups and act as a guarantor for actions of both the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil groups.

‘Operation PAWAN’ July 1987 to March 1990

The signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord changed the complexion of the impending Indian military intervention to a peacekeeping operation. The very day of the accord, formations and units of 54 Infantry Division commenced induction into the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Division Headquarters along with 47 and 91 Infantry Brigades inducted into Jaffna peninsula by amphibious landings at Kankesanthurai jetty and air transported operations at Palaly airfield.

15 MECH INF less two companies was air transported to Palaly airfield, and a second Mechanised Infantry Company conducted amphibious landings at Kankesanthurai harbour.

76 Infantry Brigade along with the third Mechanised Infantry Company were transported by Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) and merchant shipping to Trincomalee harbour and deployed along the complete stretch of the Eastern Province from Trincomalee to Batticaloa, and further South to Akkaraipattu, Amparai and Pottuvil.

The rifle-butting of the visiting Indian Prime Minister at Colombo airfield by a naval soldier part of the Guard of Honour was an open indicator that the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was not acceptable to a large component of the Sri Lanka society. An uneasy equation prevailed between the IPKF and the Sri Lankan security forces, as the military hierarchy of the two armies interacted on the modus operandi of implementing the peace keeping operations in IPKF mandated areas of Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. During this interregnum the troops were strictly confined to camps except for logistic s movement. This unfairly denied terrain familiarisation to the combat troops, critical for conduct of military operations. Coupled with a total void in military terrain maps of the area it would seriously impede the conduct of initial stages of subsequent military operations.

The first serious threat which could have led to a potential unraveling of the accord occurred with the outbreak of ethno-religious riots in August 1987 in Trincomalee town. IPKF combat presence in Trincomalee was inadequate to contain the riots. The Deputy General Officer Commanding of the 54 Infantry Division and 15 MECH INF Battalion Headquarters were moved post haste to Trincomalee to establish an ad-hoc Sector Headquarter and control the ethnic strife. Using these riots as cover Sri Lanka attempted to push through additional troops from Colombo to Trincomalee. Having been forewarned, the Mechanised Infantry established a swift roadblock to intercept the Sri Lanka infantry reinforcements from entering Eastern Province. The situation was handled with finesse and an awkward threat to the accord was negated.

By end September it was clear that the LTTE and the other Tamil militant groups were playing truant in surrendering their full cache of weapons and military equipment.

In beginning of October 1987, the capture of 17 senior LTTE commanders in Jaffna by Sri Lanka security forces and their subsequent suicide while in Sri Lanka custody was used by the LTTE to withdraw from the accord. The resumption of military action by the LTTE forced the IPKF to commence military operations against the rebel organisation.

The changed operational scenario caused the Army Headquarters to augment the IPKF to four infantry divisions. By March 1988, 54 Infantry Division was conducting operations in Jaffna peninsula, 4 Infantry Division was deployed in the Vavuniya sector, 36 Infantry Division was operating in Trincomalee sector, and 57 Mountain Division was deployed in Batticaloa sector. Two Special Forces battalions and enhanced air and naval resources were also deployed to support IPKF operations.

Deployment of Mechanised Infantry

Initially 15 MECH INF was the sole mechanised infantry unit deployed in ‘Operation PAWAN’ with Battalion less one Company deployed in Jaffna peninsula and Mechanised Infantry Company deployed in Batticaloa sector in support of 76 Infantry Brigade. As the tempo of operations increased additional mechanised infantry units were inducted.

At peak of ‘Operation PAWAN’ 15 MECH INF, 13 MECH INF, and Coy ex-17 MECH INF (Recce & Support) were deployed in Sri Lanka, along with 65 ARMD REGT, in mixed combat groupings.

Combat Group 15 MECH INF with an armoured squadron was deployed in Vavuniya and Jaffna sectors. One Mechanised Infantry Company was deployed with 54 Infantry division in Jaffna sector, another Mechanised Infantry Company was deployed in Mankulam and Mullaitivu jungles for support of infantry operations. Remainder Combat Group was deployed at Vavuniya.

Combat Group 13 MECH INF with an armoured squadron was deployed in Trincomalee sector and had shed a mechanised infantry company to 65 ARMD REGT deployed at Batticaloa.

Combat Group 65 ARMD REGT, comprising an armoured squadron and a mechanised infantry company was deployed in Batticaloa sector.

Tactical Headquarter of 2 Armoured Brigade was moved to Chennai to meet additional operational contingencies. Recce & Support Company ex- 17 MECH INF was de-inducted from ‘Operation PAWAN’.

Review of Mechanised Infantry Operations

The deployment was designated as a peacekeeping operation, in a foreign country having an established governance organisation, an effective security infrastructure and yet rife with ethnic, linguistic and communal fervor. There were no set opponents, precedents and rules to go by. Exigencies of international norms and conventions, undertakings given and taken as part of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, national interests, unspoken affinity towards the underdog Tamil minority, unit loyalty, own ethics, and intra arms rivalry only tended to further muddy any attempts at seeking operational clarity at grass roots level. Relative combat inexperience, complete lack of prior geographical terrain knowledge, little or no information to conduct own ‘SWOT’ analysis only added to the prevailing uncertainties of the ground situation.

The terrain of deployment was highly varied, ranging from densely populated built up areas, thickly forested jungles, large lagoons, open sea coasts, to semi-marshlands. The lines of communication were extended, narrow and open to interference by insurgents, impelling recourse to aerial maintenance.

Prior to induction for operations in Sri Lanka, the mechanised infantry battalions were orbatted with strike formation where training is organized for conventional offensive operations as per formation training directive. Counter-insurgency operations were not the assigned operational task for the units. Additionally, the impending operations were to be conducted against regular forces and to safeguard interests of the discriminated minority Tamil population. At no stage were the units tasked for special operations training by Military Operations Directorate/ parent formation.

It is imperative to understand the above course of events of induction of mechanised infantry battalions into Sri Lanka to realise the suddenness in change of operational plans and consequent implementation of contingencies which had not been taken into consideration. Overnight the entire complexion of operations had changed from an offensive to a peace keeping operation with no time for detailed planning, preparations, coordination, liaison and briefings. Conduct of counter-insurgency operations came about only after three months of deployment in ‘Operation PAWAN’ owing to the sudden change of national aim.

The tasks assigned and executed by the mechanised infantry were as varied and contradictory as could be possible. Escorting the militants and then fighting them; collaborating with lodger Government security forces and then holding them at bay; conducting counter insurgency operations while deployed in penny packets and yet maintain conventional dissuasive posture to deter lodger Government security forces from interference in IPKF mandated areas. Combat Teams and Squads were variously assigned on tasks of bolstering defensive layout of infantry units and formation headquarters, leading infantry advance for clearance of road axis, capture of built up areas, show of force, area domination, axis control/denial, road opening, convoy protection, escorting VIP movement, mounted and dismounted patrols, lay ambush, establish road blocks, conduct lagoon patrols, defence of airfields and helidromes, liaison with foreign security forces, riot control operations et al.

The key deduction from the deployment pattern of the mechanised infantry and armour is that their primary task was to safeguard against the probability of surprise interference in IPKF mandate by lodger government security forces. This interference could flow from a planned strategy at higher level, or outcome of rebellious action at lower formation level, or even actions motivated by dissatisfied elements of their security forces. Thus the primary task of the mechanised infantry was to maintain a dissuasive posture against likely interference by lodger government security forces while also dominating the assigned area of responsibility.

At no stage the mechanised infantry was placed under command of subordinate formations and units. They were assigned for conduct of specific operational tasks or placed in situ to meet operational contingencies. Hence, lack of clarity in channels of command and control often led to avoidable differences of opinion when operating with lower formation headquarters.

Uncertainty about the reactions of the Sri Lanka security forces to the presence of foreign troops on their soil always existed. The swift riposte by Mechanised Infantry to the very first such instance at Trincomalee in August 1987 went a long way in dissuading future attempts to intervene in IPKF mandate. The issue became even more pronounced as the subsequent opposition by the Sri Lanka government to the terms of the accord increased. As part of negotiated de-induction plan, the Sri Lanka security forces were not to move into areas vacated by IPKF till completion of de-induction. Unconventional military operations had to be undertaken in Batticaloa sector, against breach of these terms. Mechanised infantry was successfully kept well poised during the de-induction to ward off any such eventuality.

Primary casualties were suffered by the Mechanised Infantry during the first two weeks of commencement of active operations in Jaffna and Mullaitivu regions. Innovative employment of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by the LTTE group came as a relative surprise resulting in serious casualties in the initial days. However, recourse to well planned anti-IED drills enabled the mechanised infantry to negate their impact. The infantry combat vehicles along with MI-24 attack helicopters and the para-commandos came to be the most feared by the LTTE cadres.

Lack of logistics support also hampered conduct of operations by the mechanised infantry. The infantry formations were simply not geared for logistics support to the mechanised forces. The Battalion Headquarters had their task cut out in maintaining unit cohesiveness, providing logistics support, and maintaining liaison with formations and units deployed across the length and breadth of IPKF mandated areas.

Formation commanders and key staff officers from the Mechanised Infantry Regiment, namely Brig R Loganathan (12 MECH INF) as Commander 24 Mountain Brigade, Brig Samay Ram (9 MECH INF) as Commander 115 Infantry Brigade, and Maj Sunil Datta (12 MECH INF) as Brigade Major of 59 Mountain Brigade, contributed effectively in IPKF operations. Key contributions were also made by other officers of the Mechanised Infantry Regiment, such as by Col VR Vadivelu (10 MECH INF) and Capt AR Samuel (3 MECH INF), in sensitive unconventional advisory and training roles.

15 MECH INF gained singular distinction of being the first unit from Mechanised Infantry Regiment to take part in the first ever overseas operations conducted by the Indian Army under Indian flag post-independence. It is not commonly known that the unit was first placed on standby for operations in Sri Lanka in 1984 before standing down after 48 hrs. The unit was one of the first to induct into Sri Lanka on commencement of ‘Operation PAWAN’ in July 1987, and one of the last to be de-inducted on termination of the operation in March 1990. The intensity of its engagement in the operations may be gauged from its casualties of 23 killed and 34 wounded, while being awarded 1 Vir Chakra, 5 Sena Medals (Gallantry) and 2 Mention-in-Dispatches.

The Mechanised Infantry Battalions were employed beyond their designed role by being deployed in sub units, and even squads, over an extended frontage of approximately 600 kilometer for an extended duration of just under three years. Frequent groupings and regroupings with units and formations, with initial contact being established over radio, were the norm. To come out of such trying battle field deployment with flying colors speaks volume of combat skills, versatility, flexibility and potential inherent in a mechanised infantry soldier.

An Opinion

‘Operation PAWAN’ was the outcome of heady mix and match of policy options propagated by the Prime Minister Office (PMO) based on leading inputs from Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), the Ministry of External affairs (MEA) led by its representative Shri JN Dixit the Indian High Commissioner at Sri Lanka, and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) advised by Gen K Sundarji the Chief of Army Staff. Literally mid-air changes in military operations from military intervention to a peacekeeping role, initially confining the fighting unit to camps on induction, lack of suitable going maps, voids in intelligence gathering, all indicate to ad-hoc policy decisions based on individual preferences rather than a calibrated institutional response.

Withdrawal of LTTE from the accord surprised the Indian security establishment. This is clearly evident from the unplanned nature of rushing in reinforcing formations and units. There were initial setbacks, but by March 1988 the reorganization of the IPKF deployment had been successfully completed and the situation was brought under control.

Well crafted and realistic institutional response for long term solution of the Tamil issue was set into motion and IPKF had regained the upper hand not only in military operations but also in pushing through the political devolution option. These plans take time to mature.

The near simultaneous change in the political situation in Colombo and New Delhi put paid to these plans resulting in the IPKF being prematurely de-inducted. There are two clear cut indicators to assess the veracity of these observations. The first is the success of the IPKF undercover punitive actions against infringing Sri Lanka security deployments in Batticaloa sector during de-induction stage. The second is the rarely spoken and informal alliance between the Shri Premadasa led Sri Lanka government and the LTTE to jointly combat the EPRLF led Tamil alliance after de-induction of IPKF.

The IPKF had started delivering; it was the failure of the Indian strategic establishment at New Delhi which surrendered to regional satraps.